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VOLUME 43 FALL 1966 NUMBER 4
FIELD INTERROGATION: ADMINISTRATIVE,
JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES*
By LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY**
One of the recurring questions in the administration of criminal
justice is the extent of the power of the police to interrogate. Much of
the impetus for concern with this question derives from recent Su-
preme Court decisions which center on in-custody interrogation by
the police. Mr. Tiffany, however, discusses police interrogation
problems in the context of on-the-street stopping and questioning of
suspects who may not be arrested because the police lack sufficient
evidence to arrest. This analysis encompasses the responses of the
police, the courts and the legislatures to field interrogation practices.
Since adequate responses have not been forthcoming to clarify the
ambiguity surrounding the status of field interrogation, the burden
may fall upon the courts to resolve the problem. Such a solution,
Mr. Tiffany feels, may be based on the traditional arrest-or-nothing
approach since police administrative failure to articulate the need for
such practices will result in important considerations failing to reach
the courts and to affect judicial formulation and treatment of the
issues. Clear enunciation of the need for field interrogation and
delineation of the scope of the existing practices may avoid such an
over-simplification of a complex and sensitive area of police practice.
INTRODUCTION
ACOMMON police practice, probably in all localities, is to stop
and question suspects on the street when there are insufficient
grounds to arrest. In addition to detaining and interrogating the sus-
pect, the police may frisk him if they believe, even without specific
grounds, that he may be armed. The stopping and questioning of
persons found under suspicious circumstances, who may not be ar-
rested because of insufficient evidence, is referred to by the police as
*This article is a by-product of the author's participation in the analysis phase of the
American Bar Foundation's Survey of the Administration of Criminal justice in the United
States. The American Bar Foundation study, underwritten by a Ford Foundation grant, is
concerned primarily with isolating and identifying the critical problems in current criminal
justice administration. The Arrest Volume and the Conviction Volume are published.
The complete study, to be published soon, is based upon detailed observation of the actual
practices of police, prosecutors, courts and probation and parole agencies in Kansas, Michi-
gan and Wisconsin. Most of the field information for the Stopping and Questioning part
of the Detection Volume, and for this article, was secured by the author with the coopera-
tion of the Chicago Police Department in 1963-64.
**Assistant Professor of Law and Assistant Dean, University of Denver College of Law.
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field interrogation.' Although this phase of police work has been
treated ambiguously by legislatures, courts and the police themselves,
it seems clear that police consider it an important part of their law
enforcement program.
The failure of police to give adequate attention to the definition
and justification of field interrogation results in part from the fact
that it occurs on the street in the context of closely related police
practices which are designed to prevent the commission of crime
rather than to detect and apprehend offenders for prosecution. These
preventive practices include such programs as crowd control by order-
ing persons to desist from congregating on sidewalks; search and
seizure programs designed to confiscate dangerous weapons in order
to lessen the incidence of serious, assaultive conduct on the streets by
gang members and others; arrest-and-release of drunks and prosti-
tutes without prosecution; and other similar practices.' Inadequate
incentive has existed for the police to undertake systematic analysis
and control of field interrogation practices and to differentiate them
from these preventive practices.
Another reason the police fail to address this problem may be
the lack of judicial and legislative attention to the area. The courts
usually succeed in avoiding the issue. When officers have acquired
evidence of guilt as a result of detention of a suspect on the street,
the admissibility of that evidence is dependent upon the legality of
the police practice which led to the acquisition of the evidence. In
most states, when an officer detains a person on the street for ques-
tioning, the only clearly applicable privilege is the privilege to make
a lawful arrest. As a consequence, the prosecution typically claims
that the evidence was secured as the result of a lawful arrest, and the
defense typically asserts that the grounds for the "arrest" were insuf-
ficient. Whatever is decided, the field interrogation issue is not con-
fronted. As a result, the police remain in doubt about its legality.
The police themselves contribute to this uncertainty since as long as
other ways exist to justify the interference, they do not desire to put
the status of field interrogation in issue - the loss may be not only
that case, but also a desired enforcement practice.
Whether the failure of police to clearly articulate and justify
field interrogation practices results from the failure of the courts and
legislatures to give attention to this issue or is itself responsible for
the judicial and legislative default is not entirely clear. What is clear
is thnt the attention given the problem by the olice, courts and legis-
1 See, e.g., BRISTOW, FIELD INTERROGATION (1958). The practice is also referred to as
"stopping and questioning," "field contact" or "field investigation."
2
TIFFANY, MCINTYRE & ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME (in press).
VOL. 43
FIELD INTERROGATION
latures has not been adequate. The state of California has a highly
developed body of case law relating to field interrogation, and the
practice there has been recognized as proper in numerous opinions!
The California courts, however, are the only ones that have given
sustained attention to the issue.
Generally state legislatures have not been concerned with this
aspect of police practices. Certain important exceptions to this gen-
eral legislative inaction do exist, however. Several states have adopted
the Uniform Arrest Act provisions dealing with field interrogation,4
and the New York legislature has recently enacted a so-called "stop
and frisk" law.' The supporters of the statute clearly have indicated
that it was intended to overrule previous cases which denied the le-
gality of some field interrogation practices in New York.' That stat-
ute is important not only for the practice in New York; its adoption
was widely publicized and the New York court approval of the law
may stimulate similar legislation in other states.7 Additional impetus
was provided early in 1966 with publication of the American Law In-
stitute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure which specifically
confronts the field interrogation issue.'
Thus, the legality of field interrogation practices is becoming of
rapidly increasing concern to those responsible for the administration
of criminal justiceY The United States Supreme Court has spotlighted
police practices in general, and police interrogation practices in par-
3 Many of these cases are collected in MARTIN, PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST AND AD-
MISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE [in California] (1960).
4
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1902-03 (1953) ; N.H. REV. STATS. ANN. §§ 594:2-:3
(1955) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 12-7-1 to-2 (1956).
5 See authorities cited note 9 infra.
6 See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE COMBINED COUNCIL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS,
POLICE PROTECTION - MORE OR LESS?
7 See note 159 infra.
8 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §§ 2.01-.02 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1966). See also 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2641 (May 24, 1966).
9 Much of the impetus for this concern is attributable to the publicity which attended the
passage of the New York "stop and frisk" law, N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a. The
New York Times, for example, carried at least twenty articles concerning that statute
between January 21, 1964, and March 24, 1965. The July 1, 1964, "CBS Evening News
with Walter Cronkite" contained a report on the New York statute. At least two major
periodicals reviewing news and legal developments with broad appeal noticed this
statute. See Kaufman, The Uncertain Criminal Law, The Atlantic Monthly, Jan. 1965,
p. 61 ; Time, May 15, 1964, p. 80.
See also Kuh, Reflections on New York's "Stop-and-Frisk" Law and Its Claimed
Unconstitutionality, 56 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 32 (1965) ; Ronayne, The Right to In-
vestigate and New York's "Stop and Frisk" Law, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 211 (1964);
Siegel, The New York "Frisk" and "Knock-Not" Statutes: Are They Constitutional?,
30 BROOKLYN L. REV. 274 (1964) ; Wolbrette, Detention for Questioning in Louisiana,
39 TUL. L. REV. 69 (1964). See also 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 174 '(1964); Id. at
397; 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 545 (1965); Comment, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 848 (1965) ;
50 CORNELL L.Q. 529 (1965) ; 78 HARV. L. REV. 473 (1964) ; Note, 59 Nw. U.L.
REV. 641 (1964); 10 N.Y.L.F. 410 (1964); Comment, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1093
(1964); 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 392 (1964); 16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 685 (1965);
1965 U. ILL. L.F. 119.
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ticular. 0 These decisions give rise to two questions: 1) whether evi-
dence secured as a result of a field interrogation will be admissible at
subsequent trials and 2) whether field interrogation may be, in some
cases, a workable alternative to in-custody interrogation." Field in-
terrogation is also assuming major importance because it is one type
of on-the-street police practice which involves direct confrontation be-
tween the police and members of minority groups who typically reside
in high crime areas, a problem of current and critical significance."2
The major issues in relation to field interrogation practices are
analyzed in detail in the Detection of Crime Volume of the American
Bar Foundation's series on the Administration of Criminal Justice in
the United States.13 It is the limited purpose of this article to inquire
into the nature of the existing involvement of administrators, courts,
and legislatures in resolving the question of the appropriate response
by the police to the person who arouses police suspicions because of
his conduct or appearance, but who may not be arrested because of
insufficient evidence.
I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE VIEW OF FIELD INTERROGATION
A. Need for Field Interrogation: The Police View
There is little doubt that police administrators view field interro-
gation as an important, perhaps essential, part of their over-all en-
forcement practices. This is evident both from statements made by
high-ranking police officials and from the ubiquity of the practice.
One of the more obvious reasons for utilizing stopping and question-
ing has been stated by Superintendent Wilson of the Chicago Police
Department: "When a policeman encounters someone on the street
10 The implications for field interrogation of the United States Supreme Court's most re-
cent pronouncement regarding interrogation are unclear. In Miranda v. Arizona, 86
Sup. Ct. 1602 (1966), the Court required that arrested persons be adequately advised
of their right to counsel and of their right to remain silent prior to any interrogation of
the suspect. The new rules apply to "custodial interrogation." The Court said: "By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, supra at 1612. It has been argued
that the limitations do apply to the on-the-street context. 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2641 (May
24, 1966). See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (verbal evidence
illegally obtained was excluded) ; Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in
Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REV. 483 (1963).
11 See, e.g., Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319,
333-34:
It might be possible ... to lessen the risk of arrest without probable cause by
giving the police clear authorization to stop persons for restrained questioning
whenever there were circumstances sufficient to warrant it, even though not
tantamount to probable cause for arrest. Such a minor interference with per-
sonal liberty would touch the right to privacy only to serve it well.
12 Race as a classification factor is discussed in Remington, Social Change, the Law and
tbr Con nuzi Good, paper presented at Tenth Annual National Institute on Police and
Community Relations (Michigan State University 1964) and Conference Leader's
Material for Professional Police-Human Relations Training, prepared by Applied
Psychological Services for the Philadelphia Police Department, 1961.
13 TIFFANY, MCINTYRE & ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME (in press).
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under circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent policeman
to suspect that something was amiss, he must and should stop the sus-
pect long enough to ask a few pertinent questions."'" This reason fo-
cuses on the dilemma confronting an officer in a situation which
causes him to be suspicious but obviously does not justify an arrest un-
der existing limitations. An example from literature supporting the
New York "Stop and Frisk" statute illustrates this point:
The time: one thirty in the morning. The place: a tenement area,
with a history of crimes of violence. Watching from an unmarked
car, a detective sees two men pacing back and forth, impatiently,
glancing into the window of a bar and grill.
One of the men spots his observer, whispers to his companion.
Both start away.
The Detective jumps out of the car. Approaching them, he says,
'This is the police. Hold it.'
They do. He frisks them. In the rear pants pocket of one he feels a
hard metallic object. He removes it - a fully loaded pistol. A fur-
ther search reveals four additional shells.15
Obviously, sufficient grounds did not exist for an arrest prior to the
frisk. Just as obviously, ignoring the suspect is not an acceptable
alternative for the police.
A second justification for a field interrogation program, also
given by Superintendent Wilson, might be termed "satisfaction of
community expectations." This is particularly true when police action
is taken in response to a specific request from a private citizen and
relates to a particular person. In the words of the Superintendent:
The typical citizen would feel that the police were remiss in their
duty should they fail on their own initiative, or refuse on legal
grounds, to investigate by questioning a person who was lurking in
the neighborhood for no apparent reason. The disturbed citizen
would expect the police to discover whether the suspect was armed
and, if so, to disarm him and prosecute him should it be discovered
that he was carrying the weapon illegally. Should the suspect refuse
to explain what he was doing in the neighborhood, and the police-
man apologized for questioning him and then went about his duties
leaving the suspect to continue his lurking, the citizen would con-
sider that he was receiving inadequate protection. 6
Thus the police feel that they are bound to respond to requests to
investigate "suspicious" people who, because of their actions, give
rise to some alarm in another citizen. That the police do respond to
such requests is made clear in observation of the practice. Only de-
mands which are patently unreasonable may be ignored.
Although most of these cases arise from a telephone call to police
14 Hearings on H.R. 7525 and S. 486 Before the Committee on the District of Columbia
of the United States Senate, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 310 (1963).
15 NEW YORK STATE COMBINED COUNCIL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, POLICE
PROTECTION - MORE OR LESS? This is a summary of People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441.
201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965).
16 Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization, 51 J.
CAM. L., C & P.S. 395, 398 (1960).
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headquarters, which radios the patrolman in the neighborhood, the
pressure to investigate is equally as great if the patrolman is con-
tacted directly by the citizen. The police acknowledge this fact:
"Information by a citizen concerning a suspicious person should al-
ways be acted upon by the police officer. It is good public relations,
and will encourage citizens to continue to give information, even
though it is sometimes erroneous."' "'
Of course, in many cases such information merely puts the offi-
cer in a position where he may make observations which would lead
him to make his own decision to stop and question. To the extent
that is true, the practice is not criticized by the police. However, in
some cases officers are required to conduct field interrogations at the
behest of citizens when they would not do so on their own initiative.'
The foregoing justification of field interrogation may be gen-
eralized into a broader concept of giving the public the type of pro-
tection which they are assumed to demand without waiting for spe-
cific requests. The practice of interrogating persons on the street to
assauge the fears - well grounded or not - of private citizens when
complaint is made in specific cases might lead to similar police action
despite the fact that no one has notified the police of the "suspicious
conduct." Thus, if field interrogation is the response to a specific
complaint from a citizen, it would probably be the response if the
same activity were initially observed by a patrolman. If the activity
is a man lurking about a house - even though unoccupied - the po-
lice perception of what action the community expects of them does
not change. Observation of the practice clearly substantiates this
conclusion. Response to perceived community expectations is par-
ticularly understandable when it is noted that the question of the
legality of field interrogation is at best ambiguously answered in
most jurisdictions.
B. Propriety of Field Interrogation: The Police View
Despite some recognition by Illinois courts of a right of field
17 CHICAGO POLICE DEP'T, TRAINING BULL., Vol. 1I, No. 7 (Feb. 13, 1961).
18 In one instance a Wichita patrol officer registered considerable dissatisfaction at plac-
ing much reliance on a radio call relating to alleged drunks parked near a female com-
plainant's home.
If I had conducted myself within the strict letter of the law I would not have
checked that car out because I know from my dealings with courts that I had
no good reason to think that these people had actually committed any offense.
When I got there they were quiet and orderly. There were no signs that they
were drinking, and the only information i had was the word of ail unidenlti-
fied woman which passed through a second party, the dispatcher, and finally
got to me. On the basis of this highly insubstantial evidence I actually ef-
fected an arrest of all of those persons strictly speaking because I detained
them for a period of time.
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interrogation,"' Chicago police literature until recently either assumed
the legality of the practice or did not address that question at all.'
Police manuals pinpoint the need for the practice and the uncertainty
of its legality:
A police officer may stop and question any person carrying
bundles or parcels at unreasonable hours or under suspicious circum-
stances, or whom he may have reason to suspect of unlawful design,
and may demand of him his business and where he is going. Courts
have upheld officers who have made honest mistakes in making such
arrests. In these cases an officer must use his best [judgment]. This
authority must be exercised with great caution. No law-abiding citi-
zen will object to being questioned if it is done in a polite manner.
21
At the same time the manual purports to permit stopping and ques-
tioning, it denominates the action an arrest. The ambiguity in the law
is also reflected in the patrolman's understanding of the propriety of
the procedure, although almost all assert its necessity. During the
time field data were gathered in Chicago most of the patrol officers
interviewed expressed the view that the procedure was illegal because
it amounted to a "technical arrest." This same attitude was expressed
by most of the officers interviewed in other states. A few officers in
these states, however, believed that the police did have a right to stop
and question. Many simply did not know, or gave inconsistent
answers.
The effects of a large part of the various police forces believing
that field interrogations are necessary but illegal are not at all clear.2
One possibility, however, suggests itself. A particularly troublesome
aspect of the program involves the situation in which a search ac-
companies field interrogation. 3 If the officer believes he is detaining
without legal authority, he may be less reluctant to perform an ex-
ploratory search, not really expecting to find incriminating evidence.
If this is true, the uncertainty of the legal status of field interroga-
tion may result in an increase of searches accompanying field inter-
rogation.
C. The Administrator's Dilemma: Crime Detection or
Crime Prevention?
While the police are obviously interested in maintaining a high
19 People v. Faginkrantz, 21 Ill. 2d 75, 171 N.E.2d 5 (1960) ; People v. Exum, 382 II.
204, 47 N.E.2d 56 (1943) People v. Eutice, 371 Il. 159, 20 N.E.2d 83 (1939) ;
People v. Henneman, 367 Ill. 151, 10 N.E.2d 649 (1937) ; People v. Mirbelle, 276 Ill.
App. 533 (1934).20 See, e.g., CHICAGO POLICE DEP'T, TRAINING BULL., Vol. II, No. 7 '(Feb. 13, 1961).
New training bulletins, however, explain the basis of and limitations on the right to stop
and question suspicious persons insofar as the case-law provides those answers. CHICAGO
POLICE DEP'T, TRAINING BULL., Vol. V, No. 1 (Jan. 6, 1964); Vol. VI, No. 31
(Aug. 2, 1965).
21 RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE POLICE DEP'T OF THE CITY OF PONTIAC [Michigan)
§ 230 (Jan. 1941). (Emphasis added.)
22See note 18 supra.
2 See TIFFANY, MCINTYRE & ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME (in press).
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level of effectiveness in terms of the percentage of known crimes
which have been cleared by arrest, they also feel that the level of
known criminal activity is a measure of their effectiveness. Whether
or not this is valid, the police are frequently assigned and accept re-
sponsibility for the level of criminal activity in a community. A num-
ber of police practices mentioned previously have evolved from the
pressures on the police not only to apprehend those who have com-
mitted crimes, but also to prevent the commission of crimes in the
first place.2'
As a result of placing responsibility on the police for the level
of crime, police administrators have tended to adopt a twofold posi-
tion: (1) a major task of a police department is to reduce the com-
mission of crime in the first place; and (2) frequent contact with
persons on the street will further that objective. Superintendent Wil-
son states the first part of that contention:
A crime occurs when a person who desires to commit it discov-
ers the opportunity to do so. Such unwholesome desires spring from
and are a measure of criminality .... Their [the police] basic pur-
pose is to remove or lessen by both physical and psychological means
the opportunity to commit crimes.
To prevent crime, the police must either stand guard at every
point of possible attack, which is a physical and economic impossibil-
ity, or intercept the person with criminal intent before he robs, rapes,
or kills. It is better to have an alert police force that prevents the
crime than one that devotes its time to seeking to identify the assail-
ant after the life has been taken, the daughter ravished, or the pedes-
trian slugged and robbed.25
The tools which the police have available to them to combat
what they believe to be incipient criminality have several short-
comings. Attempt laws are too restricted to apply to "suspicious
loiterers," except where the scope of those inchoate laws have been
expanded to situations such as possession of burglary tools with the
intent to commit a burglary.26 Conspiracy and solicitation concepts,
while perhaps encompassing a broader range of inchoate activity,
present problems of proof and resource allocation which normally
are considered insurmountable by the police. Some officers feel that
vagrancy-type laws provide part of the answer since they bridge the
gap between possible intending criminals and those who may be con-
victed of attempt.'
But it is also asserted that field interrogations aid in controlling
intending criminals because the confrontation involved in field inter-
rogation has the same preventive efficacy as practices exclusively de-
2 -,Ed. ch. i.
25 Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization, 51 J.
CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 395, 398 (1960).2 8 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12, comment (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
27 Williams, Police Control of Intending Criminals, 1955 CRIM. L. REV. (N.Y.) 66, 136.
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signed for that purpose. Commenting on an intradepartmental pro-
posal to implement a system of Field Interrogation Reports in the
Chicago Police Department, a top-level administrator made these
express assumptions about the value of a field interrogation program:
The amount of crime committed is closely related to the criminal's
estimate of his chances to commit the crime without being appre-
hended.
The criminal's estimate of his potential for success is influenced
by the effectiveness of police patrol operations, and the criminal is
most influenced by the effectiveness of patrol operations when he
has personal contact with them.
The thief or burglar is likely to be wary of working in an area
where he is frequently questioned by the police and his identity and
description are made a matter of record, and the thief intent on com-
mitting a crime is likely to desist following a field interrogation. 28
This assumption, that field interrogation will reduce the crime rate,
is a strongly held belief of most officers who are on actual patrol."
They are quick to admit that it is largely unsupported by any real
evidence, but they are understandably unwilling to forego the prac-
tice in order to find out whether field interrogations have any real
effect on the crime rate.
One result of the police policy not to restrict activities to detect-
ing completed crimes is an obfuscation of the distinction between
several types of different practices. Thus, for example, three isolable
police practices frequently are rendered indistinguishable at both the
policy and operational levels: (1) operations designed mainly to
make felt the presence of the police for general deterrence purposes;
(2) field interrogations when the officer believes that a person is
about to commit a crime; and (3) field interrogations when the offi-
cer believes that a person has committed a crime.
The formal law seems to restrict police activity to those situa-
28 Memorandum to the Superintendent of the Chicago Police Dep't from the Director of
Planning in re field interrogation, March 27, 1962. See also BRISToW, FIELD INTERRO-
GATION 5 ( 1958 ), where one of the functions of field interrogation is stated as follows:
The frequent stopping and questioning of suspicious persons usually tends
to reduce the crime rate in a given district. Word travels quickly by the crimi-
nal grapevine that a certain area is being well patrolled. Criminals rarely fre-
quent areas where they are continually stopped for interrogation, and tend not
to choose such districts for criminal activity.
29 Cf. CHICAGO POLICE DEP'T, TRAINING BULL., Vol. VII, No. 23 (June 6, 1966):
The alert and aggressive officer on patrol will through experience learn
what locations on his beat are used by young 'toughs' as hangouts. He will
check these out even though no criminal activity is taking place at that par-
ticular moment....
By aggressive patrol procedure, the patrolling officer can create doubt
in the mind of the would-be criminal as to the possibility of successfully
committing a crime. This is the deterrent effect of aggressive patrol ...
The professional criminal will weigh the risk of the crime against what
he stands to gain if he gets away without being caught. By aggressively patrol-
ling an area you will impress the criminal with the fact that what he is about
to do would either be observed and that he would eventually be captured or
that any attempt would be futile and capture would be immediate.
1966
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tions in which a crime has probably been committed by the suspect."
Thus, police assumption of responsibility for the level of criminal
activity seems to be at odds with the limitations imposed by the formal
law upon their power. The policeman's dilemma in this regard is
further aggravated by the failure of the formal law to adopt clear
policy limitations on the scope of police authority to engage in ac-
tivities which interfere with individuals for purposes other than
criminal prosecution."
The police themselves typically will not attempt to delineate
such prevention policies. In large part this simply results from a
general reluctance on the part of administrators to take a clear, public
stand on controversial matters since to do so would result in their
having to defend, perhaps unsuccessfully, the position adopted. If
their policies were rejected, practices they feel are necessary to good
police work might be lost to the department. However, failure to
make clear their position results in confusion between crime preven-
tion and crime detection practices.
Despite some confusion, field interrogations are usually dis-
tinguishable from the kinds of programs engaged in by police which
are not specifically directed toward a person suspected of having
committed an offense or about to commit one. It seems clear that the
legality of police programs designed, for example, only to get guns
and knives off the street, or to increase the cost of doing business as
a prostitute, must rest on substantially different considerations than
field interrogations designed to apprehend offenders for the purposes
of prosecution. The fact remains, however, that field interrogation
does occur on the street in the context of these other practices and
they have not been adequately distinguished either by the police or by
the formal law.
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS RELATING TO SUSPICIOUS PERSONS
Because of legislative default, courts have necessarily become
the most important agencies in the system of criminal justice admin-
istration dealing with problems relating to police practices. Because
of their superior position in the judicial hierarchy and because their
opinions are more available to other officials in the system, appellate
courts have become the dominant source from which rules governing
police conduct emanate. In the absence of legislation and appellate
opinions, issues involved in stopping and questioning suspects must
be decided by trial courts or by administrative officials.
30 E.g., Williams, Police Control of Intending Criminals, 1955 GluM. L. REv. (N.Y.) 66,
136.
31 It is unclear what might be the future effect of the health inspection cases in this regard.
Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) ; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). See
Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT.
REV. 46 and authorities cited therein.
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The issue confronting the appellate courts has been framed as
follows:
In the absence of sufficient grounds for an arrest, should the
police have the right to stop and question a person as to his identity
and reason for being where he is, if the appearance or conduct of
that person has reasonably aroused police suspicion ?12
What is perhaps most significant about the treatment of this issue
by appellate courts is that in many cases they have not couched the
issue in those terms. Because of their central position in determining
proper police conduct and developing the law relating to field in-
terrogation it is important to understand the various approaches
which the courts have utilized.
Although field interrogations potentially involve many identi-
fiable steps - surveillance, approach, confrontation, stopping, frisk-
ing, questioning, and post-questioning detention - the most critical
step clearly is stopping or detaining. At this point of restraint most
appellate courts which have denied the legality of the practice have
found the practice unsupportable. The steps in field interrogation
which precede stopping or detaining have received relatively little
close attention; the steps subsequent to the stopping are generally
upheld only if the initial detention was proper. Interrogation, for
example, receives attention almost entirely as an adjunct to the de-
tention issue, and if there is deemed to be no restraint involved dur-
ing interrogation, it is upheld. Thus the judicial treatment of issues
relating to stopping or detaining suspects for questioning is of critical
importance.
Some courts have approved field interrogation practices; how-
ever, most courts have avoided directly deciding the question. Why
this is so is not entirely clear. Part of the explanation may be that
the police themselves have not taken the initiative. The unresolved
question is whether lack of police initiative in clearly defining the
scope of and need for a field interrogation program contributes to the
failure of the judiciary to confront the issue, or whether the converse
is the case. Even in those instances in which the police have set out
administrative rules defining the standards of their field interrogation
program, it is unlikely that their views will be adequately presented
and argued when the legality of the action is challenged in court.
But this is not the entire explanation, for there have been instances
in which the police position was ably presented on appeal and still
the issue was avoided.3
32 Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking
of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. CiM. L., C. & P.S.
386 (1960).
33 See text accompanying note 47, infra.
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Part of the explanation may lie in the point made by Professor
Hurst:
As fact finders courts were inherently hampered by the limiting
tradition of their office. It was not the proper work of judges to
initiate broad solutions of public problems. The courts inherited no
staff which they could use for independent fact finding. They had
no independent funds with which to finance inquiries.
34
Thus, courts may eschew the establishment of new policies when
sources of information are inadequate to fully foresee various rami-
fications of a decision, and Professor Hurst points out that they are
in no position to undertake their own study.
Professor Llewellyn has suggested that courts are attracted to
what is available to them - prior appellate opinions - to decide
what ought to be done in the particular case:
The simple available thing in law consists in the rules laid down on
the statute books by the legislature, or laid down authoritatively by
the supreme court of any given jurisdiction. The statute book is in
print. The reports of the supreme court are in print. Both are col-
lected and arranged in libraries. And the easiest thing to extract
from either or both is the set of rules which they purport to contain.
What wonder, then, that these have been the subject matter of our
study? What wonder, either, that once the study is begun we come
to think of them as occupying the whole field? At the same time,
what an absurdity. Useful and influential as these rules may be (and
I do not deny either their influence or their necessity or -when
they are soundly handled - their high utility) surely it is clear that
they offer the most dubious of pictures of any social behavior out-
side themselves.
35
This tendency is reinforced by "that curious drive to create a seem-
ing simplicity, when nothing else will do it, by verbal unification, by
manipulation of verbal or other symbols which correspond to nothing
in the facts.'"'3 There is a strong tendency on the part of courts-
as well as other parts of the system -to frame issues in terms of
pre-existing legal categories such as arrest, rather than to frame them
in terms of the law enforcement perspective, or in terms of "social
behavior outside themselves." The following sections discuss in more
detail the judicial methods most commonly used in resolving ques-
tions about the legality of stopping and questioning suspicious
persons.
A. Ambiguity in Formation of the Issue: The United States
Supreme Court
On three occasions over a period of years the United States Su-
preme Court has had an opportunity squarely to face issues relating
34
HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 412 (1950).
35 LLEWELLYN, JUISPRUDENCE 82 (1962).
36 1d. at 83.
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to stopping suspected persons for questioning. Those three cases are
discussed in detail in this section not only to underscore the essential
ambiguity inherent in their disposition but also because of the im-
portance of some of the pronouncements contained in the cases in
concurring and dissenting opinions.
It is not suggested that what little may 'be gleaned from those
cases is applicable to the states or governs the conduct of state offi-
cers. Indeed, the contrary has been assumed under the present state
of the law.37 Thus, state courts and legislatures may be left free to
determine proper police practice within permissible limits. 8
1. Rios v. United States
39
Two plainclothes state police officers were on patrol in an un-
marked car. Defendant Rios was observed getting into a taxicab
and the officers trailed the cab for about two miles. No reason was
given for their action other than the fact that the area being patrolled
had a reputation for high narcotic activity. When the cab stopped for
a red light, the officers alighted from their car and approached it,
one on each side. One officer identified himself.
At this point, conflicting testimony was given at trial of the
case. By one version, one of the officers drew his revolver and opened
the door of the taxi." But one of the police officers testified that
before a gun was displayed and the door of the cab was opened, he
saw the suspect drop an object on the floor of the cab. He shined a
light on the fallen object and observed a transparent contraceptive
filled with a light colored powder. It was common knowledge among
police that narcotics dealers often used such a device to contain the
contraband. The officer further testified that he opened the cab
door and then placed the defendant under arrest "for narcotics."'"
Prosecution was commenced against the defendant in the Cali-
37 Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319.
38 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
39 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
40 d. at 257-58 n.2. On remand to the district court, the testimony of the taxicab driver,
Smith, was rejected because "he was not an impartial or unbiased witness, but his bias
against the police officers was manifest to the point where his testimony lacked pro-
bative force in the points wherein it conflicted with other testimony and evidence."
United States v. Rios, 192 F. Supp. 888, 889 (S.D. Cal. 1961). It is interesting to note,
nonetheless, that Smith testified as follows:
I thought probably it was just a routine examination. I work the night shift,
have for some time, and I have been stopped by the police and they have
checked the occupants of my cab. There have been quite a few holdups of taxi
drivers and I just thought it was a routine thing.
But the defendant was getting quite agitated and I noticed at this time
that Officer Beckmann had his revolver drawn, which seemed to me somewhat
extraordinary just to stop and question an occupant of a cab....




fornia state court for illegal possession of heroin. But at the pre-
liminary examination a motion to suppress the evidence was made and
granted, and the defendant was released.42 A prosecution for the
same offense was then commenced in federal court.43 The federal
trial judge denied the defendant's alternative motions to quash the
indictment which had been returned against him by a federal grand
jury or to suppress the evidence. The trial court found that (1) the
evidence was not illegally seized and (2) even if it were illegally
seized, it would be admissible in federal court under the so-called
"silver platter doctrine" because federal officers did not participate
in the seizure of the narcotics or the arrest of the defendant.44 The
conviction of the defendant was upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals.45
When Rios reached the Supreme Court for decision, the silver
platter doctrine had been overruled46 so that Rios required a deter-
mination of the legality of the seizure of the narcotics by the state
officers. The government took the position that the Court should
give express recognition to the right of police officers to stop persons
for interrogation when adequate grounds for an arrest do not exist:
Our position is generally that investigation is a legitimate and
necessary part of law enforcement; that a police officer may stop a
person for the purpose of inquiry on less information than would
constitute probable cause for his arrest; and that any temporary de-
tention that may be involved in the act of making inquiry does not
constitute an arrest. We think further that this is as true of a passen-
ger or driver in a vehicle as it is of a person walking in the street,
except to the extent that, in judging the reasonableness of the offi-
cer's action, one factor to be considered is the manner in which the
vehicle is stopped. Where, as here, the vehicle is at a standstill, an
officer may as legitimately approach and detain the occupants to
make inquiry as he could a pedestrian, even though that same basis
might not be sufficient to justify forcing a moving vehicle to the
curb with a police car or, at a further extreme, shooting at the tires
of a vehicle to force it to stop. In short, we think that police offi-
cers have a right to make reasonable inquiry even though some re-
striction of movement is involved; that the issue of whether the
42 The reason for the suppression of the evidence in the California state court does not
appear in the federal reports, and apparently the case is unreported elsewhere. The cir-
cuit court noted, however, that the federal district court's finding that the evidence was
not illegally seized was made upon more testimony than was taken at the preliminary
hearing in the state court. Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 173, 176 n.5 (9th Cir. 1958).
While it is true that California has had the exclusionary rule since 1955, People v. Ca-
han, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955) ; Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty
States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, it is also true that California has the most highly developed
judicial recognition of the right of enforcement officers to conduct field interrogations.
43 The appellate court noted that a plea of res judicata in this type of situation has been
spciicll ;:1...rejete ;n Se;^ v. United States, 203 F.2 5A 76, 5-78 (5d, Ci") , cert. d-nied
346 U.S. 887 (1953).
4See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
45 Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1958).
46 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (a companion case to Rios on appeal).
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inquiry is reasonable is to be determined under all the circumstances;
and that here the inquiry was reasonable ....
A distinction between the requirements for an arrest and for a
temporary detention for purposes of inquiry is, moreover, a neces-
sary one if law enforcement is not to be unduly hampered.'
7
But the Court remanded the case to the district court for a fac-
tual determination of when the arrest was made. 8 The possible al-
ternative findings were outlined: (1) "If ... the arrest occurred
when the officers took their positions at the doors of the taxicab,
then nothing that happened thereafter could make that arrest lawful,
or justify a search as its incident."' 9 (2) If the court found that the
arrest was not made until after the defendant voluntarily revealed
the package of narcotics, the arrest which followed would be lawful
because the officers would then have had reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that a felony was being committed. The language of the Court
regarding this latter alternative is of some relevance in determining
the degree of recognition given the practice of stopping and ques-
tioning persons who may not be lawfully arrested:
But the Government argues that the policemen approached the
standing taxi only for the purpose of routine interrogation, and
that they had no intent to detain the petitioner beyond the momen-
tary requirements of such a mission. If the petitioner thereafter
voluntarily revealed the package of narcotics to the officers' view,
a lawful arrest could then have been supported by their reasonable
cause to believe that a felony was being committed in their presence.
The validity of the search thus turns upon the narrow question of
when the arrest occurred, and the answer to that question depends
upon an evaluation of the conflicting testimony of those who were
there that night.50
47Brief for United States, pp. 24, 30-31, Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
The government's brief also contains the following language:
The questioning of persons suspected of criminal activities or likely to have
knowledge of them is a necessary and proper part of law enforcement, and in
our view police officers may properly, if reasonable under the circumstances,
detain persons for a limited time for that purpose. [p. 10] Being stopped by
the police officer for purposes of inquiry may at times cause some incon-
venience to the person stopped, but that temporary inconvenience is nor-
mally minor compared to the importance of such reasonable inquiry to effec-
tive law enforcement. Without the power, for example, to stop a suspiciously-
acting automobile to ask questions, the police might be forced to spend fruit-
less hours investigating action which the occupant, had the police been
able to ask him questions, could readily have explained as being entirely inno-
cent. In a fair balancing of the interests at stake, we submit that the rights of
the person questioned are adequately protected by his privilege not to answer
and that the police, having reasonable grounds for inquiry, ought not to be
foreclosed from at least the opportunity, by asking questions, to determine
whether further investigation is necessary. [pp. 11-121 The importance of
promptly questioning a possible suspect does not lie primarily in obtaining
incriminatory evidence against him. It is perhaps even more important as a
means of dissipating suspicions and releasing the officers from further fruit-
less investigation. [p. 31)
4
8 Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 262 (1960).
491d. at 261-62.
50 Id. at 262.
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It is dear from this opinion that the Court did not intend to
confront the question whether it would be proper for officers
to detain for questioning persons suspected of crime who could not be
arrested because of lack of a sufficiently high evidentiary basis. The
Court speaks of the problem only in terms of arrest, search, and
seizure or voluntary conduct on the part of the suspected person.
This is the most significant fact about the opinion because this ap-
proach has probably become the most frequently encountered among
the various judicial approaches to these issues. The case was remanded
to the district court to determine when the arrest occurred without
providing any significant guidelines concerning whether the fourth
amendment permits a distinction between temporary detention for
interrogation on the one hand and arrest on the other.
Because of the subsequent findings of fact, the trial court
avoided all of these issues. That court held that the state officers
were "lawfully making a routine surveillance of the taxicab and its
occupants, and for the purpose of making a routine interrogation,
they approached the taxicab but did not stop or detain it until after
the commission of a crime by the defendant in the officers' sight and
presence."'" The trial court also found that the defendant alighted
from the cab voluntarily and that he was then arrested. Thus the ar-
rest was legal, and because the defendant had dropped the narcotics
before alighting from the taxicab, there was no seizure: "the de-
fendant voluntarily gave up possession thereof.""
2. Henry v. United States"
Federal agents were investigating defendant in connection with
thefts of whisky from interstate shipments. They had received some
general information concerning his "involvement" - from an un-
disclosed source - and on two occasions observed him and the other
defendant loading cartons into a car. After observing the second of
those transactions, the officers followed the car and waved it to a
stop. Stolen interstate shipments of radios were found in plain view.
Defendants were convicted of possession of stolen interstate goods.5'
The circuit court divided in their opinions,55 the majority uphold-
ing the police action on the grounds that the officers had sufficient
probable cause to search, and that the discovery of the radios, bearing
interstate labels, together with an unsatisfactory explanation by de-
51 Rios v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 888. 889 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
52 Id. at 890.
53 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
54 Ibid.
55 United States v. Henry, 259 F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1958).
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fendants in regard to the ownership of the cartons, constituted prob-
able cause to make the subsequent arrest.
The majority of the Supreme Court, however, agreed with the
dissenting judge of the circuit court and held that the defendants
were arrested at the time the car was stopped - a conclusion which
the government conceded - and that probable cause to arrest did
not exist at that time.
Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting, rejected both the result reached by
the majority and the traditional analysis relied upon in reaching that
result. He gave considerable recognition to the right of police officers
to stop suspected persons for interrogation:
The Court seems to say that the mere stopping of the car amounted
to an arrest of the petitioner. I cannot agree. The suspicious activi-
ties of the petitioner during the somewhat prolonged surveillance by
the agents warranted the stopping of the car. The sighting of the
cartons with their interstate labels in the car gave the agents reason-
able ground to believe that a crime was in the course of its commis-
sion in their very presence. The search of the car and the subse-
quent arrest were therefore lawful and the motion to suppress was
properly overruled.
In my view, the time at which the agents were required to have
reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was committing a felony
was when they began the search of the automobile, which was after
they had seen the cartons with interstate labels in the car. The
earlier events certainly disclosed ample grounds to justify the follow-
ing of the car, the subsequent stopping thereof, and the questioning
of petitioner by the agents. This interrogation, together with the
sighting of the cartons and the labels, gave the agents indisputable
probable cause for the search and the arrest.1
7
The dissenting opinion would give clear recognition to the right of
officers to stop for interrogation persons who have reasonably aroused
police suspicion when there is not sufficient evidence to arrest. While
Mr. Justice Clark does not define arrest, he necessarily rejects the
narrow definition which is usually couched in terms of "any restraint."
Further, it is not clear that the majority would have equated stopping
with arrest but for the concession of the government on that point.
That such an equation was made is not expressly stated, although, as
Mr. Justice Clark pointed out, it does seem to be implicit in the re-
sult reached by the majority.
3. Brinegar v. United States"
While the majority of the Supreme Court in Brinegar also took
the traditional arrest-or-nothing approach in analyzing the issues
presented, other opinions filed in connection with this case shed some
light on the question whether officers may stop a person in a vehicle
56 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
571d. at 106 (dissenting opinion).
58 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
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on less than probable cause to arrest. Even though those statements
were not controlling in the final disposition of the appeal they are
important because of their source. The principal opinion of the
Court summarized the relevant facts as follows:
At about six o'clock on the evening of March 3, 1947, Malsed,
an investigator of the Alcohol Tax Unit, and Creehan, a special
investigator, were parked in a car beside a highway near the Quapaw
Bridge in northeastern Oklahoma. The point was about five miles
west of the Missouri-Oklahoma line. Brinegar drove past headed
west in his Ford coupe. Malsed had arrested him about five months
earlier for illegally transporting liquor; had seen him loading liquor
into a car or truck in Joplin, Missouri, on at least two occasions dur-
ing the preceding six months; and knew him to have a reputation for
hauling liquor. As Brinegar passed, Malsed recognized both him and
the Ford. He told Creehan, who was driving the officers' car, that
Brinegar was the driver of the passing car. Both agents later testified
that the car, but not especially its rear end, appeared to be 'heavily
loaded' and 'weighted with something.' Brinegar increased his speed
as he passed the officers. They gave chase. After pursuing him for
about a mile at top speed, they gained on him as his car skidded on
a curve, sounded their siren, overtook him, and crowded his car to
the side of the road by pulling across in front of it ....
As the agents got out of their car and walked back toward pe-
titioner, Malsed said, "Hello, Brinegar, how much liquor have you
got in the car?" or "How much liquor have you got this time?"
Petitioner replied, "Not too much," or "Not so much." After fur-
ther questioning he admitted that he had twelve cases in the car.59
The evidence was conflicting whether there was liquor in the car
visible to the officers at the time the car was stopped. After denial
of defendant's motion to suppress the seized liquor, he was convicted
for importing intoxicating liquor into "dry" Oklahoma from Mis-
souri, in violation of federal statute.0
A plethora of judicial opinions resulted from the conviction and
subsequent appeals. Despite disagreements about the proper conclu-
sions to draw from the facts presented, most of the opinions did ap-
proach the problem relying on traditional concepts of arrest, search,
and seizure or voluntary disclosures. The district court, in the words
of the Supreme Court:
was of the opinion that "the mere fact that the agents knew that this
defendant was engaged in hauling whiskey, even coupled with the
statement that the car appeared to be weighted, would not be prob-
able cause for the search of this car." Therefore, he thought, there
was no probable cause when the agents began the chase. He held,
however, that the voluntary admission made by petitioner after his
car had been stopped constituted probable cause for a search, re-
gardless of the legality of the arrest and detention, and that therefore
the evidence was admissible.6 1
9 Id. at 162-63.
601d. at 161-62 n.1, 169 n.8.
6 1 1d. at 163.
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The majority of the court of appeals affirmed that position, adding
what seemed implicit in the district court's opinion - that the stop-
ping of the car did not amount to a "technical arrest.''62 Both of
these opinions rely on arrest concepts but found that no arrest oc-
curred until after the incriminating statements were made.
The dissent in both the circuit court and the Supreme Court
considered the chase to be illegal either because it was a search or
because it was an arrest. The dissenting judge in the circuit court
stated that he believed the officers would have searched the car even
if defendant had denied possession of the liquor, so that "the search
was on when the chase began and Brinegar was crowded off the road
and prevented from going his lawful way . 6...3 That judge con-
cluded that the "officers were illegally investigating when they pur-
sued the car, forced it to the side of the road, compelled it to stop,
and interrogated the driver."64 The reasoning of the court was that
police officers should not be encouraged in obtaining "an admission
ordinarily inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment, while engaged
in violation of the Fourth Amendment." 5 Mr. Justice Jackson, dis-
senting from the other two opinions filed by the Court, apparently
shared this view. He stated: "When these officers engaged in a
chase at speeds dangerous to those who participated, and to other
lawful wayfarers, and ditched the defendant's car, they were either
taking the initial steps in arrest, search and seizure, or they were
committing a completely lawless and unjustifiable act."66 He con-
tended not only that defendant's car was one of his "effects and
hence within the express protection of the Fourth Amendment," 7 but
also that there was no probable cause to conduct the search prior to
the statements made by the defendant.
The majority opinion of the Court shared the approach to the
problem but differed on the existence of probable cause to initiate
the chase and the subsequent stopping. Mr. Justice Rutledge, writing
for the majority, concluded that the officers had probable cause to
believe that the car contained contraband; therefore the actions of
the officers were proper under the rule that an automobile moving
on a public highway may be searched without a warrant if probable
cause for the search exists. 8
All of those opinions approach the problem in terms of arrest
62 Brinegar v. United States, 165 F.2d 512, 514 (10th Cir. 1947).
63 Id. at 516 (dissenting opinion).
64 Ibid.
65 Id. at 517 (dissenting opinion).
6 6 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 187-88 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
67 Id. at 182 (dissenting opinion).
68 Id. at 164.
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or search and either unquestionably equate stopping with search or
arrest, or completely ignore that formulation of the issue. Mr. Justice
Burton, however, took an entirely different approach in his concur-
ring opinion. In his analysis, it was unnecessary to determine whether
probable cause to search existed prior to the incriminating statements
made by Brinegar, for the officers had a right to stop and interro-
gate him. The subsequent statements provided the necessary grounds
for the search:
The earlier events, recited in the opinion of the Court, disclose
at least ample grounds to justify the chase and official interrogation
of the petitioner by the government agents in the manner adopted.
This interrogation quickly disclosed indisputable probable cause for
the search and for the arrest. In my view, these earlier events not
only justified the steps taken by the government agents but those
events imposed upon the government agents a positive duty to in-
vestigate further, in some such manner as they adopted. It is only
by alertness to proper occasions for prompt inquiries and investiga-
tions that effective prevention of crime and enforcement of law is
possible. Government agents are commissioned to represent the in-
terests of the public in the enforcement of the law and this requires
affirmative action not only when there is reasonable ground for an
arrest or probable cause for a search but when there is reasonable
ground for an investigation. 9
In this opinion, Mr. Justice Burton framed the term "reasonable
ground for an investigation" - a term meant to allow the stopping
for interrogation of persons against whom some evidence of guilt
exists, but which does not amount to probable cause to arrest or
search.
A hypothetical situation discussed by Justice Jackson in his dis-
sent might also be urged as support for a recognition of the right to
investigate when evidence available will not meet the usual stand-
ards for arrest or search. Justice Jackson urged that
[I]f we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amend-
ment for these [enforcement] reasons, it seems to me they should de-
pend somewhat upon the gravity of the offense. If we assume, for
example, that a child is kidnaped and the officers throw a roadblock
about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it would be
a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The officers might
be unable to show probable cause for searching any particular car.
However, I should candidly strive hard to sustain such an action,
executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be reasonable
to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to save a
threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not strain to
sustain such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a few bottles
of bourbon and catch a bootlegger. 0
To uphold the validity of stopping for questioning short of the
usual evidentiary standards for arresting, two approaches might be
69 Id. at 178-79 (concurring opinion).
70 d. at 183 (dissenting opinion).
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taken: (1) recognizing the difference in the evidentiary standards
because of a recognition of the difference in the amount of inter-
ference involved; or (2) continuing to call the interference an arrest
or a search, but lessening the required probable cause standard to
conduct such an arrest or search in particular situations. Clearly, it is
the latter type of approach to which Mr. Justice Jackson has ad-
dressed himself. His approach represents a lessening of the standards
of probability to conduct a lawful search without a search warrant
and not incident to a lawful arrest, and in that sense is still repre-
sentative of the traditional approach. That approach does not speak
to the issue of probable cause to investigate in the sense that term is
used by Mr. Justice Burton in his concurring opinion. Arguably,
then, this method is but an instance of a watered-down application
of the traditional approach.
4. Critique
The key question which must be answered in determining the
legality of conducting field interrogations is whether there are situ-
ations in which police officers may stop or detain a person for inter-
rogation without possessing sufficient grounds to make an arrest.
Stated otherwise, the issue is whether stopping or detaining must be
equated with arrest. A detailed discussion of the three major Su-
preme Court cases which are the most nearly in point fails to answer
that question. While individual justices have expressed a clear view,
the actual holdings of the Court leave the law ambiguous. The ma-
jority opinions invariably rely on the arrest concept in reaching their
decisions since they can dispose of the issues in traditional terms
without having to resolve difficult new issues.
On the basis of the current state of the law, it could be argued
that the Court has consistently held that arrest, search, and seizure
concepts are the only means by which such police conduct can be
upheld, that the evidentiary standards for those interferences must
be met before the conduct may be held lawful. But it could be argued
with equal authority that the Court has never held that stopping and
questioning without adequate grounds to arrest is unlawful for fed-
eral officers, much less for state police. In short, the Court seems to
have neglected the entire area.
It is, of course, quite possible for a court to treat all detentions
in terms of arrest. But if that approach is to be taken, it should at
least be predicated on a recognition that interferences with the sus-
pect concerned are such that the court feels it cannot be justified
on any less evidence of guilt than is required to take a person into
custody to be charged with a crime. If, however, the personal inter-
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ferences are deemed to be substantially less than those imposed when
a person is taken to the station to be booked and arraigned, an equa-
tion of the evidence sufficiency to justify stopping, with that required
to justify arrest, would seem to be based on an assumption that there
is no legitimate need for stopping for questioning of suspicious
persons.
On the other hand, if a court recognizes a need for field interro-
gation of suspicious persons, as well as the fact that such an interro-
gation may involve less burden on the suspect than does arrest for
prosecution, then it would seem that there would be sufficient justi-
fication for distinguishing those two practices and for allowing stop-
ping for questioning in cases in which grounds for arrest do not exist.
Whichever answer one may prefer to the issue posed, failure to
answer the question at all is probably the least desirable approach.
If it is decided that the practice cannot constitutionally be permitted,
then the courts may take appropriate steps to discourage it. If the
question is decided in favor of permitting the practice, then courts
must develop rules to limit and control the practice to keep it within
constitutional bounds so that administrators will know with which
law they must comply. But the inevitable result of a failure to con-
front the initial question about the legality of stopping for question-
ing is that the police, given their current attitudes about its necessity
in effective law enforcement, will engage in the practice and will
have the power to determine under what circumstances the practice
is permissible. The effect is that of a grant of discretion to police
administrators to work out their own rules unguided by formal law."
Observation of the current practice makes it amply clear that
while the concept of allowing a degree of interference with a person
against whom there is not sufficient evidence to make a lawful arrest
for prosecution is a relatively novel one, it is novel only to the formal
law- not to the administration of that law by front-line administra-
tive personnel. The vast majority of persons stopped and questioned
are not taken to the police station, and it is therefore fair to assume
that however high may be the number of arrests occurring in any
jurisdiction, the number of field interrogations is much higher. De-
spite that fact, the law on the questions presented by the practice in
many jurisdictions is a mystery. While these police practices may not
have been declared to be legal by the lawmakers in those jurisdictions,
71 The point here is not that police ought not to have discretion in enforcement of the
criminal laws. Obviously they must have. LAFAVE, ARREST 490-525 (1965) ; Goldstein,
Police Discretion: the Ideal versus the Real, 23 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 140 (1963). But
see Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960). The point rather
is that a minimal requirement for granting police discretion ought to be recognition that
such a grant has been made.
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the chances are very good indeed that neither have they been declared
illegal.
The arrest-or-nothing approach, with its resultant ambiguity,
has been the most common and unfortunate treatment which the
problems have thus far received by appellate courts. The three Su-
preme Court cases discussed above typify that approach.
B. Reliance on Tort Concepts
A less frequently encountered judicial answer to this problem is
observed where the courts again rely entirely on arrest concepts in
analyzing the police conduct involved in the case but take the addi-
tional step of adopting a definition of arrest.
Prior to judicial adoption and development of exclusionary rules
of evidence, the principal mode of testing the legality of detention
by police was the civil suit for false imprisonment. The decisions of
appellate courts in those actions provided a ready body of law relat-
ing to the question of what constituted the act necessary to maintain
such an action. Some courts have relied heavily on those cases, prob-
ably because of a lack of any other source of law to which they could
look. The results have varied, due at least in part to semantic con-
fusions caused by the nature of that tort action.
The confusion seems to stem from failure to distinguish between
the statement of the act which constitutes imprisonment from the
statement of privilege the absence of which makes the imprisonment
a "false" imprisonment. The following is a typical definition of the
act necessary to maintain the action: "any exercise of force, by which
in fact the other person is deprived of his liberty and compelled to
remain or to go where he does not wish . . . is an imprisonment."72
When the plaintiff in a false imprisonment suit shows that act, the
defendant, to escape liability, must show that he was privileged to
commit that act. Several types of privilege are available to him such
as self-defense, defense of others, defense of property, and the privi-
lege of an owner of a chattel to recapture it by force. But the only
privilege category arguably applicable to the type of restraint im-
posed in stopping a person for questioning is the privilege afforded
to police officers to effect arrests.
The privilege consists of two parts. The first part involves a
determination of what constitutes an arrest, and there are at least
three common definitions of that. One is the "any restraint" defini-
tion given above. The second is the current definition of arrest con-
tained in the new Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure: " 'Arrest'
72 Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Smith, 281 Ky. 583, 598, 136 S.W.2d 759, 767 (1939).
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means the taking of a person into custody."" That section was
amended just prior to the enactment of the new code. Before amend-
ment the term was defined in a third way: "'Arrest' means the tak-
ing of a person into custody in order that he may be forthcoming to
answer for the commission of an offense.
' '
7
The second part of the privilege involves determining when that
arrest - however the term is defined - may occur. Apart from the
use of arrest warrants, statutes usually provide that a peace officer
may arrest when he has grounds to reasonably believe that a felony
has been committed, and that the arrestee committed it, or when a
misdemeanor is committed in his presence. 7' Those statutes are ap-
proximate codifications of common law.
Within that framework, courts have taken two different ap-
proaches. The first is typified by Busby v. United States. 76 As a re-
sult of stopping for questioning of "suspicious men" in an automo-
bile, California officers found a weapon which led to a prosecution
in federal court for possession of an unregistered firearm. On ap-
peal, the court was faced with the contention that the weapon was
unlawfully obtained, because either stopping the car or ordering the
occupants from it constituted illegal police conduct. The court held
that these acts did not constitute an arrest or search because the Cali-
fornia statute defines that term as follows: "An arrest is taking a
person into custody, in a case and in the manner authorized by law."77
The "case" applicable here is: "At night, when there is reasonable
cause to believe that he has committed a felony."78 The court stated
that: "No one had been taken into custody in this case until after
the shotgun which gave rise to probable cause was seen. Certainly
not every police practice constitutes an arrest or search.""
The difficulty with this analysis is that the facts of the case
make it clear that there was an initial restraint when the car was
stopped and an additional momentary detention following the stop.
Thus, in tort law there clearly was an "imprisonment." The question
would then become whether that restraint was privileged. To hold
that the restraint did not amount to an arrest because it did not satisfy
the requirements of the statutory definition of that term is but to say
that in the statutory context the restraint did not fall within the arrest
73 ILL. REy. STAT. ch. 38, § 102-5 (1963).
74 PROPOSED ILL. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 38-5 (1963).
75 LAFAVE, ARREST chs. 11-12 (1965).
76 296 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876 (1962).
7 7 
CAL. PEN. CODE § 834(5).
78 CAL. PEN. CODE § 836(5).




privilege. The logical result of this approach would be to hold that
the taking of a person into custody for any purpose other than prose-
cution does not amount to an arrest in those states in which that term
is defined to include an intention on the part of the officer to hold
the suspect to answer for a crime. This is an unlikely result.
In contrast to the approach taken in Busby, other courts hold
that an arrest occurs when there is "a restriction of the right of loco-
motion or a restraint of the person .... "80 When that conduct occurs
on insufficient evidence, the result is an illegal arrest. Certainly this
approach comports better with the tort law analysis.
Underlying this approach is an implicit assumption that tort con-
cepts deriving from false imprisonment actions should govern inter-
pretations of constitutional provisions prohibiting unreasonable seiz-
ures. By rigid application of tort definitions and privilege categories
to the area of police practices, courts preclude any meaningful deci-
sions regarding field interrogation based on policy considerations un-
related to false imprisonment suits. Normally, the result of this ap-
proach will be to find that the stopping for questioning was illegal,
for detention is equated with the "seizure" prohibited except on
"probable cause" and is normally lacking in field interrogations.
The semantic confusion caused by applying various definitions
and modes of analysis to the question of whether an officer may stop
a suspected person for questioning led one writer to conclude that the
better definition of arrest was the "any restraint" concept because to
define arrest in terms of taking a person into custody that he may be
forthcoming to answer for the commission of a crime would mean
that "a search of the person, detention for questioning and investiga-
tion, and wholesale round-ups of suspects would not be arrests. This
means that the police may engage in such activities without being
subject to the sanctions for an unlawful arrest.'"
Cases which rely solely on the arrest concept to resolve issues
inherent in stopping for questioning seem to be predicated on two
assumptions, neither of which is made express and neither of which
is beyond dispute. First, courts assume that arrest - as that concept
is handled in tort law - is the only proper mode of analysis to be
used in criminal prosecutions in determining the legality of stopping
suspected persons for investigation. Second, they assume that the ar-
rest privilege is the only privilege officers may have to interfere with
persons suspected of crime. Certainly a court could reasonably rule
that stopping for questioning on less than probable cause to arrest is
an illegal police practice on the grounds that it is an unreasonable
80 Price v. United States, 119 A.2d 718, 719 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1956).
81 Note, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182, 1186 (1952).
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seizure, but such a decision should not be predicated on a paucity of
available privileges provided by tort law. Conversely, a court could
uphold that practice in a limited number of situations, but again that
decision should not be predicated on semantic manipulations of what
are essentially tort law concepts.
C. Consent
Earlier pages discuss the problem of determining when, in terms
of restraint or assumption of control, police action toward a suspect
ought to be subjected to the kinds of limitations on police authority
presumed to follow from attaching the label "arrest" to that action.
A related problem is discussed here. That problem is whether con-
cepts of "voluntary cooperation" versus "involuntary cooperation"
may realistically be used to set the outer limits on the law's concern
with police, on-the-street practices.82 The major difficulty is that com-
pliance with a request of a police officer to provide him with infor-
mation because of the citizen's own perception about his social obli-
gations frequently cannot be distinguished reliably from compliance
influenced by subtle and unarticulated, albeit real, threats of arrest
or other use of superior force. For example, if the police confront and
question a person on the street and elicit from him self-incriminating
statements, is it desirable in later stages of the criminal justice system
to make factual inquiries about why the suspect cooperated? This
problem is present in various forms in many of the observed field in-
terrogations. The courts have not adequately resolved the problem,
and legislatures have not addressed it at all.'
A court may avoid the question whether detaining a suspected
person for interrogation was proper if it finds that the suspect "con-
sented." If the suspect consents, there is no detention since the word
implies involuntariness on the part of the suspect. In a strict sense,
then, the question of whether the suspect consented relates not to the
reasonableness of detention but to the question of whether there was
in fact, a detention.
In many instances a court is confronted with a situation in which
it is amply clear that the officer intended to detain the suspect and
82 At least one court has rejected that concept in the field of search and seizure in some
cases: "Around 1:30 in the afternoon, the defendant Busby was accosted on the street
by two members of the narcotic squad of the metropolitan police department who
knew the defendant as a drug addict. Busby 'consented' to a search of his person, al-
though he denied having any marihuana. Finding marihuana in defendant's coat pocket,
the officers arrested him ...." United States v. Busby, 126 F. Supp. 845, 846 (D.D.C.
1954). The court found that the consent was not voluntary in this type of situation.
Conceivably, the same approach might be taken in stopping and questioning cases in
which it is evident to the suspected person that the mere detention wouid reveal evi-
dence of his guilt.
8 But see ALI, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 2.01 (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1966), entitled "Voluntary Cooperation With Law Enforcement Officers."
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clearly conveyed that intention to the suspected person. That the sus-
pected person has not consented to the detention is clear in those in-
stances in which he attempts to leave and is physically restrained by
the officer." In other cases, the officer may verbally convey his in-
tentions by informing the person that he is being detained," or this
may be made clear by the actions of the officer such as by drawing a
gun.
86
The difficult cases arise when the suspected person stops to talk
to the officer and the officer does not clearly indicate his intentions.
The answer to the question whether the stop or detention was invol-
untary on the part of the suspected person may even be ambiguous
when an automobile is stopped by the police, for such stops may be
made by waving to the driver, sounding the horn, or by use of a spot-
light.
There are several ways to look at the problem of the voluntari-
ness of the detention. One might take the position that if the sus-
pected person does not object to the stopping, either verbally or by
conduct, it would then be considered voluntary. But the realities in-
volved in police confrontation of persons on the street indicate that
such a position is highly unrealistic. To presume that consent to in-
terrogation was tacitly given because the suspected person did not
object is to rely on expediency at the expense of a real attempt to
understand the nature of the detention.
Another approach might emphasize the importance of whether
the suspected person correctly believed that he had an alternative to
submitting to the detention. Obviously, the consent cannot be con-
sidered voluntary if there was no real alternative. The alternative,
if there were one, would be to avoid confrontation with the officer
who has indicated that he wants to interrogate. Two difficulties
arise in considering that alternative. First, the courts often consider
flight or avoidance to be evidence of guilt.87 In some instances, flight
or avoidance is even considered sufficient to constitute probable
cause to arrest.8 Thus, if the only alternative to "consenting" to
detention is to provide the officer with even more evidence of guilt,
and perhaps enough to support an arrest, then the suspect is caught
in a legal dilemma. If a suspect submits because of this reason, then
it clearly cannot be considered voluntary.
8 Commonwealth v. Doe, 109 Pa. Super. 187, 167 Atl. 241 (1933).
85 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 179 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1959) (suspect told he
was not under arrest, but "just being detained") ; People v. Murphy, 173 Cal. App. 2d
367, 343 P.2d 273 (1959) (suspect told he was just being "checked out," but not
being held).
8s See, e.g., People v. Mirbelle, 276 111. App. 533 (1934).
87 Green v. United States, 259 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 917
(1959).
8 8 United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe, 139 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
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Secondly, even when the flight or avoidance would not be
considered by a court to be evidence of guilt sufficient to permit
detention or arrest, the suspected person may still face a dilemma
for it is clear that police officers almost invariably attempt to re-
strain a person who does not "willingly" submit to interrogation.
If the alternative to voluntary submission is physical restraint, it
again seems clear that the suspect cannot be considered to have
assented to the questioning. Nevertheless, some courts continue to
refer to the right of the suspect to refuse to halt,89 an alternative that
has a tenuous existence.
Other courts emphasize the mental attitude of the suspect or of
the officer. It has been held that confrontation by an officer in
uniform amounted to detention because the suspect "no doubt
thought he was bound to stop when approached,"9 and one judge
argued that the suspect involved "was arrested as soon as the police
accosted him, for he must have known at once that he was no longer
free to walk away. '"91
Whether the suspect in fact has available to him the alternative
of refusing to halt may depend upon the intent of the police officer
who confronts him. When the officer's conduct is such that it does
not clearly indicate whether he intends to use force to detain should
that become necessary, the only way of ascertaining that intent is to
ask the officer. In one case, the officer indicated frankly that he
did not know what he would have done if the suspect tried to leave.92
In other cases, the court simply held that consent is a question of fact
to be determined by the fact finder at trial. 3
The difficulty with these approaches to resolving the question
of consent is that they assume that voluntariness is a meaningful
concept in this context. The fact which is perhaps of greatest
significance is that the overwhelming majority of persons whom the
police desire to interrogate do in fact submit to that interrogation.
Because of that fact it seems unlikely that an officer would form an
intent to forcibly detain should he encounter what is almost a purely
hypothetical contingency of a refusal to submit. It is possible, of
course, that a particular officer may have made a generalized decision
89 Green v. United States, 259 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 917
(1959).
90 State v. Gulczynski, 32 Del. 120, 123, 12o Atl. 88, 89'(1922).
91 Ellis v. United States, 264 F.2d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir.) (dissent), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
998 (1959).
92 Pena v. State, 111 Tex. Crim. 218, 12 S.W.2d 1015 (1928).
93 See, e.g., People v. Sanchez, 191 Cal. App. 2d 783, 12 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1961).
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to use force, if necessary, anytime he encounters a suspected person
who refuses to submit to his interrogation. It seems unlikely that
an officer who entertains an actual belief that the person he desires
to interrogate may be guilty of a criminal offense would permit
investigation to be thwarted by the simple expediency of a refusal
to halt. This is particularly true if the officer believes he has a right
to stop and interrogate persons who reasonably arouse his suspicions.
Because an officer probably does not even make a particularized
decision in each case, and because if he did it likely would be to use
actual restraint if that became necessary, it may be argued that "con-
sent" on the part of the suspect is a meaningless concept. This may
be true even when the suspect does "voluntarily" submit to interroga-
tion by stopping. He may believe that he has an alternative, but in
fact he probably does not.
In one type of situation, the "calculated risk" theory has been
advanced in support of consent doctrines. In United States v. Vita,94
the question arose as to whether damaging statements were made
while the defendant was under arrest or while voluntarily in the pres-
ence of the police. The court found that he had voluntarily sub-
mitted to the investigation:
Vita was apparently confident of his ability to talk himself clear
of whatever suspicions the F.B.I. had of his possible complicity.
Surprising as it may seem, the guilty are often as eager as the inno-
cent to explain what they can to law enforcement officials. The very
same naive optimism which spurs the criminal on to commit his
illegal act in the belief that it will not be detected often leads him
to feel that in a face-to-face encounter with the authorities he will
be able to beguile them into exculpating him. Having chosen to talk
with the F.B.I. agents, Vita cannot now be heard to complain be-
cause his calculated risk worked to his disadvantage."
Perhaps the same assumptions underlie those cases which hold
that the defendant consented to a search which revealed possession of
contraband." It would seem that consent is an appropriate concept
to use in the field interrogation only if a court is willing to attribute
not only that type of reasoning to the suspected person who submits,
but in addition assumes that a real alternative existed to the suspect
and that he was aware of it.
D. The Petty Offender
When a case arises in which a police officer has stopped or de-
9294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823 (1962).
95 d. at 529.
96 See, e.g., People v. Sanchez, 191 Cal. App. 2d 783, 12 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1961).
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tained a person who committed a traffic offense97 and has thereby
secured evidence of guilt of a more serious offense, courts have
tended to oversimplify their approach to determining the legality of
the police conduct. Quite frequently the appellate court will advert
to the fact that the suspect committed a violation and conclude that
the detention was therefore lawful: "About 10:45 at night Officer
Lewis and his partner saw defendant making a U-turn. They had a
right to interrogate him."98
In a number of cases this simplified approach leads to an ob-
fuscation of the issues relating to field interrogation. Whether or
not the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect the person of
criminal activity apart from traffic infractions, the appellate court's
determination of the legality of the detention may be based entirely
on the essentially fortuitous presence of a traffic infraction. "9 But
97 Most Of the observed and reported cases involved traffic violations. But in Green v.
United States, 259 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 917 (1959),
members of a narcotic squad saw two men on the street, one of whom was known to
them as a narcotic user. They called the two men to come to the car. The known user
did, but the other man attempted to escape from them by running into a nearby house.
He was unsuccessful in gaining entry and was apprehended.
The court upheld the subsequent arrest, but one judge dissenting, posed the issue
as follows:
If appellant's attempt to get into the house amounted to a crime we would
reach some of the problems, pressed on us by appellant, as to whether the
police may, in effect, manufacture the justification for searching a mere sus-
pect by spurring him into committing some misdemeanor. E.g., is a person
liable to arrest for illegal entry if he runs into the nearest house, against the
owner's will, in an attempt to flee from threatened violence by unidentified
assailants? If, instead of forcing his way into a house in flight from the ap-
parent threat, the person runs across a street against a traffic light, may the
police arrest him and, if so, may they search him? Since appellant's conduct
did not amount to a crime, as I view the case, these problems do not arise.
259 F.2d at 183 n.1.
98 People v. Cantley, 163 Cal. App. 2d 762, 767, 329 P.2d 993, 996 (1958). Whether
"erratic" driving patterns actually constitute an offense has been considered of second-
ary importance to some courts, and stopping such drivers to determine whether they
are intoxicated has generally been upheld. See, e.g., Hodge v. State, 97 Okla. Crim. 73,
258 P.2d 215 '(1953) ; Raper v. State, 96 Okla. Crim. 18, 248 P.2d 267 (1952) ; Robe-
deaux v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 171, 232 P.2d 642 (1951) ; Ervin v. State, 196 Tenn.
459, 268 S.W.2d 351 (1954).
9 Robinson v. United States, 283 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 919
(1960) ; People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956) ; People v. One 1955
Ford Victoria, 193 Cal. App. 2d 213, 13 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1961) ; People v. Lewis, 187
Cal. App. 2d 373, 9 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1960) ; People v. Nesbitt, 183 Cal. App. 2d 452,
7 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1960) ; People v. Underhill, 169 Cal. App. 2d 862, 338 P.2d 38 (1959) ;
People v. Anders, 167 Cal. App. 2d 65, 333 P.2d 854 (1959) ; People v. Sanson, 156
Cal. App. 2d 250, 319 P.2d 422 (1957) ; People v. Dore, 146 Cal. App. 2d 541, 304
P.2d 103 (1956) ; People v. Johnson, 139 Cal. App. 2d 663, 294 P.2d 189 (1956) ;
State v. Moore, 187 A.2d 807 (Super. Ct. Del. 1963) ; State v. Harris, 265 Minn. 260,
121 N.W.2d 327, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 867 (1963) ; Moore v. State, 306 P.2d 358
(Okla. Crim. App. 1957); State v. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962).
Other types of offenses give rise to suspicion that the driver is guilty of a felony.
When officers observe a car with no license plate or a plate which is not illuminated
at night, or when they observe a person driving without any lights at night, they may
conclude that the person is attempting to avoid being detected or identified. And a
person seen speeding is viewed in the same way as a person running down the street-
both are considered suspicious. The fact that the suspicious conduct of the one is an
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observation of the practice makes it clear that a violation of the traf-
fic code is frequently used as a subterfuge by officers who desire to
interrogate a person about a more serious offense.
The discretion held by patrol officers not to enforce traffic
regulations may be used by them to gain "consent" to field interroga-
tion or to a thorough search of either the person or his car. If nothing
incriminating is found in the search, then no citation is issued. Sel-
dom will the subject complain for he is being given a "break" by the
nonenforcement of the traffic laws. The petty offense is a subter-
fuge relied upon by the officers to gain the cooperation of the person
and, if incriminating evidence is found, may later be urged as justi-
fication of the stopping and detaining for questioning.10
Although a large body of law has been developed on the ques-
tion of the legality of conducting searches of traffic violators,' the
courts have seldom considered the question whether the same viola-
tion ought to justify stopping a person for interrogation unrelated to
the traffic offense.I°s
Because of the judicial approach to field interrogation problems
in cases where the suspect is also a traffic violator, a number of dif-
ferent, recurring factual situations are insufficiently analyzed. These
situations are: (1) the violator who does not cause suspicion of any
other offense; (2) the driver whose violation itself causes suspicion
of a greater offense (for example, a missing license plate suggests to
the police that the car may be stolen) ; (3) a driver who is already
under suspicion commits a traffic offense (if followed long enough
many persons will be observed to commit some minor infraction);
(4) manifestation of suspicion by police causes a traffic offense
(frequently drivers will attempt to flee after officers have indicated
they want to interrogate them and will commit traffic violations in
their flight). A police officer, of course, is privileged to stop ve-
hicles when a violation of a traffic regulation is committed in his
presence. However, it is questionable whether the police conduct is
offense while the conduct of the other is not is essentially incidental. Both will be
stopped and questioned. See also Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876 (1962) ; Campbell v. United States, 289 F.2d 775 (D.C.
Cir. 1961) ; People v. Linden, 185 Cal. App. 2d 752, 8 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1960).
100 The Chicago Police Department awards one hundred dollars to the patrol officer who
solves a serious crime through a stop for a traffic violation. It is entitled the "Traffic
Award of the Month."
101 Agota, Search and Seizure Incident to Traffic Violations - A Reply to Professor
Simeone, 7 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1 (1962) ; Notes, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 459 (1963) ; 49
ILL. B.J. 680 '(1961) ; 10 MiAMI L.Q. 54 (1955) ; 11 OKLA. L. REV. 317 (1958);
1960 U. ILL. L.F. 440; 6 WAYNE L. REv. 413 (1960); 1959 Wis. L. REv. 347.
102 But see State v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960).
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within that privilege when the detention is for purposes other than
issuance of a summons. 1m
The police certainly must be privileged to detain traffic viola-
tors, and it might be reasonable to privilege officers to stop and
question suspicious persons found on the street, but different ques-
tions arise when one is used to accomplish the other. But for the
most part, courts have tended to equate the two.
The question arises why police officers who have decided that a
person is suspicious and should be interrogated bother to attempt to
justify the stop on the basis of a traffic violation when they believe,
in some cases, that they are within the realm of their authority in
making the stop without observing the violation. There seems to be
a twofold answer. First, following this practice probably results in
better public relations than would the practice of informing the per-
son that the officer deemed him to be suspicious. In addition to
avoiding the accusation inherent in a field interrogation, the suspected
person often believes that the police have given him a "break" be-
cause the traffic violation does not result in a traffic ticket. Second,
where the law is ambiguous in some respects, the practice may be
followed because the police desire to uphold beyond cavil the legiti-
macy of the stop should the investigation prove fruitful, or to uphold
the legitimacy of a search by using an implied threat of a traffic
ticket to induce permission to search the person and vehicle. Because
courts have failed to make the important distinctions emphasized in
this section, to some extent, at least, the police have been successful
in gaining acceptance of stopping and questioning practices by dis-
guising them under the privilege to stop persons for the purpose of
issuing a summons or traffic ticket.
E. The Test of Reasonableness of the Police Conduct
One group of courts has used a different mode of analysis in re-
solving field interrogation issues. One way of viewing the system of
criminal justice administration is in terms of the amount of evidence
103 The problem is analogous to that which arises from stops made by officers under the
authority of the so-called demand statutes, which imply authority of an officer to stop
a driver and demand to see his operator's license. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2,
§ 6-118 (1963) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-244 (1963) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2011
(1960) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 343.18(1) (1958). The Illinois statute provides in part:
"Every licensee or permitee shall have his operator's or chauffeur's license or permit in
his immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and, for the pur-
pose of indicating compliance with this requirement, shall display such license or per-
mit.., upon demand...."
Courts have held that those statutes do give an officer authority to stop motorists,
but they have also insisted that the stop be made in "good faith." that is. for the purpose
of ascertaining whether the driver is properly licensed and not as a subterfuge to uphold
stops made for the purpose of investigating other possible offenses. An excellent analy-
sis of these statutes is contained in Note, 1960 WAsH. U.L.Q., 279. Similar reasoning
might lead to the conclusion that officers may not use a traffic offense as a pretext to
stop motorists for investigation of more serious crimes.
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of guilt which must be available to the state in order to impose re-
strictions on individual liberties; the sine qua non of legal state ac-
tion - whether by police, prosecutors, judges, or juries - is pos-
session of evidence which meets a pre-determined, generalized stand-
ard of sufficiency of evidence which increases both quantitatively and
qualitatively at various stages of the criminal justice process. It is
clear, for example, that a higher standard of sufficiency of evidence
must be met in order to convict than is required at preliminary exam-
inations to bind over a defendant for trial.
This requirement of satisfaction of an ascending evidence suf-
ficiency standard is predicated on a belief that the amount of inter-
ference with individual liberties which the state action might entail
must be justified by a concomitant certitude that the person is guilty
of criminal conduct. Because conviction is normally more onerous to
a defendant than is charging, evidence of guilt must be greater to
support the legality of the former than of the latter.
If that is the way the system is designed to function, one would
logically expect to find expressions of evidence sufficiency standards
to match all phases of state interferences with individuals. But that
is not always the case. Typically the first standard one encounters on
the ascending scale is that which governs arrests.
But the approach taken by some courts in resolving issues re-
lating to the legality of stopping for questioning is to create a concept
which might be termed "reasonable grounds to investigate." Under
this approach, courts require a certain amount of evidence of criminal
conduct - less than that required for arrest - to support investiga-
tive interferences which constitute burdens on the suspected person
less than that engendered by arrest for prosecution. Under this
scheme, investigative techniques such as stopping a person on the
street for questioning would require some evidence of guilt, but less
than the "probable cause" or "reasonable grounds" which are re-
quired to effect an arrest. Consistent with the rest of the criminal
justice intake system, the lower evidence sufficiency standard might
be justified by the lesser degree of interference with the suspect.
This approach finds considerable support in California, and, to
a lesser extent, in some other jurisdictions. The following quotation
is typical of the approach taken by California courts:
The right to interrogate, under the circumstances noted, includes the
right to stop the automobile in which the person to be interrogated
is riding. . . . Such a procedure does not constitute an arrest even
though the person interrogated may be detained momentarily . . .
and the existence of facts constituting probable cause to justify an
arrest is not a condition precedent to such an investigation.'0
104 People v. Ellsworth, 190 Cal. App. 2d 844, 847, 12 Cal. Rptr. 433, 435 (1961).
1966
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
The question may be raised whether states are free to take that
approach in the wake of Mapp v. Ohio 5 which requires states to ex-
clude evidence which is illegally seized. Must state courts follow fed-
eral rules relating to what evidence is illegally obtained? At this
point there are two answers to that question. In the first place, it is
by no means clear that state courts will not be left free to decide the
proper ambit of the exclusionary rule subject only to minimal stand-
ards set by federal courts. This is apparently the assumption of the
California courts." 6 Secondly, there is no clear federal rule on
whether stopping for questioning on grounds less than that which
would be necessary to effect an arrest constitutes an illegal procedure.
Indeed, one of the most significant opinions dealing with the
problem is United States v. Bonanno,"° the case arising out of the
so-called "Appalachian meeting." State officers for some time had been
investigating the owner of an estate in Appalachia. When they learned
that a large meeting was being held on that estate and that several of
the participants were persons known to have criminal records, they
notified federal agents. Together these agencies decided to set up a
roadblock on the road leading from the estate to learn the identity of
the persons attending the meeting. Several persons were stopped and
questioned as they drove from the estate and, when the volume of
cars became too great for the officers, the persons were requested to
go to the local police station to give their name, address, and reason
for being there. With one exception, all of the approximately sixty
persons questioned either answered the questions of the officers at
the roadblock or later at the station without objection. One man
refused to answer any questions and he was allowed to proceed. A
subsequent prosecution was based on the theory that the participants
in the meeting had conspired to conceal the real purpose of the meet-
ing, and the defense moved to suppress the evidence of the conspiracy
obtained during the questioning.
Judge Kaufman held that police could, under certain circum-
stances, stop persons for questioning and that such a police procedure
would not constitute illegal conduct requiring exclusion of any evi-
dence obtained. The defendants claimed that the stopping for ques-
tioning amounted to an arrest and, because it was accomplished on
insufficient evidence, was illegal. But the court refused to rest its
opinion on the definition of a word which may mean different things
in different contexts:
'Arrest' is just such a word, not only because it is necessarily un-
specific and descriptive of complex, often extended processes, but
105 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
106 Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319.
107 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub nom, United States v.
Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
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because in different contexts it describes different processes, each of
which has built up, in both legal and common parlance, sharply
divergent emotional connotations.
1 08
The court pointed out, for example, that the stopping did not amount
to a "technical" arrest under New York law because "arrest" is there
defined as taking a person into custody that he may be held to answer
for a crime.'0 9 Neither, said the court, would a layman be likely to
consider a stopping for interrogation an arrest."' Judge Kaufman
then redefined the issue presented to the court:
But, to rely solely upon the fact that there was no technical ar-
rest, or no arrest as that term is commonly understood, would be to
fall into the very semantic trap alluded to above. The problem, as I
see it, is not whether the challenged police procedures constituted an'arrest,' but whether these procedures were of such a character that
all evidence stemming from them must be suppressed.'
It was concluded that the stopping for questioning under the cir-
cumstances of this case was proper, that evidence gained thereby
would not be excluded, and that no federal rule existed which re-
quired a contrary finding."
2
On appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the conviction
was set aside on grounds not relating to the admissibility of the evi-
dence used at trial."' The principal opinion filed on that appeal
treated the issue as moot,"4 but the concurring opinion went further:
Thus the detention, transportation to the distant Vestal police sta-
tion, and search there of most of the defendants . . . seems highly
dubious, and the admission of their statements in evidence of doubt-
ful validity. So the court's ruling supporting admissibility in . . .
108 United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
109 Ibid.
"o Id. at 78.
M Ibid.
112 One of the chief difficulties faced by the court was the holding of the Supreme Court
in United States v. Henry, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). Judge Kaufman relied on two grounds
to distinguish that case: (1) the government in Henry conceded that the stopping was
an arrest and the only question then was whether probable cause existed to arrest the
suspects; (2) physical contraband was seized in Henry while in Bonanno the evidence
consisted of voluntary, exculpatory statements. On the second point, the court said: "It
is impossible to equate the seizure of physical, incriminating evidence with the elicitation
of voluntary, exculpatory statements." United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 86
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). But it appears that the United States Supreme Court has made that
equation in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In addition to limiting
the holding to cases involving "voluntary, exculpatory statements," the court limits the
right of police to stop and question by permitting such conduct only when: (1) it is
believed that a crime has already been committed; (2) the grounds for such belief are
reasonable; and (3) there is need for immediate action.
Comment, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 262 (1960) criticizes the Bonanno opinion for
failure properly to distinguish the Henry case. It is there contended that the court could
not fairly distinguish Henry on the ground that different types of evidence were secured
in the two cases because "the point at issue here is whether stopping is an arrest, the de-
termination of which is not affected by the sort of evidence uncovered as a result of
stopping." Id. at 264 n.21. However the court expressly stated that whether stopping
is an arrest is not the issue; the issue was the reasonableness of the police conduct in-
volved in the stopping.
"13 United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cr. 1960).
1
4 Id. at 413 n.6.
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Bonanno ... would seem at variance with Henry v. United States
... and the rationale there set forth.115
On the other hand, several years later, Judge Lumbard who wrote the
principal opinion, emphasized the need for police officers to know
their powers of stopping for questioning."' There are similar divi-
sions of opinion within other federal circuits and among circuits.1
It is difficult to assess the relationship between a court's selec-
tion of a mode of analysis and its possible pre-disposition about the
result that should be reached in the particular case or in regulating
police conduct in the entire area of stopping for questioning. There is
some evidence, however, that the way in which the issue is posed and
analyzed is merely a reflection of a pre-disposition to decide the case
one way or the other. It is clear, for example, that when the court
decides that the case must be approached in terms of "arrest" and
that term is then defined to mean "any restraint," the court will, in
the large majority of cases, decide ultimately that the stopping for
questioning was illegal for there will often be inadequate evidence
to meet that standard set for effecting arrests.
But when a court decides that stopping for questioning is not
illegal conduct per se, and that the ultimate disposition of the case
must turn upon a determination of the "reasonableness" of the police
conduct involved, then the court still must find either that the con-
duct complained of was legal or illegal. The selection of this ap-
proach does not necessarily lead to an inevitable result as does selec-
tion of the other approach. There is some evidence, however, that
selection of this approach does, in fact, normally lead to upholding
the police conduct.
California courts are the leading judicial exponents of the
"reasonableness" approach to resolving issues relating to stopping
and questioning. It may be of some significance that in only a trivial
number of those cases did an appellate court find the conduct of the
police unreasonable.118
Even though California courts have considered the question
more often than have other courts, the results of those decisions are
not necessarily representative of all courts which have chosen to re-
ject the arrest-or-nothing approach in favor of the more flexible
rule. If California courts have been too lax in their determinations
115 Id. at 420 n.3 (concurring opinion).
116 Lumbard, The Administration of Criminal justice: Some Problems and Their Resolu-
tion, 49 A.B.A.J. 840, 842 (1963).
117Compare mith v. United States, 2(-4 F.2d 8th Cir 1959N 'rd Lee v. Uited St,
221 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1954), with Plazola v. United States, 291 F.2d 56 (9th Cir.
1961).
118 A search is usually involved in such cases. See, e.g., People v. Schraier, 141 Cal. App.
2d 600, 297 P.2d 81 (1956).
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about what is reasonable police conduct,"' the fault may lie in their
determinations about what factors are relevant in considering whether
given police action was reasonable.
III. LEGISLATION RELATING TO SUSPICIOUS PERSONS
Only a very small part of the legislation arguably related to
field interrogation actually confronts the issues in those terms. Thus,
there is little legislative definition of who may be detained. For the
most part, legislation deals with the problem as one of substantive
criminal law ostensibly designed to control "suspicious" persons.
Legislative bodies have taken five different approaches to the prob-
lem.12 These are: (1) suspicious conduct or appearance, without
more, may be made a criminal offense; (2) suspicious circumstances
may be the basis of a criminal prosecution when the suspect does not
"satisfactorily account" for those circumstances; (3) suspicious con-
duct or appearance, combined with a failure to account, may be made
the basis for in-custody investigation, not considered an arrest; (4)
suspicious conduct or appearance may be made the basis of on-the-
street interrogation only, unless adequate grounds to arrest are dis-
covered; and (5) the police may be authorized to order a suspicious
person to remove himself from the area where he is found. Several
of these approaches may exist in the same jurisdiction.'
A. Suspicion as a Substantive Offense
The Kansas statute is typical:..
Any person . . .who shall be found loitering without visible
means of support in any community... shall be deemed a vagrant,
and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not less than
one hundred nor more than five hundred dollars, and shall be im-
prisoned in the county jail for a period not less than thirty days nor
more than six months.
22
On its face, it is not at all apparent that this type of statute is aimed
at the same problem with which field interrogation is supposed to
deal. It seems, rather, to be an embodiment of the "breeding ground
of criminals" theory with a concomitant imposition of criminal sanc-
tions against persons whose economic status is presumed to make
them peculiarly susceptible to criminal propensities.
119 See, e.g., People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956).
'2oMODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12, comment (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
121 See text accompanying note 151 infra.
122 Vagrancy laws of various types are collected and discussed in these articles: Douglas,
Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960) ; Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law
and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956) ; Lacey, Vagrancy and Other
Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1203 (1953); Sherry, Vagrants,
Rogues, and Vagabonds - Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 557
(1960) ; Comment, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 506 (1935) ; Comment, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 616
(1935); Note, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 102 (1962) ; Note, 59 YALE L.J. 151 (1950).
1 2 3
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2409 (1963).
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In practice the vagrancy laws in Kansas are used as a means of
obtaining custody of a person the police desire to investigate for a
suspected offense but who may not be arrested on the more serious
charge."2 4 Because of the broad sweep of the law, the poor economic
status of the persons involved, and the cooperation of lower court
judges, this use of the vagrancy laws goes substantially unchallenged.
Despite the increasing amount of literature which is highly
critical of this type of law,125 similar provisions have survived sub-
stantive code revisions.'26 Why this is so is not entirely clear, but a
California experience provides some interesting evidence that it is
felt that these laws are needed to fulfill a law enforcement function
not related to vagrancy.
In 1959 the California legislature approved a proposal which
would, inter alia, repeal two provisions of the existing vagrancy
laws.'27 The existing law included the following classes of persons
among those denominated vagrants: (1) every person who roams
about from place to place without any lawful business and (2) every
person who wanders about the streets at late or unusual hours of the
night, without any visible or lawful business.' Governor Brown
vetoed the repeal of these two sections and subsequently explained
his reasons:
I am sympathetic to the overall purpose of the Bill which was
to punish individuals only for wrongful actions and not simply be-
cause of their status. But I found that in accomplishing this laud-
able objective the proposed legislation unfortunately removed from
police control certain dangerous conduct, regulation of which is
necessary in the public interest.
The Bill proposed to repeal subdivisions 3 and 6 of the present
law without substituting any kind of control over those whose con-
duct afforded occasion for legitimate suspicion. I am aware that
police action in this regard has led to criticism, and I agree that the
present law should be revised. But I do not think that the possibility
of abuse justifies completely denying any controls at all. Legislation
in this area would be effective if it gave some definition of authority
and obligation to which the private citizen and the policeman could
reasonably and fairly conform. 129
1
2
4 LAFAVE, ARREST 354-60 (1965).
125 See authorities cited in note 122 supra. The most common criticism is the peculiar
susceptibility to abuse inherent in this type of legislation.
126 Only one state - Illinois - does not have vagrancy-type law either by statute or com-
mon law. But local ordinances serve the same purpose. See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MU-
NICIPAL CODE § 193.1 which lists as a disorderly person "all persons found loitering
about any hotel, block, barroom, dram-shop, gambling house, or disorderly house,
or wandering about the streets either by night or day without any known lawful means
of support .. " The standard Chicago Municipal Court "Quasi-Criminal Complaint"
carried by all patrolmen lists this section but curiously omits the word "block" which is
potentially the broadest category.
127 Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds- Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48
CALIF. L. REv. 557, 568-72 (1960).
12 CAL. PEN. CODE § 647.
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Even though it is suggested that this type of vagrancy law is a
necessary weapon in the police arsenal, there is much to indicate that
it is considered a means to accomplish in-custody investigations rather
than to support on-the-street interrogation practices. In California,
the proposed abolition of the two sections of the vagrancy law would
not have affected stopping and questioning authority since that is
derived from appellate cases13 and is not dependent on the vagrancy
statute. But there is, of course, no case-law doctrine which would
permit in-custody investigations without arrest and without consent.
For that practice the vagrancy offense was needed.'
Legislatures may resist repeal of vagrancy-type laws because of
their cognizance and approval of the investigative use made of them;
on the other hand, this reason does not demonstrate a legislative de-
sire to permit stopping and questioning. This type of statute does
not appear to authorize that practice, and it is not used for that pur-
pose. A California legislative committee concluded: "It is fairly
obvious that the police often use a vagrance arrest to cover a sus-
picion arrest."'32 The same is true in Wisconsin and Kansas.'
B. Satisfactory Account Clauses
One result of the agitation for legislative reform of the Cali-
fornia vagrancy law was retention of that law in modified form. The
section is now entitled "disorderly conduct" and provides:
Every person who commits any of the following acts shall be
guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor: ...
(e) Who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to
place without apparent reason or business and who refuses to iden-
129 REPORT OF [California] ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMiTTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
12 (1959-1961).
130 Many of these cases are collected in MARTIN, PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST AND AD-
MISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE [in California] (1960).
131 People v. Wilson, 145 Cal. App. 2d 1, 301 P.2d 974 (1956), illustrates the operation
of the vagrancy laws as an aid to investigation of suspicious persons. The police sus-
pected defendant of engaging in gambling operations but surveillance and field interro-
gation over a period of time failed to reveal evidence adequate to arrest for that offense.
On appeal the court reversed a gambling conviction obtained as a result of a search of
defendant and his car following his arrest for vagrancy:
The present case is a good example of over-zealous law enforcement. The ar-
rest for vagrancy was an obvious subterfuge to try and secure evidence of
bookmaking, and when that arrest, and the search of the person, failed to pro-
duce evidence of that activity, the police officers determined to search de-
fendant's automobile. . . . All that appears in the record is that the police,
for some undisclosed reason, decided to keep a certain restaurant and pool
hall under surveillance. Whatever that reason may have been, it certainly was
not for the purpose of finding evidence that defendant was a vagrant. During
that three-week period of surveillance, defendant was observed daily. During
that time he was not observed committing one illegal or even suspicious act.
145 Cal. App. 2d at 5-6, 301 P.2d at 977. Similar uses of the vagrancy laws are dis-
cussed in the REPORT OF [California] ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 8-19 (1959-1961).
132 REPORT OF [Califomia] ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
10 (1959-1961).
133 LAFAVE, ARREST 354-60 (1965).
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tify himself and to account for his presence when requested by any
peace officer so to do, if the surrounding circumstances are such as
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such
identification.3 4
The comments of the legislative committee regarding this sec-
tion seem to indicate that they view it less as a means of permitting
investigation arrests than as a way of enforcing the police right to
conduct field interrogations of suspicious persons, a right recognized
by appellate courts.135 Thus, the intent was to shift from recognition
of a need for in-custody investigation of persons who may not be ar-
rested, to recognition of the police right to stop and question sus-
pected persons.
While the legislative background of statutes in other states is
less clear, similar vagrancy-type laws - those containing satisfactory
account clauses - may be retained because they imply a power to stop
and question.'36 In Wisconsin, for example, after a thorough revision
of the substantive law code, the vagrancy law still classes as vagrant
"A person found in or loitering near any structure, vehicle or private
grounds who is there without the consent of the owner and is unable
to account for his presence." ' 7 Despite the lack of a clear legislative
purpose to relate this provision to a right to stop and question, the
statute does seem to imply that power.
This implication has been questioned, however. The comments
to a Model Penal Code provision on loitering (vagrancy) also advert
to the relation between account clauses, the right to stop and ques-
tion, and arrest. Although the reporter drafted a proposal which
contains a satisfactory account clause, he disapproved of its adoption
by the Institute. "Loitering statutes, whether or not they include pro-
visions for police interrogation and compulsion on the loiterer to ex-
plain his presence, appear to be designed to enable the police to arrest




CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(e) (Supp. 1965).
1 35 REPORT OF [California] ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(1959-1961).
136 See, e.g., Freeman v. United States, 322 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; Cogdell v. United
States, 307 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 957 (1963); United
States v. Sykes, 305 F.2d 172 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 364
(1964) ; Kelly v. United States, 298 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ; People v. Lucas, 180
Cal. App. 2d 723, 4 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1960); People v. Romero, 156 Cal. App. 2d 48,
318 P.2d 835 (1957); Miles v. Weston, 60 111. 361 (1871) ; City of Por0 tland v. Good-




WIS. STAT. ANN. § 947.02 (2) (1958).
138 MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12, at 63, comment (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
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C. Suspicious Conduct or Appearance, Combined with a Failure to
Account, Authorizes In-Custody Investigation Not Considered an
Arrest
The Uniform Arrest Act provisions have been adopted by the
legislatures of only three states: New Hampshire,'39 Rhode Island,'
and Delaware.' Appellate cases have dealt with some of the issues
raised by this extension of arrest laws in the latter two states. The
cases have dealt mostly with the in-custody detention provisions. If
the appellate cases are representative of the use made of the Uniform
Arrest Act sections, then its primary function is to allow time for the
police to administer in-custody sobriety tests to persons suspected of
driving while intoxicated.'42 The statute has been invoked in cases
where it appears that probable cause to arrest exists,' 4' the de-
tention provisions are confused with post-arrest detention prior to
arraignment,'" and the intended difference between the evidentiary
standards to detain and to arrest has been referred to as a "semantic
quibble.""
139 N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 594.2 (1955).
140 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 12-7-1 to -2 (1956), adopted in 1941. The evidence suffi-
ciency standard to stop provided for by the Uniform Arrest Act is "reasonable ground
to suspect." This was changed to "reason to suspect."
14 1DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1902-03 (1953), adopted in 1951. Minor grammatical
changes were made.
14
2 Halko v. State, 54 Del. 180, 175 A.2d 42 (1962) ; Cannon v. State, 53 Del. 284,
168 A.2d 108 (1961) ; State v. Smith, 47 Del. 334, 91 A.2d 188 (1952) ; Kavanagh
(sic) v. Stenhouse, 93 R.I. 252, 174 A.2d 560 (1961), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S.
516 (1962).
143 De Salvatore v. State, 52 Del. 550, 163 A.2d 244 (1960).
144 State v. De Koenigswarter, 54 Del. 388, 177 A.2d 344 (1962).
145 De Salvatore v. State, 52 Del. 550, 163 A.2d 244 (1960). The court's language, which
has been quoted with approval in Kavanagh [sic] v. Stenhouse, 93 R.I. 252, 255, 174
A.2d 560, 563 (1961), stated:
We can find nothing in [the Uniform Arrest Act] ... which infringes on
the rights of a citizen to be free from detention except, as appellant says, "for
probable cause.' Indeed, we think appellant's attempt to draw a distinction
between an admittedly valid detention upon 'reasonable ground to believe' and
the requirement ... of 'reasonable ground to suspect' is a semantic quibble.
We point out that in Wilson v. State. in referring to the arrest of the de-
fendant, we said, 'Nor can it be doubted that the arrest was legal, that is, upon
reasonable suspicion of felony.' . . . In this context, the words 'suspect' and
'believe' are equivalents.
De Salvatore v. State, supra at 555, 163 A.2d at 249. The Rhode Island court, relying
on De Salvatore, said that the "reason to suspect" of their detention statute was the
equivalent of the "reasonable ground to suspect" of the Delaware statute. Kavanagh
[sic] v. Stenhouse, supra at 255, 174 A.2d at 563. See also Wi!son v. State, 49 Del. 37,
109 A.2d 381 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 983 (1955).
In only one reported instance arising under this act was a stopping and questioning
unrelated to a traffic offense involved. Schaffer v. State, 184 A.2d 689 (Del. 1962),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 834 (1963).
The cases arising under the Uniform Arrest Act which involve suspected driving
while intoxicated litigate only the question whether in-custody detention was proper.
The legality of the on-the-street detention seems to have been assumed. See e.g., Cannon
v. State, 53 Del. 284, 168 A.2d 108 (1961). Furthermore, these cases do not primarily
involve a desire to gain verbal evidence. Instead, the stop provides an opportunity to
smell the breath of the suspect and to observe his physical condition. It appears that
probable cause to arrest may exist without the necessity for field interrogation in this
type of case. See, e.g., State v. Klinehoffer, 53 Del. 550, 173 A.2d 478 (1961).
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Thus, these legislative attempts to deal procedurally with the
problems raised by the suspicious person who may not be arrested
may have failed - at least to the extent that in-custody investigation
was intended to be authorized when grounds to arrest did not exist.
A state which now adopts the Uniform Arrest Act detention provision
runs the risk that it will be similarly emasculated by its courts relying
on the earlier cases.
In contrast, the assumed forerunner of the Uniform Arrest Act
has recently been interpreted by a Massachusetts court to authorize
field interrogation, or a "brief threshold inquiry" as that court termed
it.14 The Massachusetts statute, which some claim is based on com-
mon law,147 provides:
Powers and [D]uties [of Police Officers] .... During the
night time they may examine all persons abroad whom they have
reason to suspect of unlawful design, and may demand of them their
business abroad and whither they are going. . . .Persons so sus-
pected who do not give a satisfactory account of themselves ...
may be arrested ... and may thereafter be safely kept by imprison-
ment or otherwise unless released in the manner provided by law,
and taken before a district court to be examined and prosecuted.
48
Whether this statute actually authorizes prosecution as vagrancy-
type statutes do is doubtful, but at least one authority has assumed
that it does.'49 The Uniform Arrest Act, which clearly was intended to
permit in-custody detention without arrest, 5° may have been ineffec-
tual in doing so. The Massachusetts statute, which may have been
designed to provide for arrest and prosecution, was interpreted by
the court to authorize only on-the-street detention for questioning
when adequate grounds for arrest do not exist.
New Hampshire has both the Uniform Arrest Act provision and
a statute similar to the one in Massachusetts:
Every watchman may arrest any person whom he shall find com-
mitting any disorder, disturbance, crime, or offense, or such as are
strolling about the streets at unreasonable hours, who refuse to give
an account, or are reasonably suspected of giving a false account, of
their business or design, or who can give no account of the occasion
of their being abroad. 151
Because both of those statutes are present in New Hampshire, the
legislative scheme may be interpreted to mean that an officer, in ap-
146 Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 147, 196 N.E. 2d 840 (1964).
147 Ibid. See also note 149 infra.
1
48 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41, § 98 (1958).
149 See 45 Mass. L.Q., Dec. 1960, p.4 , 68-70. THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MASSACHUSETTSAd . ' ° d AA; " I.. i*.k: . .
FOR ... , pprove g a penalt provison to ,,. onh
ground that a general statute gives courts power to punish defendants when no punish-
ment is specifically provided in the substantive statute.
150 Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315 (1942).
Is' N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 105:12 (1955).
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propriate cases, has authority either to arrest or to detain in custody.
However, neither statute has been judicially interpreted.
The Illinois courts have recognized a right to stop and question
persons who reasonably arouse the suspicions of the police." 2 During
the recent revision of the Illinois Criminal Procedure Code, a pro-
posal was made to add a provision which would codify that case law
and extend it to include a detention provision similar to that con-
tained in the Uniform Arrest Act. The tentative final draft provided:
§ 43-2. Right of Inquiry
A peace officer may under reasonable circumstances inquire of
any person his name, address, and the circumstances of his presence.
§ 43-3. Right of Detention
(a) A peace officer may under reasonable circumstances detain
for investigation for a reasonable period of time any person whom he
believes has committed, is committing, or is about to commit any
offense, even though the nature of the offense may be unknown.
(b) A period of detention in excess of four hours shall be
prima facie unreasonable. At the end of the detention period the
person so detained shall be released or shall be arrested.
(c) The release of the person detained does not of itself render
the detention unlawful.
153
Both sections were dropped from the Code before enactment.5
The deletion of these sections is apparently attributable to op-
position expressed by both the American Civil Liberties Union and
the Chicago Police Department. s15  Opposition was also expressed by
152 People v. Faginkrantz, 21 Il. 2d 75, 171 N.E.2d 5 (1960) ; People v. Exum, 382 111.
204, 47 N.E.2d 56 (1943) ; People v. Euctice, 371 111. 159, 20 N.E.2d 83 (1939) ;
People v. Henneman, 367 111. 151, 10 N.E.2d 649 (1937) ; People v. Mirbelle, 276 111.
App. 533 (1934).
153 TENTATIVE FINAL DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED ILLINOIS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
1963, §§ 43-2 to -3 (1962).
15 4 The comments to the Proposed Code, note 153 supra, indicate that the drafters did not
conceive of the inquiry section as a substitute for "investigation arrests," but intended
the detention section to serve that purpose. In the comments to the latter section, it is
stated: "In the great majority of cases in all jurisdictions police unwarrantedly use
vagrancy, disorderly conduct and obstructing justice statutes to support an arrest when
all they need is a little time to verify or 'check out' a story." Id. at 98. For support of
the detention provision, the comments cite ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 10-3 (c) (1961),
which provides:
Any merchant, his agent or employee, who has probable cause to believe
that a person has wrongfully taken or has actual possession of and is about to
wrongfully take merchandise from a mercantile establishment, may detain
such person in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time for the
purpose of investigating the ownership of such merchandise. Such reasonable
detention shall not constitute an arrest nor an unlawful restraint nor shall it
render the merchant, his agent or employee liable to the person detained.
It is doubtful that this statute provides any precedent for the detention provision pro-
posed, but rejected, in the procedural code. Under this section, probable cause must exist
and that is not true of the proposed detention statute. Secondly, it does not provide for
custody at a police station but, apparently, only detention at the "mercantile establish-
ment." No appellate case has dealt with the shoplifter statute.
15Letter from Judge Richard B. Austin, Chairman, Joint Committee to Revise the
(Illinois) Criminal Code, to Superintendent 0. W. Wilson of the Chicago Police De
partment, Jan. 16, 1963, on file at the Chicago Police Department.
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the Civil Rights Committee of the Chicago Bar Association. It was
directed principally at the four-hour detention provision but also
criticized the stopping and questioning section because it failed to
make clear what actions would be appropriate should an officer en-
counter a refusal to cooperate on the part of a suspected person. The
argument was that the right of inquiry section placed in juxtaposition
with the detention provision led to the conclusion that detention
would be appropriate in such cases.'56
Superintendent Wilson of the Chicago Police Department op-
posed the field interrogation provision for the following reasons: 1'
1. The stopping and questioning section did not make it clear
that officers have the right to stop and question. The section was en-
titled "Right of Inquiry" and it merely provided that an officer could
ask questions of persons. It has never been doubted that officers may
ask questions of persons on the street if no detention is involved.
2. The section did not make it explicit whether the suspect's
answer or refusal to answer may be considered relevant to a determi-
nation to arrest.
3. The section did not take into account police officer "ex-
pertise" in evaluating the adequacy of evidence to stop and question
or arrest.
4. The proposal did not make it clear that officers may frisk in-
cident to a field interrogation.
The Superintendent also opposed the detention provisions for
two reasons: (1) it was subject to abusive administration and (2)
it was unnecessary. It was felt that the provision would be inter-
preted by officers to give them the power to pick up and hold for
four hours any person suspected of criminal activity, and that the
four-hour maximum would tend to be construed as a convenient "rule
of thumb" to be applied to all detentions. Finally, the Superintendent
expressed his awareness of the possible unconstitutionality of the
section.
Although the Superintendent is a firm advocate of a right to
stop and question, he expressed the view that an adequate field inter-
rogation power combined with adequate arrest powers would elimi-
nate the need for custody-without-arrest powers:
If provision is made for effective inquiry and if there is a con-
tinued recognition of the fact that good law enforcement requires a
156 REPORT BY THE CIVIL RIGHTS COMMITTEE OF THE CHICAGO BAR ASS'N ON CERTAIN
DETENTION ANDRREST PROVISIONS OF THE DR-AFT ILLINOIS CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, Jan. 21, 1963. The report was not acted upon by the Chicago Bar Ass'n
as a whole.
157 Wilson, Comments Presented at the Conference on the Proposed Illinois Code of
Criminal Procedure, Jan. 12, 1963.
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reasonable opportunity for in-custody investigation following arrest,
then we do not feel that there is a need for an additional provision
enabling the police to take into custody suspects when there are not
reasonable grounds for arrest. In other words, adequate authority to
inquire as proposed will minimize the need for in-custody investi-
gation of suspects and thus achieve the objective not only of effec-
tive enforcement but also of minimizing the instances in which sus-
pects have to be taken into custody.
We appreciate that the four-hour detention proposal is made
with the objective of increasing the capability of law enforcement
to deal with the increasingly serious crime problem. Needless to say,
we concur in that objective. But we think the objective can better
and more properly be achieved by making clear the need for and the
propriety of adequate inquiry and an adequate opportunity for rea-
sonable in-custody investigation following a lawful arrest118
Because of the perceived inadequacies of the proposed legisla-
tion the legislature apparently intended to leave to the courts the task
of developing the existing Illinois case-law which presently recognizes
a right to stop and question. 59
D. On-the-Street Interrogation Only
A recent New York law omits the in-custody detention pro-
vision:
1. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public
place who he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is
about to commit a felony or [specified misdemeanors] . . . and may
demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning
pursuant to this section and reasonably suspects that he is in danger
of life or limb, he may search such person for a dangerous weapon.
If the police officer finds such a weapon or any other thing the pos-
session of which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep it
until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either
return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person. 60
Some New York cases decided prior to enactment of this statute
held that some field interrogation procedures were unlawful under
158 Id. at 7.
159 52 ILL. B.J. 106, 108 (1963). Similar legislation, H.B. 1078, has recently been vetoed.
See veto message from Governor Otto Kerner to Secretary of State (Illinois), August
17, 1965.
160 McKinney's Session Law News, ch. 86 (1964) which became N.Y. CODE CRIM.
PRoc. § 180-a, eff. July 1, 1964. For discussion of this statute see Kuh, Reflections on
New York's "Stop-and-Frisk" Law and Its Claimed Unconstitutionality, 56 J. ClUM. L.,
C. & P.S. 32 (1965) ; Ronayne, The Right to Investigate and New York's "Stop and
Frisk" Law, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 211 (1964) ; Siegel, The New York "Frisk" and
"Knock-Not" Statutes: Are They Constitutional?, 30 BROOKLYN L. REV. 274 (1964);
Wolbrette, Detention for Questioning in Louisiana, 39 TUL. L. REV. 69 (1964). See
also 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 174 (1964); Id. at 397; 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 545
(1965) ; Comment, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 848 (1965) ; 50 CORNELL L.Q. 529 (1965) ;
78 HARV. L. REV. 473 (1964); Note, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 641 (1964); 10 N.Y.L.F.
410 (1964); Comment, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1093 (1964); 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
392 '(1964); 16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 685 (1965) ; 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 119.
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New York law.1" ' Sponsors of this measure have made it clear that
the law was intended to disapprove of those cases which held that
on-the-street detention with an incidental frisk was illegal.6 '
E. Move-On Orders
It has been suggested that a fifth way of dealing with suspicious
persons who may not be arrested is to empower the police to order
them to remove themselves from where they are found."' The as-
sumption is that this would prevent a crime if they are contemplating
one. One way of granting this power is to prohibit loitering'64 and
thereby presumably empower the police to exercise discretion not to
arrest all persons who fall within the literal purview of the law, but
to order them to move on instead, i.e., to desist from their illegal
activity.
However, New York Penal Law section 722 specifically author-
izes the police to order loitering persons to move on. That statute
provides in part: "Any person ... with intent to provoke a breach
of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned
* . .congregates with others on a public street and refuses to move
on when ordered by the police"'65 is guilty of disorderly conduct. The
statute has withstood numerous constitutional attacks,' and it has
been held that the statute was intended to give police broad discretion
161 No New York case actually held that on-the-street detention, without more, was un-
authorized. Reversals of convictions have been predicated on frisking, People v.
Rivera, 38 Misc. 2d 586, 238 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1963), rev'd, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d
32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965), and in-custody de-
tentions, People v. Estrialgo, 37 Misc. 2d 264, 233 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 1962). Cf.
People v. Salerno, 38 Misc. 2d 467, 235 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1962) which upheld the right
to frisk. In Estrialgo, the court indicated the police did have a right to stop and ques-
tion, but stated that the right is severely restricted.
16 The "stop and frisk" law, as it is called, was part of a package recommendation made
by Governor Rockefeller to the New York Legislature. This package included the law
authorizing execution of warrants without notice to occupants of a dwelling in some
situations. Support for both of these measures centered in the New York State Com-
bined Council of Law Enforcement Officials, an organization created for this purpose,
and coordinated by Richard H. Kuh. Support for the measure is found in Kuh, The
Mapp Case One Year After: An Appraisal of Its Impact in New York, 148 N.Y.L.J. 4
(1962). The Combined Council also published a booklet entitled "Police Protection-
More or Less?" which criticizes the results in some of the New York cases in a legiti-
mate memorandum.
The bill was disapproved by the New York Civil Liberties Union, LEGISLATIVE
MEMORANDUM No. 14, Jan. 25, 1964; by the Committee on Criminal Courts of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1964 LEGISLATIVE BULLETIN No. 2;
and by the New York State Bar Association Committee on Penal Law and Criminal
Procedure, NEW YORK STATE BAR NEWS, RaLEASE No. 21, Feb. 25, 1964.
163 MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12, comment (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
14 Many of the vagrancy-type laws include loitering as one type of prohibited behavior
and it is usually combined with other elements such as "no visible means of support."
In addition to those authorities cited in note 122 supra, see Comments, 49 J. ChUM. L.,
C. & P.S. 562 (1959); 6 ST. Louis U.L.J. 247 (1960).
16 N.Y. ANN. PEN. LAW 39 pt. I, § 722 (3).
16 The cases are collected in Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 1152 (1959). This annotation deals al-
most exclusively with the New York statute. But see People v. Diaz, 4 N.Y.2d 469,
151 N.E.2d 871, 176 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1958).
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in determining whom they might order to move on. Upholding the
conviction of defendant for disorderly conduct when he failed to
move on, the court said:
Certainly the evidence shows that the defendant did "congre-
gate" with five or six friends on a public street, even if he did so in
an orderly and inoffensive way. . . . Their act was probably not
unreasonable.... It was near midnight on a summer evening ...
Doubtless the sidewalk was then used mainly for recreation, yet it
was the duty of the police officer to see that its use for pedestrian
passage was not unreasonably obstructed. The evidence sustains a
finding that the police officer's direction to these groups to move on
was given in performance of that duty.
Even if we should find that the police officer's interference was
unnecessary, and, in the circumstances, ill-advised, we could not find
that it was unauthorized .... Friends may congregate on the side-
walk in an orderly group for a short conversation, without creating
disorder or unduly offending or obstructing others, but they must,move on' when a police officer so directs for the purpose of avoid-
ing possible disorder which otherwise might ensue .... A refusal to
obey such an order can be justified only where the circumstances
show conclusively that the police officer's direction was purely arbi-
trary and was not calculated in any way to promote the public
order.8
7
Certainly the New York court construed the statute in its broadest
possible meaning. Still, two difficulties remain with using this ap-
proach. First, "loiterers" constitute a group not inclusive enough to
encompass the broad range of persons who arouse the suspicions of
the police. This approach would not empower an officer to take any
action with regard to persons who were acting suspiciously but not
loitering. A related difficulty is that ordering suspicious persons to
move on is not often a solution to the problem. This alternative
"hardly solves the problem of the individual who is bent on crime,
and confers a disturbingly unbounded discretion upon the police."' 88
Such a response could be a solution to the problems caused by a man
lurking about a person's home (if not limited to groups), but it is of
little help to authorize the police to order a man to move on who flees
at the very sight of the police and thereby arouses suspicion.
In practice, loitering ordinances, whether or not they contain an
express move-on provision, are used primarily to support the type of
street control activity noted in the quoted material above. In Chicago,
the "bum squad" constantly orders the disbanding of groups who
are not suspected of any criminal offense. Indeed, the practice is so
common that often they get the desired result by just looking at the
167 People v. Galpern, 259 N.Y. 279, 284-85, 181 N.E. 572, 573-74 (1932).
168 MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12, comment (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
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group without saying anything. The order, express or tacit, is ulti-
mately enforced by arrest.16
But with respect to the application of such provisions to sus-
pected persons, the practice observed seems to indicate that move-on
orders are issued only after stopping and questioning when the police
are not suspicious enough to arrest, but are not completely satisfied
with the person's explanation for being where he is.
Thus, the move-on order is either used when persons are not
suspected, or, if they are suspected, it is used after completion of field
interrogation. Because of this, it seems clear that the police do not
consider the power to order persons to move a substitute for field
interrogation."'
The legislative responses to the problem of suspicious persons
discussed in this section range from making a substantive offense of
being found in suspicious circumstances through authorizing the
police to order persons to move from where they are found. Each of
the responses has serious defects. The vagrancy-type laws are a drastic
approach because they permit conviction of merely suspicious persons.
They also appear to support in-custody investigations when adequate
grounds to arrest are not otherwise present. The same is true of the
in-custody detention provision of the Uniform Arrest Act. Authoriza-
tion to order persons to move on largely relates to entirely different
police problems.
'While some police rely on vagrancy arrests to facilitate investi-
gations, others feel that field interrogation, including authority to
frisk, is sufficient. The principal difficulty with that approach is that
it is unclear what responses the police may make when a suspected
person refuses to cooperate or fails to allay suspicion. If arrest and
prosecution are the sanctions, this seems to lead right back to a
vagrancy-type law with a "satisfactory account" clause. The effect is
similar.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of current field interrogation practice contributes to a
more thorough basis for dealing with two major issues. The first is
the extent to which field interrogation is important to the police and
169 One instance was observed in which officers of the "bum squad" stopped and observed
a group of men who were standing outside the door of a bar at night. When the men
did not disperse, two of the men were placed under arrest. They claimed that they had
just moved to the neighborhood and did not know the significance of the police stop-
ping to look at them. In most cases, however, persons automatically disperse without a
verbal order and without threat of arrest.
170 Further evidence of this is inherent in the New York experience. There, the police have
very broad authorization to order groups to move on. See text accompanying note 167
supra. But even with that authority, the "stop and frisk" legislation was deemed by the
police to be essential.
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is necessary if they are to have adequate investigative authority. Cer-
tainly, the degree to which the police actually need to conduct field
interrogations is an important factor to be taken into account in re-
solving value questions about whether the practice should be author-
ized. It is equally important to understand the amount of interference
to persons on the street which is brought about by the practice. In
constitutional terms, these questions relate to whether current inter-
pretations of proscriptions against unreasonable police action permit
a distinction between arrest and on-the-street detention on the one
hand, and between search and frisk on the other.
The police themselves have not sufficiently addressed these
questions. The extreme ambiguity which characterizes the formal law
relating to field interrogation may, in part, be attributable to this
police inactivity. The failure of the formal law to address the im-
portant issues involved in field interrogation does, however, leave
the police in a position to take the initiative in the establishment of
administrative rules to regulate their own conduct, and to formulate
policy which may later prove useful in resolving these issues in a ju-
dicial or legislative setting. In the absence of such administrative
initiative, the courts or legislatures will ultimately be forced to de-
cide, and the decision will necessarily occur in the absence of articu-
lated administrative experience with the problems, and all field in-
terrogation practices may be lost to the police as a result.
A second major issue is whether field interrogation can realis-
tically be separated from other, on-the-street police practices. This
raises the question whether it is feasible to recognize a police right to
stop and question suspicious persons on the street without, at the same
time, giving unwanted support to other, less desirable practices which
also occur on the street.
The police currently do not sufficiently distinguish between
practices designed to result in prosecution of offenders if sufficient
evidence of guilt is discovered and those practices designed to de-
crease the level of criminal activity without prosecutions. Legislatures
have given tacit support to crime preventive measures by making sus-
picious conduct or appearance a substantive criminal offense whether
or not provision is made for the suspect's exculpation by giving a
"satisfactory account" of the causes of suspicion. Such legislation has
its roots in attempts to deal with a disruption of feudal society
caused by labor shortages resulting from the Black Plague in England.
Their current relevance is ambiguous.
Courts have also given some support to preventive practices -
albeit unwittingly - by justifying police action in terms of the privi-
lege of officers to issue traffic tickets to minor traffic offenders and
1966
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by application of notions of "consent" to the on-the-street interroga-
tion which happens to result in evidence of guilt. It is doubtful,
however, that courts would lend support to such practices as stopping
and questioning persons not suspected of crime if the issue were posed
to the court in those terms. Judicial reluctance to support such prac-
tices may result in failure to approve any field interrogation practices
if the court believes that such approval would lend unwanted sup-
port to other, nonprosecution-oriented practices of the police. Thus,
again, administrative failure to clearly articulate the limits of their
field interrogation practices may contribute to reluctance to legitimize
any police practice short of arrest.
THE UNITED STATES' ACTION IN THE
1965 DoMINIcAN CRISIS:
IMPACT ON WORLD ORDER -PART I'
By VED P. NANDA*
Beginning with the premise that collective use of coercion is
more desirable than individual use of force, Professor Nanda
analyzes and evaluates the United States' action in the Dominican
Republic. The United States' justification for its action is presented,
studied and placed in the context of the O.A.S. and U.N. Charters.
Asserting that the validity of a state's claim to use coercive measures
depends upon necessity and proportionality, Professor Nanda
measures the United States' action in light of these standards. Noting
that any attempt to test the validity of a state's action hinges upon the
observer's perception of facts, Professor Nanda concludes that the
United States' action fell short of meeting the standard of pro-
portionality. He recommends that regional and international fact-
finding bodies be established for a factual determination of an
internal conflict situation. Furthermore, he recommends that inter-
national or regional tribunals should review the initial use of force
by a state on the basis of first-hand information provided by these
bodies. Legal adjudication of a state's right may thus supplant the
political rationalizations.
INTRODUCTION
T HE Dominican Republic has had the unenviable distinction of
changing government no less than eight times during the four-year
period following Trujillo's assassination on May 30, 1961. 2 The latest
crisis, initially an internal conflict, began on April 24, 1965.' Visible
external participation started with the landing of the United States
Marines in Santo Domingo on April 28.' Soon thereafter the Organ-
*Assistant Professor, College of Law, University of Denver.
1 This is part 1 of a series of two articles, the second part to be published in Vol. 44, No. 2
of the Denver Law Journal. The writer is painfully aware of the conflicting reports on
what constitutes the "facts" of the Dominican crisis. He finds the proximity of events
coupled with each commentator's subjectivities coloring most of the writing in this area.
Consequently, analysis of the events is likely to suffer from lack of reliable source ma-
terial. Discussion in this paper is however, based on the best data presently available.
For a historical background, see PERKINS, THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
(1961) ; PERKINS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN (1947) ; RODMAN, QuIs-
QUEYA: A HISTORY OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (1964); SCHOENRICH, SANTO
DOMINGO: A COUNTRY WITH A FUTURE (1918); WELLES, NABOTH'S VINEYARDS:
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1844-1924 (1928) (two volumes); WILGUS, THE CARIB-
BEAN: ITS POLITICAL PROBLEMS (1956).
2 N.Y. Times, April 26, 1965, p. 1, col. 8. See also Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
Background Information Relating to the Dominican Republic, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-14
(1965). For a recent biography of Trujillo, see CRASSWELLER, TRUJILLO - THE LIFE
AND TIMES OF A CARIBBEAN DICTATOR (1966).
3 N.Y. Times, April 25, 1965, p. 1, col. 3. For a summary report see Dennis, Dominican
Dilemma, EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 263, 268 (April 13, 1966).
4 For the President's statements on the dispatching of the United States Marines to the
Dominican Republic, see 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 738 (1965).
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ization of American States dispatched a special committee to the Do-
minican Republic,5 followed by a special representative of the United
Nations Secretary General who arrived on the scene on May 18.6 The
bulk of the United States troops formed the core of an Inter-American
Peace Force whose "sole purpose" was that of cooperating in the
restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic.'
The OAS Committee succeeded in getting the military Junta and
the rebels to agree to a cease-fire on May 5,8 but a week later, on
May 13, armed hostilities started again." Mainly through the good
offices of the United Nations and the Organization of American
States another cease-fire was arranged on May 2 1," and a provisional
government was set up on September 3, 1965." General elections in
the Dominican Republic were held in June 1966, resulting in the
victory of the Reformist candidate, Joaquin Balaguer, for the presi-
dency.12 A gradual withdrawal of the Inter-American forces started
in July 1966.13 It is still not clear, however, whether another era in
5 As per Resolution adopted by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of For-
eign Affairs on May 1, 1965. The vote was 19-0-1. For the text of the Resolution see
note 4 supra at 741; U.N. Doc. No. S/6319 (1965). The primary objective of the
Committee was to offer its good offices to obtain, urgently, a cease-fire.
6 For the Secretary-General's reports on his representative, Mayobre's arrival in Santo
Domingo, see U.N. Doc. No. S/6369 (1965); U.N. Doc. No. S/6365 (1965). For
the Secretary-General's report of the appointment of Jos6 A. Mayobre as his special rep-
resentative, see U.N. Doc. No. S/ 6358 (1965). See S/Res/203 (1965) for the Secur-
ity Council Resolution of May 14, 1965, inviting "the Secretary-General to send, as an
urgent measure, a representative to the Dominican Republic for the purpose of report-
ing to the Security Council on the present situation."
7 As contained in the operative Paragraph 2 of the Resolution adopted by the Tenth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on May 6, 1965. The voting
was 15 to 5 (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay) with Venezuela abstaining.
The text of the resolution is contained in 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 862-63 (1965). For
the OAS Secretary-General's speech after the signing of the Constituent Act, Inter-
American Armed Forces, at Santo Domingo on May 23, 1965, see U.N. Doc. No.
S/6381, 3 (1965).
8 For the text of the Act of Santo Domingo, see OAS Official Records OEA/Ser. F/11.
10 Doc. 38 REV., 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 868 (1965). See also KURZMAN, REVOLT OF
THE DAMNED 187-89 (1965); SZULc, DOMINICAN DIARY 137-41 (1965). It should
be noted that from the very beginning of this strife the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in
Santo Domingo, the Vatican representative, the Papal Nuncio, played a leading role in
making efforts for the cease-fire.
9 
SZULC, DOMINICAN DIARY 207 (1965). See also KURZMAN, REVOLT OF THE DAMNED
253-79 (1965). SZULC, op. cit. supra at 207-68, gives an -on-the-spot" account of the
happenings between May 13 and May 21 when the "humanitarian" truce went into
effect.
10 For a summary report, see 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 9-10 (No. 6, 1965).
11 See U.N. Doc. No. S/6676 (1965) for the OAS reports to the UN Secretary-General
on the accession of power of Dr. Hector Garcia Godoy to the presidency of the provi-
sional government. The document also contains Garcia Godoy's speech on that occasion
on September 3, 1965.
1 2 N.Y. Times, June 3, 1966, p. 1, col. 7.
13 id., June 29, 1966, p. 16, col. !, contains a report about the sailing from the Dominican
Republic of a United States artillery battalion on June 28. These were the "first troops
to leave the Dominican Republic in the withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force."
See also on the pull-out of the troops, editorials, id., June 27, 1966, p. 34, cols. 3-4; id.,
June 6, 1966, p. 40, cols. 1-4. The last units of the Inter-American Peace Force left the
Dominican Republic on September 21, 1966. See id. Sept. 28, 1966, p. 3, col. 1.
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the turbulent history of the Dominican Republic has finally come to
an end or whether a revolution has been temporarily interrupted."
Perhaps to a layman the Dominican internal strife poses simple
issues. The critics of the United States action in dispatching Marines
to the Dominican Republic have conveniently characterized this action
as a revival of the much resented "big stick policy" and "gunboat
diplomacy,"' S beginning of the so-called "Johnson doctrine,. 18 "ille-
gal unilateral intervention,"" "military invasion,"" "direct aggres-
sion,"'" "flagrant violation of the United Nations and OAS Char-
14 See, e.g., Lens, The Unfinished Revolution, The Nation, May 2, 1966, p. 520. Id. at 523,
Lens poses the dilemma of the Dominican people in the words of Juan Bosch: "You
can't build democracy in this hemisphere with the United States and you can't build it
without the United States." Lens explains the dilemma thus:
You can't build it with the United States because Uncle Sam insists, as the
cornerstone of its policy, on upholstering flabby military Fascists. And you
can't build it without, because the U.S. represents the economic and political
reality of this hemisphere. Without U.S. tolerance it is impossible to forge a
violable [sic] society.
The Dominican people are caught on the horns of this dilemma, and it is
doubtful that the June elections ... will spring them loose.
Id., May 2, 1966, p. 523. See also Draper, "The New Dominican Crisis," The New
Leader, Jan. 31, 1966, 3 at 8.
15 "Sensitivity to Latin American concern over a seeming revival of 'gunboat diplomacy'
prompted the Washington administration to propose ... that the O.A.S. create an Inter-
American Peace Force to assume charge of the Dominican situation." DENNIS, Op. Cit.
supra note 1, at 270-71. KURZMAN, SANTO DOMINGO: REVOLT OF THE DAMNED 297
(1965). See, however, the reply to the charge of "gunboat diplomacy," entitled "Inter-
vening for Freedom," N.Y. Herald Tribune, May 2, 1965, which the editorial said was"as unjustified in this instance as the gunboats of old are obsolete." The editorial pointed
out that the purpose and the context of "intervention" justified the United States action,
notwithstanding the editorial's finding that "the protection of United States and other
foreign lives seems to have been more an excuse than a reason - a device designed to
give juridical legitimacy to a move made for reasons of high policy." The Soviet repre-
sentative charged in the Security Council that the United States action was a 'throw-back
to gunboat diplomacy," 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 12 (No. 8, 1965). Cf. Meeker's state-
ment on the subject, 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 60, 61 (1965). See also Fleming, Can FAx
AMERICANA Succeed?, 360 THE ANNALS 127, 134-35 (1965).
16 The representative of Uruguay at the United Nations said that like the Monroe Doctrine
and the Roosevelt Corollary, the "Johnson doctrine was only a political statement which
... was neither a juridical statement nor an American doctrine in the original and cor-
rect meaning of the word." 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 6 (No. 6, 1965). See also James
Reston's column, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1965, p. 46, cols. 4-8, wherein he says that if the
Johnson doctrine, that is, unilateral military action, were carried out, it "could require
more Marines than the President has under his command." See also Matthews, Santo
Domingo and 'Nonintervention, id., May 10, 1965, p. 32, cols. 4-8, wherein he ob-
serves that the " 'Johnson doctrine'-that the United States will intervene automatically
against the threat of a Communist take-over in any Latin-American country - involves
a basic conflict with [the] nonintervention principle." Chew, A New Latin American
Policy - How Communists Were Thwarted in the Dominican Republic, The National
Observer, May 17, 1965, quoted a U.S. official in Santo Domingo as saying: "With his
move into the Dominican Republic President Johnson has adopted a new policy for
Latin America ... a Johnson doctrine. . . . He has put the Communists on clear notice
that we have at last drawn a line." See also N. Y. Times, May 6, 1965, p. 38. cols. 1-2,
entitled The Illusion of Omnipotence.
17 See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 23365, 23369 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965) (speech by Senator
Clark).
18 From the Cuban representative's remarks in the Security Council, 2 UN Monthly Chron-
icle 5 (No. 6, 1965).
19This is how the Soviet news agency Tass characterized the United States action. See
U.N. Doc. No. S/6317 (1965).
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ters,"' etc. Supporters of the United States' action are equally vocal
in applauding it as an appropriate and timely action that protected
the lives of the American citizens and of other foreign nationals,"
prevented the spread of "a major civil war,"' 2 and thwarted the Com-
munist conspiracy to take over the Dominican Republic and transform
it into "another Cuba."' Thus it provided the Dominican people "an-
other chance to let their wills be known at the ballot box."2' The
supporters can easily vindicate their claims by pointing to the relative
calm in the June 1966 Dominican elections, and to the results of
these elections. 5
For a student of international law, however, who looks at the
Dominican scene from the standpoint of an independent observer in-
terested in a better world order, 8 the happenings in the Dominican
Republic provide a combination of intriguing questions of law and
policy. The purpose of this paper is to identify some of these prob-
lems and to inquire into their impact on the international legal order.
20 From the U.S.S.R. representative, Nikolai Fedorenko's remarks in the Security Council,
2 UN Monthly Chronicle 4 '(No. 6, 1965).
21 See, e.g., Ambassador Bennett's speech in Atlanta in which he attributed to the prompt
action on the part of the United States the "important result" that "no American civi-
lians lost their lives ... [and] close to 5,000 persons from 46 countries were evacuated
safely from the country." 111 CONG. REc. 23669 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1965).
22 Ibid.
2 See, e.g., Representative Selden's speech, 111 CONG. REc. 24073, 24076 (daily ed.
Sept. 23, 1965). Representative Rogers of Florida left no doubt as to what he perceived
the outcome of the United States action was, when he remarked in the House that "had
the United States acted as swiftly in Cuba as was done in the Dominican Republic Castro
and communism would not be in Havana today. It is also clear that we must pursue a
firm policy in the Dominican Republic to curb Castroism in the Caribbean." Id. at
13468 (daily ed. June 17, 1965). See id. at 8838 (May 3, 1965) for Representative An-
drews' remarks that the President's "expressed determination to prevent the establish-
ment of another Communist regime in this hemisphere [as indicated by U.S. action) is
the most encouraging announcement in America's foreign policy since 1961." See also
remarks by Representatives Whitener and Dorn, id. at 8809, and by Senators Lausche
and Long, id. at 9000-1, 9038, respectively (daily ed. May 4, 1965).
24 111 CONG. Rac. 24076 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965).
25 See Montgomery, The Dominican People Voted in an Atmosphere of Tranquility To-
day, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1966, p. 1, col. 3. Id., June 3, 1966, p. 13, col. 4: "Orderly
vote pleases Johnson."; Id., June 3, 1966, p. 38, col. 1: "Victory of Balaguer ....
(editorial). This editorial praised the orderliness of the Dominican elections and sug-
gested that Balaguer had won because the people were weary of violence and thought he
offered the best hope for peace.
26 A "better world order" in the context of this paper means a world in which unilateral
coercion across state lines gives way to collective action undertaken only by interna-
tional organizations. It is both desirable and useful to make every effort to clarify issues
in a given conflict that might have a significant bearing on the international scene. It is
similarly helpful to discuss ways and means to refine and strengthen the regional
and international machinery for handling such conflicts. Obviously there are at present
serious limitations on effective regulation and control of unauthorized coercion by in-
ternational decision-makers. These limitations stem mainly from the ideological strug-
gle between contending systems of diverse public order that should be recognized before
offering suggestions to improve the existing collective machinery to resolve internal
conflicts with possible international repercussions.
The writer's thinking has been largely influenced by the writings and teachings of
Professors Myres McDougal, Leon Lipson, and Harold Lasswell of Yale Law School.
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In doing so, this study will critically examine the following two areas:
1) claims made, strategies used, and outcomes accomplished by a ma-
jor participant in the controversy -the United States; and 2) the
validity of its claims and acts under both applicable treaty laws and
relevant norms of customary international law. Some of these norms
are couched in self-serving concepts such as "intervention," "non-
intervention," "self-determination," "self-defense," and distinctions
of dubious validity such as "rebellion," "insurgency," and "belliger-
ency." Furthermore, these concepts have become hopelessly inade-
quate to describe and analyze the intricate issues of a Dominican-
type situation.
Recommendations made in this paper pertain to: 1) setting up
regional and international fact-finding agencies; and 2) community
review of the unilateral use of coercive measures through regional and
international tribunals. Assumed throughout the discussion is the
desirability of a collective, rather than an individual, use of coercion.
I. THE PROCESS OF CLAIMS
The United States as a major participant in the Dominican con-
flict made claims which varied according to audience and occasion.
Claims made in the post-crisis period did not necessarily have the
same emphasis as those forwarded during the crisis period. Further-
more, both during and after the crisis the focus of particular claims
occasionally shifted with the changing objectives of the United States.
A. Claims by the United States27
The United States made the following major claims:
1) Claim to protect Americans and other foreign nationals.
2) Claim to restore internal law and order and maintain it until
the formation of a government capable of doing so.
3) Claim to uphold values and principles shared by the regional
system and thus prevent the creation of "another Cuba" in
the Western Hemisphere.
4) Claim to assume competence initially to give the Organiza-
tion of American States competence when it was ready for it.
5) Claim based on collective self-defense to meet any danger to
peace and security of the hemisphere.
6) Claim to uphold the competence and propriety of the OAS
over the United Nations to deal with a regional conflict.
7) Claim that the establishment of the Inter-American Peace
27 These claims are taken from the official pronouncements of the United States decision-
makers. The sources used are the Congressional Records, the United States Department
of State Bulletins and the United Nations and the OAS documents.
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Force was not an enforcement action under article 53 of the
United Nations Charter and hence did not require prior
authorization by the Security Council.
8) Claim that the United States' action did not violate its treaty
commitments under the charters of the OAS and United
Nations.
9) Claim that the United States' action did not defeat the prin-
ciple of self-determination for the Dominican people.
10) Claim to provide relief and rehabilitation measures.
For a more detailed account of the United States' claims and their
analysis, these claims will be further studied under three broad cate-
gories:
1) Claim to protect the United States nationals and other for-
eign nationals.
2) Claim to prevent a Communist take-over.
3) Claim to take unilateral action to give OAS competence to
deal with the situation; in later stages, claim to uphold the
competence of the regional organization to deal with the
regional conflict without interference from the United
Nations.
II. CLAIM TO PROTECT THE UNITED STATES NATIONALS
The audience for this claim was the world at large; more speci-
fically, public opinion at home and in Latin American countries, the
OAS and the United Nations.
The United States State Department Memorandum entitled "Le-
gal Basis for U.S. Actions in the Dominican Republic," 8 opens with
the statement that it was "an emergency action taken to protect
lives ...."' The initial landing of the United States troops is said
to be "under conditions in which immediate action was essential to
preserve the lives of foreign nationals - nationals of the United
States and of many other countries. This kind of action is justified
both on humanitarian and legal grounds."3 The action was taken
after the United States had been officially notified by Dominican
authorities that they were no longer able to preserve order. The factual
circumstances of the breakdown of order in the Dominican Republi-
can [sic] were such that the landing could not have been delayed
beyond the time it actually took place without needless sacrifice of
lives ... [including] foreign nationals .... 31




31 Id. at 10734. Senator Wayne Morse said that this memorandum "would not receive a
passing grade in any law... school in the United States." Ibid.
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President Johnson made his first public statement on sending the
United States troops to the Dominican Republic on the evening of
April 28. This action, he said, was "necessary in this situation in order
to protect American lives.""2 He explained the situation further: the
military authorities in the Dominican Republic had informed the
United States Government that American lives were in danger, that
those authorities were "no longer able to guarantee their safety" and
had reported that the assistance of military personnel was "now
needed for that purpose."33 Four hundred marines were, therefore,
sent ashore "in order to give protection to hundreds of Americans...
still in the Dominican Republic and to escort them safely back to this
country.""4
In another statement made two days later the President reiterated
that the reason for sending the American forces into Santo Domingo
was "to protect the lives of Americans .... ." The United States
Government had taken this step, he said, "when, and only when, we
were officially notified by police and military officials of the Domini-
can Republic that they were no longer in a position to guarantee the
safety of American and foreign nationals and to preserve law and
order."3 In his later statements, on May 136 and May 2," the Presi-
dent further clarified the United States' objective - the protection of
the United States nationals and their safe evacuation. It was not,
however, until May 2 that for the first time the President mentioned
another goal for the United States forces: the goal "to help prevent
another Communist state in this hemisphere." 8
Notwithstanding subsequent assertions regarding the United
States' objective of preventing "another Cuba,"" the United States
Government consistently took the position that the initial landing of
its forces was solely for the protection of the lives of its citizens and
other nationals. Almost all leading United States public officials
associated with decision-making in foreign affairs, made statements to
32 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 738 (1965).
33 Ibid.
34 The President also said that the same assistance would be "available to the nationals
of other countries some of whom have already asked for our help." For a letter from
the United States representative at the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, to the presi-
dent of the Security Council informing him of the United States' action, see U.N. Doc.
No. S/6310 (1965). Stevenson gives exactly the same reasons as mentioned by the
President for the landing of the United States Marines without, however, mentioning
the protection for foreign nationals. Id. at 1. The text of the President's statement of
April 28 is contained id. at 2.
35 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 742 (1965).
38 Id. at 743.
37 Id. at 744.
38 Id. at 747.
39 The author will examine this claim in part two of this article.
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that effect; the list includes Ambassadors Stevenson," Bunker," and
Bennett;' Secretary of State Rusk;43 Undersecretaries Mann," and
Ball ;45 State Department Legal Adviser Meeker;" and the President's
special representative to the Dominican Republic and former Ambas-
sador, John B. Martin."
A June 17, 1965, statement by President Johnson made at a
White House news conference on United States policy will further
confirm this conclusion. He recalled the situation in Santo Domingo
immediately prior to his decision to send the United States troops. He
was talking on the telephone with Ambassador Bennett in Santo Do-
mingo who, the President said, was "talking to us from under a desk
while bullets were going through his windows, and he had a thousand
American men, women, and children assembled in the hotel who were
pleading with their President for help to preserve their lives."' 8 The
President further said that:
as we had to go into the Congo to preserve the lives of American
citizens and haul them out when they were being shot at, we went
into the Dominican Republic to preserve the lives of American citi-
zens and the citizens of a good many other nations .... We removed
5,600 people from 46 nations, and we didn't sprain an ankle doing
it.49
A. Past Trends
Under the traditional international law of the nineteenth cen-
tury a state's claim to use its armed forces for the protection of its
nationals and their property was considered a valid exercise of its
rights. 0 During that period powerful states unhesitatingly followed
this practice. To illustrate, the United States, in pursuance of this
objective, is reported to have sent its forces on foreign lands more
than seventy times during the 19th century and early part of the 20th
40 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 876 (1965).
41Id. at 739-40.
42 111 CONG. REC. 23668, 23669 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1965) (speech in Atlanta).
43 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 938 (1965) (press conference, May 26).
4' 53 id. at 733-34 (Nov. 8, 1965).
45 52 id. at 1045-46 (June 28, 1965).
4653 id. at 61-62, 64 (July 12, 1965).
4' Martin, Inside the Drama and Chaos of the Dominican Upheaval, Life, May 28, 1965,
reprinted in 111 CONG. REc. 23299 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1965).
46 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 19, 20 (July 5, 1965). (Emphasis added.)
49 Id. at 20.
50 For a brief account of the 19th century practices, see BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 289-301 (1963). See generally BORCHARD, DIPLO-
MATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1916); Clark, Right to Protect Citizens in
Foreign Countries by Landing Forces (Memorandum for the Dep't of State, 3d ed. 1934) ;
DUNN, PROTECTION OF NATIONALS (1932). For the bases of state responsibility, see
Eagleton, Responsibility of States in International Law (1928), Harvard Draft Con-
vention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens (12th
Draft, Sohn & Baxter Reporters, 1961).
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century." Several jurists, past and present, have also ungrudgingly
supported such a use of force by states.12 Starke, for example, enu-
merates among what he calls the "principal exceptional cases in which
a State has at international law a legitimate right of intervention,"
the case "to protect the rights and interests, and the personal safety
of its citizens abroad." 3
Notwithstanding the wide acceptance of this claim during the
earlier period, many doubts have recently been raised concerning its
continued validity as a right. The main concern of the jurists is that a
powerful state could abuse this alleged right by employing it as a
handy pretext to use force for its preferred political objectives. 4
The asserted legality of this claim can be challenged on the
ground that nowhere is this alleged right specifically excepted from
the prohibitions on the use of force contained in the United Nations
Charter, especially in article 2(4)." However, it can be argued
that the saving clause contained in article 51 of the United Nations
Charter, the inherent right of self-defense, " validates the claim; the
5 1
OFFUTT, PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED
STATES, chs. 2-4 (1928). See also Clark note 50 supra; BORCHARD, op. cit. supra
note 50.
5 2 
VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA Lor NATURALLE, Bk. II, ch. VI,
§ 71 (1758) in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1916), is often cited as authority
in support of this customary right. HERSHEY, ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
LAW AND ORGANIZATION 238-39 (rev. ed. 1927) considers the forcible means em-
ployed by a state "to protect the lives and property of the nationals of the intervening
State..." legally justifiable if they are taken "as a last resort." BROWNLIE, op. Cit.
supra note 50, at 289 nn.3-7 cites writers including Hall, Westlake, and Wheaton who
port this doctrine on theories of self defense, self-preservation, and necessity. But cf.
statement by HALL, Forward to A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 304 (4th ed.
1895):
Interventions, whether armed or diplomatic, undertaken either for the reason
or upon the pretexts of cruelty, or oppression, or the horrors of a civil war,
or whatever the reason put forward, supported in reality by the justification
which such facts offer to the popular mind, would have had to justify
themselves, when not authorised [sic) by the whole body of civilised [sic)
states accustomed to act together for common purposes, as measures which,
being confessedly illegal in themselves, could only be excused in rare and
extreme cases in consideration of the unquestionably extraordinary character
of the facts causing them, and of the evident purity of the motives and con-
duct of the intervening state.
53 STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (4th ed. 1958).
54 See, e.g., BROWNLIE, op. cit. supra note 50, at 301 ; Fitzmaurice, The General Prin-
ciples of International Law Considered From the Standpoint of the Rule of Lw, 92
RECUEIL DES COURS 5, 172 (11-1957) ; Waldock, General Course on Public Interna-
tional Law, 106 RECUEIL DES COURs 5, 240-42 (11-1962). See also HIGGINS, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 220-21 (1963).
55 U.N.CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 provides:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.
56 U.N. CHARTER art. 51 provides in part:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
rationale would be that self-defense of the state is no different from
the self-defense of its nationals. 7
However, even if the alleged right of a state to protect nationals
be still considered valid under the customary right of self-defense, it
is not an arbitrary right unfettered by community standards to regu-
late it; it is a legal right58 and its validity can certainly be tested un-
der the generally accepted standards laid down by Secretary of State
Webster in the well-known Caroline case. 9 The case arose out of an
incident on December 29, 1837, when the British Armed Forces en-
tered the United States territory from Canada and seized and de-
stroyed the steamer Caroline which had been employed by persons
illegally helping an insurrection in Canada. The incident resulted in
the death of two United States citizens as well. The British Minister
at Washington justified this action as a legitimate measure of self-
defense. In a later communication, Secretary of State Webster as-
serted what later became a classic statement, that in order to have its
act qualify as a valid exercise of self-defense, Great Britain must show
a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice
of means, and no moment for deliberation.""0 Furthermore, he said
that even if the necessity of the moment had authorized the local
Canadian authorities to enter United States territory, Great Britain
must also show that they "did nothing unreasonable or excessive;
since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited
by that necessity, and kept clearly within it."'-
1
It should also be recalled that the International Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg had reaffirmed that the asserted legality of a preven-
tive action in the territory of another state must be tested by Webster's
requirements in the Caroline case.'
As an illustration of the assertion of a state's right to protect its
nationals, the following statement by Secretary of State Hughes at the
57 See generally on self-defense BowETT, SELF DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1961). For the application of this doctrine in the OAS context, see THOMAS &
THOMAS, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 162 (1963). See also CHENG,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 101 (1953); STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 94-97
'(1958). For the United States' views on the right of self-defense in the context of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, see U.S. Foreign Relations 36 (1-1928).
68 See generally BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 315-21 (5th ed. 1955). Brierly says
that,
Self-defence, properly understood, is a legal right, and as with other
legal rights the question whether a specific state of facts warrants its exercise
is a legal question. It is not a question on which a state is entitled, in any
special sense, to be a judge in its own cause.
Id. at 319.
5 See generally Jennings, Tbe Carofine andMcLeod C -,, 3 . JI.Nl L 82 (1938).
60 Communication of April 24, 1841. See 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1129,
1138 (1-1840) ; 30 id. at 193 (cited in Jennings, supra note 59, at 85 n.11, 89 n.31).
61 Jennings, supra note 59, at 89.
62 See 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1947).
VOL. 43
DOMINICAN CRISIS
Sixth International Conference of American States at Havana in 1928
is often cited:
What are we to do when government breaks down and American
citizens are in danger of their lives? Are we to stand by and see them
killed because a government in circumstances which it cannot con-
trol and for which it may not be responsible can no longer afford
reasonable protection?
I am speaking of the occasions [when the] government itself is
unable to function for a time because of difficulties which confront
it and which it is impossible for it to surmount.
Now it is a principle of international law that in such a case a
government is fully justified in taking action - I would call it in-
terposition of a temporary character - for the purpose of protecting
the lives and property of its nationals. . . .Of course the United
States cannot forego its right to protect its citizens. 61
Secretary Hughes was thus expressly emphasizing the requirements of
both the necessity and proportionality of the action of a state in using
force to meet the community standards.
It is, however, of relatively recent origin that the community of
nations has started a collective review of a state's assertion of its right
to use coercive measures to protect its nationals. The following dis-
cussion will examine the response of the League of Nations and the
United Nations to selected instances wherein states had asserted such
rights.
One such instance was the response by the League Council to the
Japanese claim that Japan had legally dispatched its armed forces to
Manchuria on September 18, 1931. The Japanese plea was in part
based on the asserted right of self-defense undertaken for the protec-
tion of the lives and property of its nationals."
Addressing the League Council the Japanese representative justi-
fied his country's occupation of Manchuria on the aggregate of Japa-
nese treaty rights and on the
vital and justified measures of self-protection as the standard prin-
ciple laid down in the Caroline case, that every act of self-defence
must depend for its justification on the importance of the interests
to be defended, or the imminence of the danger and on the neces-
sity of the act .... 65
In the Council discussion the Chinese representative took issue
with the Japanese claim and called it "a dangerous principle to assert
that, in order to protect nationals and their property in a foreign
country, a large number of troops may occupy so many places, destroy
so much property and kill so many innocent people."" It is not clear
6 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 252 (2d rev. ed. 1945) (chiefly as interpreted and ap-
plied by the United States).
"See, e.g., LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 2289-90 (1931). Excerpts from the remarks of
the Japanese representative at the League Council are contained in Brown, Japanese
Interpretation of the Kellogg Pact, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 100 (1933).
6 Brown, supra note 64, at 100.
66 Statement of 25 September 1931, LEAGUE OF NATIONs OFF. J. 2284 (1931).
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whether the Chinese representative was challenging a state's right to
use force for the protection of its nationals under any circumstances
or was merely suggesting that in the Manchurian incident the Japa-
nese had not met the requirement of proportionality.67 The Council's
resolution of September 30, 1931, was equally ambiguous; it noted
the Japanese representative's statement that his "Government will
continue, as rapidly as possible, the withdrawal of its troops, which
has already begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety
of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively as-
sured .... 68
Subsequently, the Council appointed the Lytton Commission"
to inquire into the matter. Meanwhile, Japanese troops landed in
Shanghai and one of the Japanese pleas to justify its action was again
the necessity to protect the Japanese nationals." The Lytton Commis-
sion reported that the Japanese military operations "could not be re-
garded as measures of [legitimate] self-defense."" The League As-
sembly adopted the Commission report and although there was some
discussion on the question of the validity of the Japanese claim of
self-defense based on the protection of its nationals in the resolution
adopted on the subject, the Assembly did not pass on this claim. 2
In the United Nations context three claims to use force to protect
a state's nationals will be briefly examined here: first, the British
claim during the 1956 Suez crisis; second, the United States claim
during the landing of its troops in Lebanon; and third, the Belgian
claim to use its troops in the Congo crisis in 1960.
The following statement by Anthony Eden, then British Prime
Minister, in the House of Commons debate on the Israeli-Egyp-
tian situation, sets out the British claim clearly. While referring
specifically to the Tripartite Declaration73 of the prohibition of the
use of force under the United Nations Charter, he said:
we do maintain, and I think I must fairly say, that there is nothing in
the Tripartite Declaration or in the Charter which abrogates the right
of a Government to take such steps as are essential to protect the lives
of their citizens and vital rights such as are here at stake. .... 74
67 For a discussion on this point, see BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE BY STATES 242, 294-96 (1963).
68 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 2307 (1931).
69 Id. at 2374.
7 0 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 331, 345 (1932). But see, SHINOBU, INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE SHANGHAI CONFLICT 119-20 (1933).
71 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., SPEC. SUPp. 112, at 72 (1933).
72 See generally LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., SPEC. SUPP. 111 (1933).
73 Declaration of May 25, 1950. The signatories were the Governmnents of the United
Kingdom, France, and the United States. See 22 DEP'T STATE BULL. 886 (1950) for
the text of the Tripartite Declaration Regarding Security in the Near East. The three-
power statement was issued to the press on May 25, 1950.
74 558 H.C. DEB. (5th ser.) 1277 (1956) cited in 5 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 643 (1965).
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Again, intervening in the House of Commons debate, Eden said
that,
In the present international system, where the Security Council is
subject to the veto, there must be the right for individual countries to
intervene in an emergency to take action to defend their own nation-
als and their own interests .... We have got to reserve to ourselves
the right to take the necessary action in an emergency at the time we
think fit.7"
He also argued that the right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51
of the Charter covered the situation where there was an imminent
threat to the nationals of a state and that it was not necessary to wait
until an attack had been actually launched. 6
In a House of Lords debate on November 1, the Lord Chancellor
had defended the United Kingdom's action on three grounds, one of
them being, "the danger to our nationals (for example to those at
Ismalia) .,7
The United Nations, however, did not have an occasion to pass
on the validity of the British claim, the main reason being the multi-
plicity of other important claims involved in the conflict, for example,
the claims to prevent the Egypt-Israeli conflict from spreading further,
to protect the canal and its valuable installations from possible harm,
and to remove the risk to free passage through the canal. 78 Although
the French Government never forwarded the claim to protect its na-
tionals as an official justification for its use of force,7" both the United
Kingdom and the French Governments in their notes verbales of De-
cember 3, 1956, informed the Secretary General that they had in-
structed the Allied Commander to seek agreement with the United
Nations Commander on a time table for the complete withdrawal of
their forces and asked that "the position of British and French na-
tionals in Egypt should be fully guaranteed."8
The United States' claim to send its forces to Lebanon was based
in part on the right "to protect American lives." This claim is suc-
cinctly stated by President Eisenhower in the following message to
the Congress:
United States forces are being sent to Lebanon to protect Ameri-
can lives and by their presence to assist the Government of Lebanon
75 Fawcett, Intervention in International Law, 103 RECUEIL DES COURs 347, 400 (II-
1961).
76 Ibid. See also Queen Elisabeth's Prerogation Speech of November 5, 1956, contained
in 199 H.L. DaB. (5th ser.) 1380-81 (1956).
77 199 H.L. DEB. (5th ser.) 1353 (1956).
78 See U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 1st Emer. Spec. Sess., 561st Plenary Meeting at para. 220,
for the French representative's statement. For the British representative's remarks, see
id. at para. 73. (A/OR/ES-I/PV561) (1956). See also Eden's remarks 558 H.C. DEB.
(5th ser.) 1343-44 (1956).
79 The French representative's remarks, supra note 78, at 220.
80 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 66, at 28, 29 (A/3415).
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in the preservation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and indepen-
dence, which have been deemed vital to United States national inter-
ests and world peace.81
Prior to that action the United Nations had sent observers into Leba-
non to see that further outside assistance to the insurrection would
cease. 2 It was, however, the forcible overthrow of the Iraqi Govern-
ment that had precipitated the events. The United States' action was
discussed both in the Security Council and the General Assembly.
The Security Council adopted no resolution on the subject, mainly
because of the Soviet veto. The General Assembly did not officially
pass on the legality of the claim either." The troops were subse-
quently withdrawn and the incident subsided."
The avowed purpose of Belgium in reinforcing its troops in the
Republic of the Congo on July 9, 1960, was to protect its nationals
from the grave consequences of disorder that had erupted in Leo-
poldville on July 2, 1 9 6 0 ,1 and had spread widely during the next
week. One commentator has recently remarked that despite the ap-
parent inconsistencies of the initial moves by the Belgian Govern-
ment in the Congo crisis, it was also apparent that "all Belgians were
justifiably concerned with protecting Belgian lives and property
throughout the Congo."'
On July 12, the Secretary-General received a written cable from
the Congolese authorities soliciting urgent United Nations "military
assistance" to meet the Belgian "aggression." The United Nations
response to the Belgian action was a resolution by the Security Coun-
cil on July 14, 1960," which called upon "the Government of Bel-
gium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the
Congo." The same resolution authorized the Secretary-General to
provide the Congolese Government with military assistance. Later
resolutions reiterated the Council demand that Belgium withdraw all
of its troops from the Congo.8 Attention at the United Nations was,
however, soon directed to other serious aspects of the Congo crisis
which arose mainly from the Katangeese Secession and the grow-
81 39 DEP'T STATE BULL. 182 (1958).
82 U.N. Doc. No. S/4023 (1958).
8 See generally U.N. Doc. No. S/PV.827 '(1958). See the proposed Security Council
resolutions and discussions in U.N. Docs. Nos. S/4050/Rev. 1, S/PV.834 and
S/4055/Rev. 1, S/PV.837 (1958). For the General Assembly resolutions see U.N.
Doc. No. A/3893/Rev. 1, A/PV.746, A/RES/1237 (E.S.-II) (1958). For President
Eisenhower's address to the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, see
U.N. Doc. No. A/PV.733, at 7-10 (1958).
84 For a discussion of some aspects of the Lebanon incident, see Potter, Legal Aspects
of the Beirut Landing, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 727 (1958); Wright, United States In-
tervention in Lebanon, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 112 (1959).
85 it was the third day of the Congolese independence. For a brief account, see LEFEVER,
CRISIS IN THE CONGO, 10-11 (1965).
88 LEFEVER, op. cit. supra note 85, at 30.
87 U.N. Doc. No. S/4387 (1960), adopted by a vote of 8-0-3 (China, France and the
United Kingdom).88 See, e.g., U.N. Doc. Nos. S/4405 (1960) ; S/4426 (1960) ; S/4741 '(1961).
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ing internal conflicts within the Republic of the Congo. As a result,
the initial Belgium claim to protect its nationals was never officially
rejected; it was not approved either. Nevertheless, two implications
can be drawn from the United Nations actions in sending its forces to
assist the Congolese authorities and in repeatedly demanding the
withdrawal of all Belgian troops. They are, one, the Katangeese Se-
cession made the Belgian motives look suspect; and, two, in view of
the action by the international community it was considered impera-
tive that the unilateral action should cease.
As is evident from the preceding analysis these three cases which
on the surface seem relevant to the issues of the paper, provide no
guidelines to the decision-makers for appraising the permissibility of
the Dominican situation.
B. Present Status of the Law
State practices and the community review in the United Nations
do not provide adequate standards for evaluating the Dominican sit-
uation and for future prediction. We might, however, examine the
pronouncements of the international tribunals to seek clarification of
issues.
An important case in which the International Court of Justice
had occasion to discuss some aspects of the legality of a state's re-
course to coercive measures, the Corfu Channel (Merits) case,8" will
be studied here. There, the Court was faced with the British claim of
having a right of innocent passage through the Corfu Strait. Further-
more, the United Kingdom was claiming justification for its subse-
quent action of mine-sweeping "Operation Retail," in the Channel on
the basis of "self-defense and self-redress" and of "self-protection"
or "self-help.'"'"
The British claim of "self-help" was, however, put forward as a
strictly limited measure undertaken with the sole objective of investi-
gating the minefield and securing evidence. Albania had emphatically
denied the latter claim by the United Kingdom on the plea that such
actions had resulted in the violation of the Albanian Sovereignty.
The Court rejected the British claim, stating that,
The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the
manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise
to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present
defects in international organization, find a place in international
law. Intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular
form it would take here; for, from the nature of things, it would be
reserved for the most powerful States, and might easily lead to per-
verting the administration of international justice itself.9'
89 I.C.J. Rep. 4 [1949).
90 2 CORFU CHANNEL CASE- PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS 280-
84 (I.C.J. 1950), 3 id. at 293-97; 4 id. at 572-92.
91 Corfu Channel Case, [19491 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 35.
1966
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
The following discussion will show that the Court's pronounce-
ments in this case and several jurists' comments thereupon also failed
to set any measurable standards to determine the permissibility of a
state's recourse to coercive measures.
Professor Lauterpacht, for example, observes that this part of
the judgment
amounts to an outspoken restriction of the sovereignty of States as
traditionally interpreted and as implying the rights of intervention.
Obviously, it indirectly affirms at the same time the right of sov-
ereign States to immunity from intervention on the part of other
States. To that extent it protects sovereignty.
92
The Court's rejection of the British claim that it was entitled to
remove an international nuisance caused by the minefield in the Corfu
Strait, would, in part, confirm Professor Lauterpacht's observation.
While specifically rejecting this plea of self-protection or self-help,
the Court said that it could not accept this defense either. It further
said that between independent states, respect for territorial sov-
ereignty was an "essential foundation of international relations."
The Court recognizes that the Albanian Government's complete
failure to carry out its duties after the explosions, and the dilatory
nature of its diplomatic notes, are extenuating circumstances for the
action of the United Kingdom . . . [In order to] ensure respect for
international law . . . the Court must declare that the action of the
British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian Sovereignty.
93
However, the Court's pronouncement regarding the "respect for
territorial sovereignty," which Lauterpacht termed as amounting to
an "outspoken restriction . .. [on] intervention" does not set any
measurable standards as to when and under what circumstances and
in the assertion of what rights and in what intensities a state's use of
coercive measures would be considered justifiable.9 Does the Court's
pronouncement amount to an "emphatic rejection.., of the right of
intervention..."?95
In an earlier part of the judgment covering the right of innocent
passage, for example, the Court had said that the legality of the
9 2 
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT 317 (1958).
9 Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 35.
9' For representative writing on important aspects of the Court's judgment, see BowETr,
op. cit. supra note 57, at 14-15 (1958) ; BROWNLIE, op. cit. supra note 50, at 283-
89; Fitzmaurice, supra note 54, at 172; Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the
International Court of Justice, 27 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1950) ; LAUTERPACHT,
op. cit. supra note 92 at 87-90, 316-17, 335-36, 392; McDoUGAL & FELICIANO,
LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 225-27 (1961); Schwarzenberger, The
Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87 RECUEIL DES COURS 195, at 339-48
(1-1955) ; Schwarzenberger, Report on Some Aspects of the Principle of Self-De-
fense in the Charter of the United Nations . 22-24 (Int'l L. Assoc. 1958):
Sorensen, Principes de Droit international Public, 101 RECUEIL DES COURs 5, at
241-45 (111-1960) ; Waldock, supra note 54, at 237-40.
95 LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 92, at 90. But see id. n.47: "There is room for
the, possibly pedantic, question: If intervention can find no place in international
law at all, can it be said that it is 'perhaps' less admissible in some cases than in others?"
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United Kingdom's action in sending four warships through the Corfu
Strait could not be disputed,
[P]rovided it was carried out in a manner consistent with the require-
ments of international law. The 'mission' was designed to affirm a
right which had been unjustly denied. The Government of the
United Kingdom was not bound to abstain from exercising its right
of passage, which the Albanian Government had illegally denied.96
After making a contextual analysis, the Court was "unable to charac-
terize these measures taken by the United Kingdom authorities as a
violation of Albania's sovereignty."97
Professor Waldock reads in the Court's opinion
a sharp distinction between forcible affirmation of legal rights
against a threatened unlawful attempt to prevent their exercise and
forcible self-help to obtain redress for rights already violated; the
first it accepted as legitimate, the second it condemned as illegal.98
He further adds that "[Allthough the legitimacy of affirming the
exercise of a legal right was upheld . . . it is not the enjoyment of
every right possessed by a State under international law that may be
affirmed by force . Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice comes to a similar
conclusion:
The Court naturally distinguished clearly between this case - that is
the use or threat of force in (and where necessary for) the active and
current assertion of a right, and its use to remedy a wrong already
committed (other of course than one itself involving the illegitimate
use of force). The Court thus differentiated the cases in which forc-
ible self-help is justified from those in which it is not. The test seems
to be, broadly, whether the self-help is analogous to self-defence, be-
cause used defensively to counter or prevent an attempt by force to
deny a right; or whether, on the other hand, it takes the form of
punishment or coercion carried out in cases where it is alleged that a
wrong has already been committed, or a right denied. 1°°
The Court's pronouncement and the foregoing statements by
Lauterpacht, Waldock and Fitzmaurice make nebulous reference to
the terms "legal right," "right of intervention," "territorial sover-
eignty," and the distinction between the "enjoyment" of a "legal
right" and its "exercise." It is certainly not in the exercise of every
legal right that the use of force, in varying intensities, should be
considered justified. The legality or illegality of the use of intense
coercive measures must necessarily depend upon several factors, in-
cluding the nature and intensity of the coercive measure, the nature
of the "legal right," and the outcome of the measures undertaken.
The outcome or the consequentiality would include "the importance
and number of values affected, the extent to which such values are
96 Corfu Channel Case, [ 1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 30.
9 Id. at 31.
98 Waldock, supra note 54, at 240.
99 Ibid.
100 Fitzmaurice, supra note 54, at 172 (footnotes omitted). See also Fitzmaurice, The Law
and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 27 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 1 (1950).
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affected, and the number of participants whose values are so af-
fected.""'' Similarly "intervention"'0 2 is a highly ambiguous term.
As a state may "intervene" for various objectives, employing any one
or a combination of different strategies - diplomatic, ideological,
economic or military,0 3 ranging from a "friendly" diplomatic chat,
beaming "informative" programs across national lines on radio and
television, granting or discontinuing economic aid, to sending war-
ships to patrol waters adjacent to land masses, giving armed assistance
to an insurrection movement, or landing armed forces in another state,
and using different gradations of coercion, the Court's pronounce-
ment, its asserted "outspoken restriction . . . [on] intervention" is
of dubious value to decision-makers and observers alike.
The concept, "intervention" is ambiguous since it may refer
to any one or a combination of the following -the factual con-
tent of the situation, that is, the events; claimed or projected legal
consequences of the facts assumed, asserted or ascertained; or the
likely or actual responses of the authoritative decision-makers to the
claims made. Thus, in order to give an empirical reference to the
high-sounding verbiage surrounding the concept of "intervention" it
is imperative that a multifactoral, contextual analysis of the events
which allegedly constitute "intervention" and their outcome be under-
taken to determine the permissibility or impermissibility of the con-
duct of participants. Such an analysis would take into account the
nature and intensities of the coercive measures undertaken, the par-
ticipants undertaking these measures, their objectives, the strategies
used by them, and the outcome of the measures undertaken.
A redefinition of the term "claim to intervene" in the context of
this paper would mean, in general, the claim by a state"° to employ
military coercion or military interference across state lines in an in-
ternal conflict situation."5 More specifically, this claim would be
made in a situation when the other state faces a total collapse or at
least a partial breakdown with possible serious consequences of in-
101 McDoUGAL & FELICIANO, op. cit. supra note 94, at 15. See generally id. at 1-96.
1
02 See generally STRANGER ed., ESSAYS ON INTERVENTION (1964), especially by Burke,
The Legal Regulation of Minor International Coercion: A Framework of Inquiry, id.
at 87-125; Fawcett, Intervention in International Law, 103 RECuEIL DES COURS 347
(11-1961) ; THOMAS & THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN
THE AMERICAS (1956).
103 For an extensive treatment, see MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, op. sit. supra note 94, at
309-33.
104 it would normally be a more powerful state in relationship with the state against
which it is claiming the right to use coercive measures.
105 It is realized that a distinction between internal and international conflicts is seldom
easy to make. The Spanish civil war and the present Vietnam conflict are the prime
examples- However, two important distinguishing features of the conflicts primarily
internal from international conflicts are: 1) physical location of these conflicts-their
limited geographical character; and 2) a unanimous or near unanimous accord of major
participants in the effective power process to treat these conflicts as primarily internal
with an implicit understanding not to extend their areas of operations. See generally
ROSENAu ed., INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE (1964).
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ternal public order and is unable to give the necessary protection to
the nationals of the claimant state. It should be emphasized that al-
though other types of "interventionary" activity certainly exist, they
cannot be adequately dealt with within the confines of this paper.
After a careful study of several situations in which such claims
were made, Fawcett comes to the conclusion that,
The customary right of intervention for the protection of nationals
or their property is therefore now severely restricted: its exercise is
admissible only in the clearest cases, it must serve no other purpose
than protection from immediate danger, and must be discontinued as
soon as that has been achieved." 6
Professor Waldock has succinctly summed up the present status
of law in this area. He says,
Clearly, every effort must be made to get the local government to in-
tervene effectively and, failing that, to obtain its permission for in-
dependent action; equally clearly every effort must be made to get
the United Nations to act. But, if the United Nations is not in a posi-
tion to move in time and the need for instant action is manifest, it
would be difficult to deny the legitimacy of action in defence of
nationals which every responsible government would feel bound to
take, if it had the means to do so; this is, of course, on the basis that
the action was strictly limited to securing the safe removal of the
threatened nationals.
0 7
Other writers including Lord McNair,"° Sir Gerald Fitzmau-
rice,"° Brownlie,"' Bowett,"' and Van Panhys"1' are all in accord on
106 Fawcett, supra note 102, at 405. He suggests that this right has not survived the prohi-
bitions of Articles 2 (3) (4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter. Id. at 404.
'0r Waldock, supra note 54, at 240-41.
108 Lord McNair mentions as an exception to the otherwise changed "attitude of inter-
national law ... towards the use or threat of armed force for the purpose of attaining
national objectives," the "emergency protection by a State of its nationals and its or their
property located in a foreign country when the local authorities are unable or unwilling
to give this protection." MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 209-10 (1961). McNair is
among a few jurists who still consider the right to protect the nationals' property also
justifiable.
109 See Fitzmaurice, supra note 54, at 172-73.
110 Unlike McNair, Brownlie denies the existence of this asserted right. He considers it
"very doubtful if the present form of intervention has any basis in the modern law ....
Forcible intervention is now unlawful." He, however, concedes that a state when it is
"faced with a deliberate massacre of a considerable number of nationals in a foreign
state would have cogent reasons of humanity for acting, and would also be under great
political pressure .... '[I]n a case of such urgency, an exceptional circumstance," he
adds, "the possible risks of denying the legality of action . . . must be weighed against
the more calculable dangers of providing legal pretexts for the commission of breaches
of the peace in the pursuit of national rather than humanitarian interests." BROWNLIE,
op. cit. supra note 50, at 301.
11 BowE-r, op. cit. supra note 57, at 105 reads:
Moreover, since the exercise of the right depends upon the international legal
system it must be capable of evaluation in the light of the standards imposed
by that system. This is particularly so where the right to resort to these ex-
treme forms of protection is dependent upon a prior breach of the standards
of state responsibility imposed by that system. If the question of breach is ca-
pable of being objectively determined, then the reaction to that breach must be
equally so.
212 VAN PANHYS, THE ROLE OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 113-14 (1959):
"Such flagrant ill-treatment may occur that drastic action on the part of the national
State maybe morally justified as an ultimatum remedium if international organizations
such as the Security Council fail to act."
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restricting the permissibility of this claim to meet the related standards
of necessity"' and proportionality."4 Professor McDougal's reminder
that,
[T]he requirements of necessity and proportionality as ancillary pre-
scriptions of the basic community policy prohibiting change by
violence, can ultimately be subjected only to that most comprehensive
and fundamental test of all law, reasonableness in particular con-
text ... 115
is equally well applicable in the present context.
Viewed as such, a state's claim to intervene for the protection of
its national should be considered permissible only in rare instances.
Widespread abuse of this right in the past and the temptation to ex-
ercise it as a smokescreen for other political objectives make this claim
highly suspect. The nebulous concept of "nationality" in some in-
stances, for example, in dual nationality cases, may add another di-
mension to the problem. Only when a state is left with no other re-
course - diplomatic on its part and collective in terms of regional
and international organizations - and only when the danger to their
lives, and not their property alone, is imminent, could this claim be
considered justifiable. One could perhaps not dispute the ultimate
justification of the use of coercive measures in such a situation be-
cause the "loss of life and certain kinds of grave physical injury are
irremediable. No subsequent action, remedy, redress or compensation
can bring the dead to life or restore their limbs to the maimed. There
is no remedy except prevention.
In addition to the general prohibitions against the use of coer-
cive measures across state lines contained in the United Nations Char-
ter,"7 the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) has
further restricted "intervention" on the part of member states. It says:
No State, or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or in-
directly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs
of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed
force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic
and cultural elements." 8
Furthermore, the OAS Charter is even more emphatic in its prohibi-
tion on the use of force when it declares the territory of a State to
be "inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military
113 For an excellent formulation in the broader context of self-defense, see generally Mc-
DOUGAL & FELICIANO, op. cit. supra note 94, at 217-41.
114 McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, op. cit. supra note 94, at 241-44. See also Weightman, Sell-
Defense in International Law, 37 VA. L. REv. 1095, 1097 (1951).
115 McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, op. cit. supra note 94, at 218.
116 Fitzmaurice, supra note 54, at 173.
117 U.N. CHARTER ch. 1, art. 2, para. 3, 4.
"
8
0.A.S. CHARTER ch. 3, art. 15.
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occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State,
directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever.'
1 9
Latin American jurists are especially critical of a state's assertion
of its "right" as a permissible self-defense measure to take coercive
action to protect its nationals.' Moreover, these jurists reflect their
states' attitudes as well. These attitudes, in turn, stem from the past
experiences of the Latin American States' and are further reflected
in their codes and treaties dealing with the subject."2 However, it can
be argued that similar to the right of self-defense contained in Article
51 of the United Nations Charter, Article 18 of the OAS Charter also
authorizes the use of force in an exceptional case, "the case of self-
defense in accordance with existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof."
It has also been argued that the Punta del Este declaration of January
1962, attempting to stem the Communist aggression in the Western
Hemisphere constitutes another exception. The OAS Charter also
contains another provision to the effect that, "Measures adopted for
the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing
treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in
Articles 15 and 17."'12
While a discussion of the preventive and anticipatory aspects of
self-defense posed by Article 51 is beyond the reach of this paper,
124
another aspect of Article 51 is pertinent to our discussion here. That
is, when Article 51 refers to an armed attack "against a Member of
the United Nations," it can be argued that an attack against the na-
tionals of a state constitutes an attack against the state and hence the
defense of nationals amounts to the defense of the state. 2' Finally,
if coercive measures by a state could be considered permissible when
undertaken to protect its nationals from an attack by another state,
such measures could certainly be considered permissible when under-
taken to protect nationals from anarchy, that is, when nationals were
attacked by individuals and not the state. Moreover, while there may
be doubt on the permissibility of a state's use of coercive measures in
119 O.A.S. CHARTER ch. 3, art. 17. (Emphasis added.)
120 See, e.g., SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE: A PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY (1955).
121 During the first quarter century, the United States troops had landed four times in the
Dominican Republic-in 1903, 1904, 1914, and 1916. From 1916 to 1924 they had
occupied the Dominican territory. U.S. News and World Report, May 1, 1961, p. 43.
122 E.g., O.A.S. CHARTER ch. 3, arts. 15, 17. But see Plank, The Caribbean: Intervention,
When and How, 44 FN. AFFRS. 37'(1965).
13 O.A.S. CHARTER ch. 3, art. 19.
124 See, e.g., BowETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 182-248 (1958); MC-
DOUGAL & FELICIANO, op. cit. supra note 94, at 232-60; cf. KELSEN, RECENT TRENDS
IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1951). On the recent discussion regarding
the Cuban Quarantine measures by the United States, see several articles and comments
in 57 AM. J. INT'L L. at 373, 515, 525, 546, 588, 592, 597 (1963).
125 See, e.g., BOWETT, op. cit. supra note 124, at 91-105 and the sources mentioned therein.
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the former instance, the prior discussion leads one to the conclusion
that under extreme circumstances coercive measures taken by a state
might be considered permissible in the latter situation provided those
measures meet the criteria of necessity and proportionality.
III. VALIDITY OF THE UNITED STATES' CLAIMS
Thus the United States' claim of sending Marines to protect its
nationals should be examined to see if it meets the strict standards of
necessity and proportionality. It is only then that the permissibility of
the United States' action could be determined. Before undertaking
that examination, however, it is interesting to observe how the United
States' officials met the questions of legal prohibitions on the use of
force under Articles 15 and 17 of the OAS Charter.
A. Official United States' Position
Ambassador Bunker is thus implying that the prohibitions of Arti-
cles 15 and 17 are not applicable to the United States' action; he
of Foreign Affairs, on April 30, 1965. He argued that,
[Because] of the solemn duty which each state has to protect its citi-
zens ... from violence in a situation where there are no authorities
to insure their protection .... The United States must reserve its
right to take the necessary measures to protect its own citizens and
officials from violence in a situation of anarchy. 26
Ambassador Bunker must have had the prohibitions of Articles 15
and 17 of the OAS Charter in mind when he said that the United
States' action was not "inconsistent with the inter-American obliga-
tions. We wholeheartedly subscribe to these obligations, including the
doctrine of nonintervention and self-determination."' 27 He further
added:
We are not talking about intruding in the domestic affairs of other
countries; we are talking simply about the elementary duty to save
lives in a situation where there is no authority able to accept respon-
sibility for primary law and order.' 28
Ambassador Bunker is thus implying that the prohibitions of Arti-
cles 15 and 17 are not applicable to the United States' action; he
does not spell out the legal basis for this conclusion but perhaps he is
alluding here to the right of self-defense.
Justifying the United States' action, Ambassador Stevenson took
a similar position in the Security Council. He declared:
The obligations of nonintervention contained in articles 15 and 17
of the OAS Charter did not preclude the use of armed forces for the
humanitarian purpose of saving lives of foreigners. Nor did those
obligations require the United States to withdraw its forces imme-
126 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 739, 740 (1965).
12 Ibid. See also another statement by Bunker to the same effect. Id. at 859.
128 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 739, 740 (1965).
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diately, when it was apparent that there was no local means of keep-
ing order pending the creating of a government capable of keeping
order. 12
9
He tried, however, to justify the presence of American troops by re-
ferring to the purposes and principles of the OAS Charter and the
Inter-American System. He specifically mentioned what he called the
"first purpose of the Organization of American States," that is, "to
achieve an order of peace and justice."'30 He also mentioned two
"basic" and "fundamental" principles of the Inter-American System,
which the OAS "seeks to promote throughout the hemisphere": 1)
"respect for the fundamental rights of the individual," and 2) "the
effective exercise of representative democracy." Ambassador Steven-
son is obviously referring to Article 5 of the OAS Charter.' Thus,
the purpose of the United States' action was, in Stevenson's words,
to preserve the situation so that the organs of the inter-American
system may carry out their intended responsibilities under inter-
American treaties and assist the people of the Dominican Republic in
reestablishing democratic government under conditions of public
order.
32
Similarly Leonard Meeker, the legal adviser to the State Depart-
ment, argued that the use of coercive measures by the United States
should be considered permissible since they were taken in furtherance
of the primary purposes of the OAS Charter. The United States' ac-
tion, he said, "gave the organs of the OAS the essential time in which
to consider the situation in the Dominican Republic and to determine
means of preserving the rights of that country under the inter-Amer-
ican system."' 3 3 In the House debate, Representative Selden for-
warded the same argument that the United States troops were fulfill-
ing the role of furthering Article 1 of the OAS Charter.'
The validity of the arguments by Stevenson, Meeker and Selden
as counterclaims to the "nonintervention" doctrine enunciated in Arti-
cles 15 and 17 may be challenged on the ground that since Articles 15
and 17 of the OAS Charter are contained in Chapter III entitled "Fun-
damental Rights and Duties of the States," no derogation from their
strict application can be justified by relying upon Articles 1 and 5.
However, a counter-argument could be made on the desirability of
interpreting a treaty keeping in view the major purposes of the
12 Id. at 876, 879.
130 This "primary" purpose is part of Article 1 of the OAS Charter. The other purposes
are: "to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their
sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their independence."
131 Article 5 of the Charter deals with political structure of member states, to be organized
"on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy."
132 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 876, 879 (1965).
'33 Address given before the Foreign Law Association at New York on June 9, 1965, 53
DEP'T STATE BULL. 60, 62 (1965).
134 111 CONG. REC. 24077 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965).
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treaty.' These arguments go beyond the immediate context of this
paper insofar as they relate to an effort to provide a legal justification
for the continued presence of the United States troops in the Domini-
can Republic; they might still have some bearing on the question if
the United States' action had met the required standard of propor-
tionality.
B. Necessity of the United States' Action
Ambassador Stevenson's statement in the Security Council throws
sufficient light on the circumstances under which the United States is
reported to have taken coercive measures. He said:
First, on April 28, in the absence of governmental authority or law
enforcement, the military officials then exercising such authority as
there was in the Dominican Republic informed us that the safety of
foreign nationals could not be guaranteed any longer and that an
immediate dispatch of forces was necessary to safeguard their lives.
United States forces were sent only after that request, and we
promptly notified both the OAS and the United Nations. 136
Earlier, he had said in the Security Council:
[W]e could have decided not to do anything - at least for the time
being. But the lives of thousands of people from nearly 40 countries
hung in the balance....
The United States initially landed troops under these emergency
conditions to preserve the lives of foreign nationals - nationals of
the United States and of many other countries. Such action is justi-
fied both on humanitarian and legal grounds. 3 7
In the Senate debate on the Dominican situation, Senator Smath-
ers in a reply to Senator Fulbright also addressed himself to the neces-
sity of the United States' action. In his words:
Remember the President did not send our troops until the revolution
had been going on for 4 days. Everybody's hindsight is better than
their foresight. It may be that there were not 1,560 people killed.
However, many of them were killed, and millions of dollars worth
of property was destroyed. Our Embassy was being fired upon. Other
embassies were being looted. Thank God our troops finally showed
up.
1 3 8
Four more statements, one each by the President, Secretary of
State Rusk, Undersecretary Mann, and Legal Advisor Meeker would
give a fairly representative picture of the United States' perception of
the overwhelming necessity of the situation that demanded an imme-
diate United States response in dispatching its armed forces to the
Dominican Republic.
President Johnson said that "some 1500 innocent people were
murdered and shot, and their heads cut off, and six Latin American
135 See, e.g., MCNAIR, op. cit. supra note 108, at 380-81.
136 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 913, 915 (1965).
137 Id. at 877.
138 111 CONG. REc. 23007 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965).
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embassies were violated and fired upon over a period of 4 days before
we went in."'39 Pointing to the urgency of the situation, he further
added:
As a matter of fact, we landed our people in less than one hour from
the time the decision was made. It was a decision we considered
from Saturday until Wednesday evening. But once we made it...
they landed within one hour. But they didn't save 1,500 lives. 140
In Secretary Rusk's words:
As late as 4 o'clock in the afternoon of that Wednesday, we had in
front of us reports from our Ambassador in which he himself was
not recommending that we use our own forces with respect to that
situation. But then, as you now know from other sources, the Presi-
dent and Secretary of Defense and I were in a meeting on another
matter and about 5:15 we were handed a telegram from our Ambas-
sador, saying that the situation had completely deteriorated, disinte-
grated, that the police and the military authorities there had indicated
that they could no longer undertake responsibility for the security of
American and foreign nationals, and that if these people were to be
safe, U.S. forces would have to be employed. 4 1
Undersecretary Mann was quite emphatic when he said that since
there was no constituted authority in Santo Domingo to provide pub-
lic order the United States had to take the immediate action to send
troops. "We did not consider it necessary to wait until innocent civil-
ians had been killed in order to prove to the most skeptical that lives
were in danger. Had we done this we should have been derelict in our
duty to our citizens. 142
The following statement by Meeker regarding the breakdown of
law and public order suggests the necessity for the United States'
action:
The breakdown in public order resulted in indiscriminate shooting
on a rising scale. The police were no longer effective. Armed mobs
were terrorizing the city, firing on homes and other buildings, in-
cluding the United States and other embassies. 4 1
He went on:
One possibility would have been to wait and see. There is no telling
how many American and other foreign nationals would have lost
their lives in mob violence if this course had been followed. There is
no telling how many hundreds and thousands of Dominican lives
would have been sacrificed needlessly in the armed civil strife that
had exploded in Santo Domingo' 4
Three further inquiries will be made here. One, statements chal-
lenging the United States' action on the basis of necessity will be
examined; two, the nature and source of the request from the Do-
139 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 19,20 (1965).
140 Id. at 21.
"4 52 id. at 942.
142 53 id. at 734.




minican authorities will be looked into; and finally, the United States'
attitude on consultations with the OAS prior to its sending forces will
be studied.
1. Necessity of the United States' Action Challenged
The Soviet challenge to the United States' action was based on
the contention that although it was undertaken "on the pretext of
protecting American lives," its real reason lay in other political objec-
tives.145
Similarly, the representative of the constitutional government
(the rebel faction) of the Dominican Republic, challenged the United
States' contention by asserting that "the lives of foreigners in the
Dominican Republic were at no time threatened...14
Statements by Senators Fulbright and Clark also challenged the
primary objective of the United States' action. "It is all very well to
talk about protecting American lives," Senator Clark said, "but the
real reason that the marines went in there was to prevent a Commu-
nist takeover."'' After conducting hearings on the Dominican Re-
public in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Chairman of
the Committee, Senator Fulbright, said, "The danger to American
lives was more a pretext than a reason for the massive U.S. interven-
tion that began on the evening of April 28.'1 '  He further added:
"The United States intervened forcibly in the Dominican Republic
S.. not primarily to save American lives, as was then contended, but
* . . primarily on the fear of 'another Cuba' in Santo Domingo.''14
As an evidence of alleged overaction of the United States, it was
pointed out by Senator Morse that not even one American life "had
been lost prior to our landing the Marines."'' 0 Senator Fulbright had
earlier said that, "[N]o American lives were lost in Santo Domingo
until the Marines began exchanging fire with the rebels after April
28; reports of widespread shooting that endangered American lives
turned out to be exaggerated." ' Nobody, however, denies that on
145 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 3,4 (No. 6, 1965) (Soviet representative's speech in the
Security Council).
6 Id. at 9.
147 111 CONG. REC. 23366 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965).
1
4 8 Id. at 23001.
1
49 Id. at 23002.
150 Id. at 26185. See also Bosch, The Dominican Revolution, The New Republic, July 24,
1965, reprinted in 111 CONG. REC. 18130, 18131 (daily ed. July 29, 1965).
The revolution did not shoot a single person; it decapitated no one, burned
down not a single church, nor raped one woman. Nevertheless, allegations
of these horrors were proclaimed to the world at !arge. .".
President Johnson said that his Marines went into Santo Domingo to
save lives; what they really did was to destroy the democratic image of the
United States throughout the South American continent.
151 111 CONG. REc. 23001 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965). See also Senator Clark's statement
to the same effect, id. at 23367-68.
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the evening of April 28, Santo Domingo was in the throes of internal
conflict, that the public order had already been disrupted and that
hundreds of foreign nationals felt unsafe and wanted to leave the
country." Moreover, a counter-argument to the contention that no
foreigner lost a life in the Dominican Republic is made that no one
was killed because of the swift decision to protect foreign nationals .
5 3
The first report of the Special Committee of the OAS that ar-
rived in Santo Domingo on the morning of Sunday, May 2, is instruc-
tive. It reads, in part:
From the moment it arrived in Santo Domingo, the Special
Committee was deeply moved and saddened at the sight of this city
on a war footing. The streets were devoid of traffic; all businesses
and stores were closed, including those selling foods of prime neces-
sity. Also closed were banks and government offices, and, in general,
the city's entire normal activity had come to a halt. Many refugees
and other persons were in asylum in the embassies of the various
American countries, and the chiefs of mission of these countries per-
sonally told us that they were concerned that there were no guaran-
tees for the premises of their respective missions. Consequently, there
was an evident lack of security and of authorities having effective
control of the situation. Public services were nonexistent, including
the most essential ones of water, electricity, and telephones. The at-
mosphere was one of tragedy, mourning, and real human anguish.
Rumors and other unverifiable reports were circulated regarding
bloody incidents in various parts of the city. 5 4
2. Request from the Dominican Authorities
The question has been raised on the nature of the request 'by the
Dominican Military Junta for the United States Armed Forces. The
United States' official view is that the word came from the "military
officials then exercising such authority as there was in the Dominican
Republic," that they could not guarantee protection of the American
citizens. 5 The United States did not recognize the military Junta,
and did not "intervene ... on the side of the antirebel forces ... to
152 See generally SZULc, DOMINIcAN DIARY 13-50 (1965).
There was firing everywhere and nobody seemed safe. As a foreign am-
bassador recounted later, machine-gun bullets were raining into his garden
all morning from all directions. His 5-year-old son, watching bullets from
behind a wall inside the buildings, innocently asked whether he could go
out and play with 'these things.'
id. at 52. See also KURZMAN, SANTO DOMINGO: REVOLT OF THE DAMNED 129-71
(1965). Cf. KURZMAN, id. at 171: "This is not necessarily to question the wisdom
of landing U.S. troops in some cases for the purpose of saving lives.... What can be
questioned is the relative importance of the humanitarian consideration in the decision
of the Administration to dispatch troops to Santo Domingo."
15 111 CONG. REC. 24075 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965) (statement by Rep. Selden). To the
same effect see id. at 23668-69 (statement by Ambassador Bennett).
154 First Report of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Minis-
ters of Foreign Affairs of the American States, submitted at the 4th Plenary Session
(closed) held on May 7 and 8, 1965, reprinted in 111 CONG. REC. 21248 (daily ed.
Aug. 26, 1965).




put down the revolt, as the United States was requested to do on
April 28 by the antirebel military junta." '
Senator Fulbright recalls the events of April 28 thus:
In midafternoon of April 28 Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit, head of
a junta which had been hastily assembled, asked again, this time in
writing, for U.S. troops on the ground that this was the only way to
prevent a Communist takeover; no mention was made of the junta's
inability to protect American lives. This request was denied in Wash-
ington, and Benoit was thereupon told that the United States would
not intervene unless he said he could not protect American citizens
present in the Dominican Republic. Benoit was thus told in effect
that if he said American lives were in danger the United States
would intervene. And that is precisely what happened.'57
To the same effect is Senator Clark's account of the events of the
day the American forces landed. He says:
At the instance of the CIA - I believe it can be documented - a
new junta headed by a certain Colonel Benoit had been formed, al-
though it was pretty well confined to the San Isidro air base. That
junta sent word to Ambassador Bennett, 'You had better send Amer-
ican troops in because a Communist takeover threatens.'
Ambassador Bennett sent word back, 'I can't get away with
bringing Americans in on that ground because the evidence is not
dear. If you will change your request and make it in writing, and
ask American forces to intervene in order to protect American lives,
then I believe that we can persuade Washington to do it.'
So Benoit changed his position and put it on the basis of pro-
tecting American lives. Bennett forwarded that post haste to the State
Department and to the White House, and troops were sent in."5 8
Senator Morse's account is no different. In his words,
Washington - when our Ambassador was seeking to get the police
authorities to ask him to ask our Government to send in the Marines
to give so-called protection to American nationals and to evacuate
them - was not about to intervene on the public ground of a fear of
a Communist takeover, but we were ready to intervene to save Amer-
ican lives - not one of which had been lost prior to our landing the
Marines.
The record which was made before the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee makes that additional fact crystal clear. 1 9
In the official United States pronouncements, this charge has not
been denied. Even Undersecretary Mann, who devoted an address to
"Correcting Some Misconceptions" about the Dominican crisis, as late
as October 12, 1965, does not mention it.
60
It is possible that the United States did not attach much impor-
tance to this criticism and ignored it; apparently, the United States
reason would be that on the 28th of April, on all accounts, there was
156 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 62 (1965).
1. CoNG. R.. c. 23.01 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965).
158 Id. at 23366 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965).
1
5 9 Id. at 26185 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1965).




disorder in the Dominican Republic. Thus the United States' decision
to send troops could be justified on Ambassador Bennett's appraisal
of the situation and not merely on the request from the military Junta,
although the Ambassador had sent the note for the American troops"'l
only after he had received the request.
For two reasons, however, the nature of the request might be
relevant to the justification of United States claims."62 One, it is
widely accepted that it was the United States Ambassador who had
"visibly sponsored the creation of the Junta."' 63 This casts doubt upon
the integrity of the request. However, when this feature is coupled
with the soliciting of the request from such a sponsored government,
it casts doubt upon the declared reason for the United States' action,
that is, the protection of its nationals. Thus, the necessity of the ac-
tion becomes suspect. Second, on a prior occasion the landing of the
United States forces in Beirut in 1958 was justified on the request of
the Lebanese Government. Inquiring into the legal issues involved in
the Beirut landing, a commentator had observed: "The most plausible
ground for the recent landing of military forces of the United States
near Beirut is to be found in the invitation of the . Government of
Lebanon . 64
3. Prior Consultation with OAS
One criticism of the United States' action was that it was unilat-
eral and that the United States had not consulted the OAS members
beforehand. It had "confronted them with a fait accompli, convening
the Council of Ministers only after landing its troops in the Domini-
can Republic.' '165
Apparently replying to such criticism, Secretary Rusk explained
at a press conference on May 26, 1965, that the United States had
called together on April 27, a day before the United States action, the
Peace Committee of the OAS for consultation on the Dominican sit-
uation. 6' The Peace Committee did not feel itself competent to deal
with the situation. The next morning, on April 28, the United States
asked for a meeting of the OAS Council for further discussion of the
Dominican situation. The United States did not ask for any action,
161 For the Ambassador's note see KURZMAN, op. cit, supra note 152, at 171.
162 For a comment on the relevance of the invitation from the Lebanese Government in
1958 United States landings in Beirut, see Wright, United States Intervention in Leb-
aeon, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 112, 119 (1959).
163 SZULC, op. cit. supra note 152, at 53.
164 Potter, Legal Aspects of the Beirut Landing, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 727 (1958).
165 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 4 (No. 6, 1965) (Soviet representative's remarks in the Se-
curity Council).
166 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 938, 941 (1965).
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since, as Secretary Rusk said, "[W]e ourselves did not believe that
the situation called for it."'6 7 The Secretary added, however:
Now, in retrospect, I suppose that one could say that it might have
been somewhat better for us to have insisted upon a meeting that
same evening. It might have looked better. But, in fact, when they
met the next morning, they felt that under the Charter of the OAS
the Council standing alone was not empowered to act .... [The OAS
then waited 24 hours before it took preliminary steps to meet the
situation.] 168
Ambassador Bunker said in his statement of May 3*"0 that the
United States "sent forces there in the absence of any standing OAS
force that might have been sent promptly to the Dominican Repub-
lic . 1... 70
President Johnson,' 7' Ambassador Stevenson, 7 1 and Undersecre-
tary Ball,'7 ' among others, have also made statements to the effect
that the United States had consulted with the OAS on the Dominican
situation, but that the time factor prevented the United States from
further consulting it before sending its forces to the Dominican
Republic.
An exchange in the House of Representatives of this issue pro-
vides an interesting comparison of the two opposing viewpoints. Rep-
resentative Reid of New York, said:
I am not persuaded, that it was not possible to take 5 minutes, 15
minutes, a half-hour, or even an hour to have consulted with the
OAS, and at least have informed them at the highest level of our
thinking and to consult with them with regard to the decision that
we are planning to make."74
To this Representative McVicker replies: "A question of which split
second should the President have called the OAS or the Latin leaders
is merely one of splitting hairs, of begging the question."' 75
C. Proportionality
The initial response of the United States was to land 400 ma-
rines. If the United States had met the standard of necessity, and
since the protection of nearly 5,000 people was in question, this step
could not be challenged as being disproportionate to the need. The
267Id. at 942.
168 Ibid.
169 Id. at 859 (4th session of the General Committee of the Tenth Meeting).
170 Ibid.
7' Id. at 744-45 (statement of May 2d).
172Id. at 876-77 '(statement made on May 5th in Security Council). Stevenson said: "'In
this case - when hours and even minutes counted - there was no time for deliberate
consultation and for the organization of international machinery which did not yet
exist."
'73 Ball, The New Diplomacy, 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1042-45 (1965).
'7' 111 CONG. RFC. 24094 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965).
175Id. at 24095.
176 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 738 (1965) (President Johnson's statement).
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French representative at the United Nations had warned the United
States that while the initial United States' action was understandable
"such operations must be limited in objective, duration, and scale, or
run the risk of becoming armed intervention, for which there ap-
peared to be no need in this case.""'
As events turned out, after the evacuation of foreign nationals
was completed, the United States changed its objective to one of pre-
venting "another Cuba," and continued its operation even after the
initial objective was accomplished; it further increased its armed
forces from 400 to more than 20,000.
In the Senate debate a critic of the United States' action in the
Dominican Republic, Senator Clark, explained his position thus:
My position is that when that initial intervention was multiplied by
many thousands of troops, and when the ostensible objective to pro-
tect American lives was converted by advisers of the administration
into an effort to intervene in a civil war to prevent an alleged Com-
munist takeover, its illegality became obvious and apparent.178
Similarly, Senator Morse criticized the United States' action for
not confining its scope to the "limited purpose of bringing out Amer-
ican nationals and evacuating them" and for involving itself in the
revolution.179
Senator Fulbright's criticism is on the same lines. He said that
the landing of a small force for the "express purpose of removing
U.S. citizens and other foreigners from the island" could be justi-
fied.18 He further said that had such a force been landed and then
promptly withdrawn when it had completed its mission, no "fair-
minded observer at home or abroad would have considered the United
States to have exceeded its rights and responsibilities."
President Johnson addressed himself to the question of propor-
tionality in his statement of May 2. He said:
Our goal is a simple one. We are there to save the lives of our citi-
zens and to save the lives of all people. Our goal, in keeping with
the great principles of the inter-American system, is to help prevent
another Communist state in this hemisphere. And we would like to
do this without bloodshed or without large-scale fighting.18'
The objective had thus shifted: henceforth, the United States
was to justify its action not in proportion to the force needed to pro-
tect the lives of its nationals but, as the President had earlier de-
dared, the stakes were now "the liberty of a nation, and the prin-
177 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 7 (No. 6, 1965) (statement made at a Security Council
meeting).
178 111 CONG. REc. 23369 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965).
19 Id. at 26183 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1965).
180 Id. at 23001 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965).
181 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 747 (1965).
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ciples and the values of all the American Republics.""I And in the
President's words the reason was that the revolutionary movement
had taken a tragic turn.
Communist leaders, many of them trained in Cuba .. .joined the
revolution. They took increasing control. And what began as a pop-
ular democratic revolution, committed to democracy and social
justice, very shortly moved and was taken over and really seized and
placed into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators. 183
In Undersecretary Mann's view the standard of proportionality
was met. He said: "All those in our Government who had full access
to official information were convinced that the landing of additional
troops was necessary in view of the clear and present danger of the
forcible seizure of power by the Communists." '' He added that the
government had evidence indicating that at that stage the Communist
component in the revolutionary movement was stronger than the non-
Communists and that "these non-Communist elements were working
hand in glove with the Communists."'"
Statements by Ambassador Stevenson in the Security Council de-
bate on May 5,186 and Representative Selden in the House of Repre-
sentatives debate on September 23, 1965,1"7 seemed to justify the
continued presence of the United States forces in the Dominican Re-
public on the basis of their function in helping maintain and restore
law and order. In these statements, emphasis on the objective shifts
from the primary concern of the United States decision-makers to save
the Dominican Republic from becoming "another Cuba" to an objec-
tive related to the initial United States landing, that is, to protect lives
in general and to prevent utter chaos and anarchy which the United
States alleged might have otherwise resulted.
Selden, who makes a similar argument to the one made earlier
by Stevenson, said:
It was by no means out of proportion to the necessity. On a nor-
mal day in Santo Domingo, a police force numbering over 6,000 men
preserves the peace. Those were not 'normal' days in Santo Domingo.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that U.S. troops had several
missions to perform .... Troops in the safety zone protected that
area from continual attacks and, at the same time, conducted the
evacuation of some 5,000 people. Troops stationed in the communi-
cations corridor were charged with maintaining a safe route for evac-
uation and with distributing food and medical supplies to Domini-
182 Id. at 744.
1
83 Id. at 745.
164 Mann, The Dominican Crisis: Correcting Some Misconceptions, 53 DEP'T STATE BULL.
730, 736 (1965).
185 Ibid.
186 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 878 (1965).
187 111 CONG. REc. 24076 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965).
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cans of both factions. Moreover, these troops acted as a de facto
buffer zone subject to frequent sniper fire and direct attack.1'
However, in the official United States announcements, propor-
tionality of the United States action is often justified by reference to
a combination of objectives - to prevent a Communist takeover, to
give the OAS a chance to assume responsibility, to give the Domini-
can people an opportunity to exercise their right to self-determina-
tion, etc. The State Department Memorandum," 9 as well as statements
by Meeker'9" and Bunker.9 for example, would point to this con-
clusion.
D. Appraisal
The Dominican situation on the eve of the landing of the United
States troops on April 28, was, on all accounts, tense, grave, and un-
predictable. Hence, notwithstanding the criticism of the United
States action to the effect that
while a few shots may have been heard in the vicinity of the Amer-
ican Embassy in Santo Domingo, embassies, as well as other U.S. in-
stallations, have in some countries been burned to the ground by
rampaging mobs. But Washington did not send in marines in those
cases to save American lives, or even seriously consider doing
so.192
The initial landing of four hundred Marines should be considered a
permissible self-defense measure to protect the United States na-
tionals.
This action would be permissible even if the charge was true
that the United States authorities had solicited the request from the
military junta.'93 This would be so even if one agreed with an ob-
servation made by Senator Morse that "The failure to inform the
OAS of U.S. intervention before it was underway was an insensitive
oversight ...."I"
Finally, this action would be permissible notwithstanding a re-
cent observation by Professor Quincy Wright that,
While civil strife may result in barbarities which 'shock the
conscience of mankind' and may, therefore, present humanitarian
aspects which have in the past been utilized as justification for inter-
vention, it would seem that at the present time remedial measures
involving intervention belong, not to states individually, but to the
188 Ibid.
189 Id. at 10733 (daily ed. May 20, 1965).
190 Meeker, The Dominican Situation in the Perspective ot International Law, 53 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 60, 64 (1965): "Without our presence, it is quite possible the Dominican
Republic could have been thrown into another 30 years of darkness."
191 See, e.g., his statements at the Tenth Meeting, 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 739 (1965)
Id. at 854, 856-57, 859-62 (1965).
192 KURZMAN, op. cit. supra note 152, at 171.
193 See notes 155-60 supra and the accompanying text.




United Nations, in pursuance of its responsibilities concerning hu-
man rights. 95
If this action were limited in scope and duration and if the pri-
mary United States' objective had not altered later, the United States'
use of coercive measures would have met the requirement of propor-
tionality as well, and thus would be considered permissible. Even the
staunch critics of the United States' policy in the Dominican Re-
public tend to agree with this conclusion. Senator Fulbright, for ex-
ample, has said that, "If the United States had really been intervening
to save American lives, as it had a moral if not strictly legal right to
do, it could have done so promptly and then withdrawn and the inci-
dent would soon have been forgotten."'9 6
Senator Clark would consider the initial United States' action
justified "on humanitarian grounds."'91 He believed that the United
States was "under an obligation, despite ... treaty obligations to the
contrary, to send in a small force to protect American lives. '
Senator Morse would go even a step further; he considered the
initial landing of the Marines justifiable not only under moral and
humanitarian grounds but under international law as well. He would
have restricted its scope to evacuating Americans and other for-
eign nationals, and not to involving itself in the revolution.99
However, the United States' action was not limited in its objec-
tive of protecting the lives of its nationals; furthermore, it was not
limited in its scope or duration either. Hence, there are serious doubts
that it met the required criterion of proportionality to justify the
United States' claim that since it had dispatched armed forces pri-
marily to protect its citizens, the United States' use of coercive meas-
ures in the Dominican Republic should be considered a permissible
use of self-defense. Whether the action can be considered justified on
other grounds, for example, in furtherance of its treaty commitments
under the OAS Charter, will be studied later."'
IV. CLAIM BASED ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Several United States officials stressed the "humanitarian" as-
pects of the Dominican conflict to justify the United States' use of
coercive measures. To illustrate, Ambassador Bunker stated in his
address before the Tenth Meeting of Consultation on May 1, 1965:
"United States forces were dispatched purely and solely for humani-
1'5 Wright, International Law and Civil Strife, 1959 Proceedings A.S.I.L. 145, at 152.
196 111 CONG. REc. 23001 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965);
197 Id. at 23369.
1981d. at 23365.
19 Id. at 26183.
200 The author will examine this claim in part two of this article.
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tarian purposes, for the protection of the lives not only of the United
States citizens but the lives of citizens of other countries as well." '
In an address two days later, he read the message addressed to
President Johnson from the Papal Nuncio who had expressed his per-
sonal gratitude "for the humane contribution and for the protection
of the foreign embassies as well as for the contribution to a cease-
fire and the saving of human lives .... "'
Several other statements, such as by President Johnson,"° Am-
bassador Bunker,"0' Secretary Rusk,'05 and members of the Congress,"
refer to the "humanitarian" objective of the United States' action,
that is, that the United States' action was taken not only to protect
the United States' nationals but also nationals of other countries.
A. Past Trends
1. A Relatively Obsolete Doctrine
Most jurists writing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries
described "humanitarian intervention"' as a permissible exercise of
a state's right to use coercive measures on the territory of another
state."08 The wide acceptance of this theory rested on the assumption
that a state must guarantee certain minimum basic rights to the people
within its territory and hence within its sphere of competence; if these
rights were denied, any other state could intervene to remedy the sit-
uation and protect their fundamental rights.
It was, however, equally well accepted that the use of force for
humanitarian intervention could be justified only "in extreme cases
.. . where great evils existed, great crimes were being perpetrated,
or where there was danger of race extermination,"2" only when "some
extraordinary state of things is brought about by the crime of a gov-
20152 DEP'T STATE BULL. 854 (1965). (Emphasis added.)
202 Id. at 857.
203 Id. at 742 (President Johnson's statement of April 30).
204 Id. at 861 (Bunker's statement of May 4).
205 Id. at 842-43 (statement by Rusk at an interview with AP).
2°'See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 26183 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965) '(statement by Senator
Morse) ; Id. at 24077 (statement by Representative Selden).
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ernment against its subjects,""21 and only on the assumption that "in-
ternational law forbids the conduct of rulers to their subjects, and of
parties in a state towards each other, which such interventions are in-
tended to repress.''211 The alleged right of "humanitarian interven-
tion" had at most a nebulous content."' It could 'be claimed on what
Hall called "real or pretended grounds of humanity and religion,
213
- including "tyrannical conduct of a government towards its sub-
jects, massacres and brutality in a civil war, or religious persecu-
tion.... ,,214 Moreover, since the alleged right could be exercised only
by powerful states, and could be easily forwarded by them as a justifi-
cation of other political objectives, it has not been taken seriously in
modern times; rarely has it been asserted in state practices or pub-
licists' writings.2 1 1 Professor McDougal dismisses "humanitarian in-
tervention" as a "relatively obsolete" doctrine.2 " However, Sir Hersh
Lauterpacht supports it.21 Also, a notable exception indicative of
state practice asserting this right is the 1964 Stanleyville operation by
the United States and BelgiumY.2 8 A brief discussion of the Stanley-
ville operation should be helpful to put the Dominican situation in a
proper perspective.
B. The Stanleyville Operations
The November 24, 1964, operation consisted of the United
States aircraft transporting Belgian paracommandos who were para-
chuted into the Stanleyville area. The United Kingdom Government
2 1 0 
WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 44 (5th ed. rev.
1879).
211 HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 302 (4th ed. 1895). See generally id. at 302-04.
212 See, e.g., WILSON & TUCKER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-96 (9th ed. 1935).
213 HALL, op. cit. supra note 211, at 302.
214 Ibid. See also DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
172-73 (Corbett transl. 1957).
215 BROWNLIE, op. cit. supra note 208, at 340: "The state practice justifies the conclusion
that no genuine case of humanitarian intervention has occurred, with the possible ex-
ception of the occupation of Syria in 1860 and 1861. With the embarrassing exception
provided by Germany, the institution has disappeared from modern state practice."
2 1
6 McDoUGAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 90 (1961):
"For nationals of the belligerent, the common assumption is that international law of-
fers no protection, other than in relatively obsolete doctrines of humanitarian interven-
tion." Id. at 536: "amorphus doctrines on 'humanitarian intervention'.
217 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 312 (Lauterpacht ed. 1955):
There is general agreement that, by virtue of its personal and territorial
supremacy, a State can treat its own nationals according to discretion. But
there is a substantial body of opinion and of practice in support of the view
that there are limits to that discretion and that when a State renders itself
guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its nationals in such a way as to
deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of mankind,
intervention in the interest of humanity is legally permissible.
Sec also i GUGGENHEIM, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 289-90 (1953).
218 BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (1958), also mentions the claims
by the Arab States and Israel on racial grounds to protect the Arabs and "the Jewish




had assisted the operation "for humanitarian reasons 219 by authoriz-
ing the use of their air base on Ascension Island. The operation lasted
four days and evacuated foreign nationals from Stanleyville and
Paulis.2, 0
A statement issued by the United States State Department on
November 24, 1964, explained the purpose of the action: "The im-
mediate mission is the rescue of innocent civilians and the evacuation
of those who wish to leave the area. When this mission is accom-
plished, the rescue force will be withdrawn promptly.'"'"' Similarly,
another State Department statement of November 28 said: "the
United States participated in the rescue mission to Stanleyville and
Paulis for purely humanitarian reasons and with the authorization of
the Government of the Congo. ' 22 As a further justification for the
United States' action the statement added:
The mission was undertaken only because the rebels had left
open no other way to save the lives of innocent civilians of at least
18 nationalities, many of whom had been held hostage by the rebels
in direct violations of the Geneva Conventions and accepted humani-
tarian principles. 223
Thus the United States State Department was justifying the United
States' action on the grounds of:
1) a specific limited purpose;
2) authorization by the Congolese Government;
3) limited duration of the mission;
4) limited use of coercive measures - only one battalion of
paracommandos was transported; and
5) lack of any other recourse.
The United States-Belgium action was severely criticized by sev-
eral African states in the Security Council which held seventeen
meetings on the subject. Twenty-two member states requesting the
Security Council to consider the situation had complained that the
action had "constituted an intervention in African affairs, a flagrant
violation of the [United Nations] Charter and a threat to the peace
and security of the African continent. '2 24
The Security Council debates show that the major criticism of the
United States-Belgian action came from the African states and the
Soviet bloc and was based on four major grounds. These grounds
were:
1) Purpose of the action - The charge was made that the action
219 1 UN Monthly Chronicle 9 (No. 7, 1964).
220 51 DEP'T STATE BULL. 844, 846 (1964).
2211d. at 841.
222 Id. at 846.
223 Ibid.
22 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 7 (No. 1, 1965).
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which "had taken place in coordination with the fighting at
and around Stanleyville," had "a military significance,' '115 and
was merely a "pretext,"" a "crude subterfuge,""2 7 to "impose
upon the people of the Congo the disputed authority of the
Tshombe Government.'"'m
2) Authorization by the Congolese regime - It was said that
"the threadbare screen of the legality of the Tshombe re-
gime was nothing but a pretext to justify the new interven-
tion of the NATO powers in the Congo."229
3) Violation of the United Nations Charter - The United
States, Belgium and the United Kingdom were accused of
having violated the Charter prohibition on intervention in
the internal affairs of the member states;230 furthermore,
they were accused of violating Article 52 of the Charter by
challenging the competence of the O.A.U. 2'
4) Violation of the United Nations Resolutions - The ac-
tion had violated the General Assembly Declaration on In-
dependence,2  and the prior "United Nations resolutions
calling for the withdrawal of all forces of the former colonial
power and of foreign mercenaries and the non-interference
of all powers in the internal affairs of the Congo.' '2
The Belgian-American contention was that the urgency of the
situation demanded the use of coercive measures by these states and
that these measures were proportionate to their limited objective of
saving innocent civilians whose lives were otherwise endangered "by
rebel activity in violation of international law.""24 In answering the
criticism of their action, the United States and the Belgian represen-
tatives at the United Nations, supported by representatives from the
225 Id. at 19 (Czechoslovakian delegate's remarks in the Security Council debate).
226 Id. at 7 (statement of the representative of the Congo (Brazzaville)) ; Id. at 18 (state-
ment of the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania).
227 Id. at 9-10 (statement of the representative of Mali).
228 id. at 18 (statement of the representative of the Republic of Tanzania).
29 Id. at 19 (Soviet delegate's remarks).
230 See, e.g., id. at 19 (statement by U.S.S.R. representative) ; Id. at 19-20 (statement by
Czechoslovakian representative) ; Id. at 16-17 (statement by Burundi representative).
231 See the African states' memorandum requesting the Security Council meeting, U.N.
Doc. No. S/6076 '(1965).
232 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 19, 20 (No. 1, 1965) (remarks of the representative of
Czechoslovakia).
233 Id. at 19.
234 See U.N. Doc. No. S/6068 (1965) ; see 51 DE'T STATE BULL. 845 (1964) for a letter
from the United States representative to the President of the Security Council. For the
Belgian representative's statement, see 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 11 (No. 1, 1965).
For the Congolese representative's statement, see id. at 12. For Ambassador Stevenson's
statement in the Security Council, see 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 15 (1965). See also id.
at 18 (Stevenson deals with the urgency of the situation).
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United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, France, China, Brazil and Bolivia,
put forward the following major arguments:
1) Since several foreign nationals had already been killed be-
fore the rescue operation began, 5 and others taken as hos-
tages and threatened,238 the danger was real and urgency
great.
2) The United Nations, Organization of African Unity, and the
International Red Cross had all been repeatedly approached
to help relieve the situation but had failed to provide any
assistance because of the intransigence of the rebels;" thus
these states had exhausted every other means before resort-
ing to their "emergency rescue mission." '38
3) The object of the operation was "solely one of saving
lives," '239 and the troops involved were withdrawn immediate-
ly after the objective had been achieved.24
4) The action was "justified by its objectives: to frustrate the
perpetration of a crime under international law - the use
of innocent civilians as hostages, as a bargaining point in
wartime."
241




It is noteworthy that the Security Council resolution adopted on
December 30, 1964,2" does not mention the operation at all; it merely
reiterates its prior request that all states should "refrain or desist from
intervening in the domestic affairs of the Congo."
C. Validity of the United States' Claim
The preceding discussion on "humanitarian intervention" does
not give the decision-makers adequate guidelines to determine the
permissibility of the United States claim to use coercive measures in
the Dominican Republic on humanitarian grounds. The United Na-
tions and OAS Charters, and the Council resolution after the Stan-
25 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 10 (No. 1, 1965) (Ambassador Stevenson's statements
in the Security Council).
236 51 DEP'T STATE BULL. 845 '(1964).
27 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 11 (No. 1, 1965) (Belgian representative's statement).
28 Id. at 13 (Ambassador Stevenson's statement).
23 See, e.g., id. at 14 (United Kingdom representative's statement) ; Id. at 16 (French
representative's statement) ; Id. at 20 (Norwegian representative's statement).
240 See, e.g., id. at 14 (United Kingdom representative's statement).
241 Id. at 17 (Brazilian representative's statement). See also id. at 20 (Norwegian rep-
resentative's statement).
242 See, e.g., id. at 16 (French representative's statement) ; Id. at 17 (Brazilian representa-
tive's statement) ; Id. at 18 (Chinese representative's statement) ; Id. at 20 (Bolivian
representative's statement).
24 Id. at 22-23 (text of resolution adopted).
244 Id. at 23.
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leyville debate do not prohibit such action, nor do they specifically
permit it. The choice, however, is not between the two conflicting
statements, each one asserted to be the rule:
1) that whatever is not specifically prohibited under interna-
tional law is permitted, and
2) that whatever is not specifically authorized under interna-
tional law is prohibited.*
The blanket application of either one of the approaches suggested in
these statements to every situation does not provide a meaningful
answer. Both of these approaches are rigid and doctrinaire and are
unrelated to the context of a situation. Perhaps the best approach is
to test the permissibility of a state's action to use coercive measures
by the related criteria of necessity and proportionality.
Before testing the United States' claim by these standards a few
major distinguishing features between the claim in the Dominican
situation and the one in the Stanleyville operation should be noted.
They are:
1) While the objective in the Stanleyville operation was clearly
limited to humanitarian purposes 4 it was not so in the Do-
minican situation. 47
2) While the Tshombe Government was the legitimate govern-
ment of the Congo248 (although some African states ques-
tioned it)2 48 the military Junta was not so25 and therefore
could not speak for the Dominican people.
3) While prior consultations between Belgian authorities and
international organizations in the Stanleyville case"s' had left
no alternative for Belgium but to resort to coercive measures,
the lack of prior consultations with the OAS was a major
criticism of the United States' action in the Dominican
Republic."2
The distinguishing features between the two situations notwith-
standing, the prior discussion on the validity of the United States
claim to use force for protecting its nationals is equally applicable
245 See case of the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 (1927) (discussion of these
statements).
248 See note 238 supra.
247 See notes 178-85, 196-200 supra and accompanying text.
248 See note 242 supra and accompanying text.
249 Cf. 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 16 (No. 1, Jan. 1965) (Nigerian representative's state-
ment).
250 See notes 155-64 supra and accompanying text.
251 See 2 UN Monthly Chronicle 11 (No. 1, 1965) (Belgian representative's state-
ment) ; Id. at 12 (Congolese representative's statement).
252 See notes 166-75 supra and accompanying text.
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here"3 - while the necessity of the action can be defended on human-
itarian grounds, the proportionality cannot be justified. The question
of the permissibility of the action on some other grounds" will be
examined in a later article.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Many arguments justifying or criticizing the United States' action
in the Dominican Republic hinge on the observer's perception of what
the asserted or assumed facts and events are. Thus, in the Dominican
situation or any other similar situation, the criteria of necessity and
proportionality to determine permissibility of the use of coercive
measures will have a meaningful reference only if the "facts" are
known. Therefore, it is imperative that independent fact-finding
bodies on regional and international levels be established. It is sug-
gested that as a preliminary step, regional organizations such as the
OAS should set up a permanent fact-finding organ with its represen-
tatives stationed in the capital of each member state. The mechanics
of setting up such an operation should not pose too much of a prob-
lem. It is realized that this suggestion involves the risk of a major
power in a regional organization exercising a preponderance of in-
fluence and control in such an agency, and thus the reported "facts"
may be colored; however, as a first step, it is still preferable to the
present situation wherein a state assumes the competence of unilat-
erally defining the character of a situation and subsequently justifying
its response by reference to the character so defined. It is further
realized that this suggestion will not automatically resolve all prob-
lems of factual determination. However, the installation of such ma-
chinery will provide better chances for a more fair and objective
determination of "facts" and events.
Second, regional and international tribunals should review the
initial use of coercive measures by a state. The fact-finding bodies
could provide first-hand information to these tribunals. Community
review in the political forums is undoubtedly valuable, but a legal
adjudication of a state's asserted right by a regional or international
tribunal will have an additional advantage of providing a forum
where judicial treatment and reasoning will supplant political tirades
and polemics.
253 See notes 136-75 supra and accompanying text.
2
54See note 200 supra and the enumeration of the United States claims, supra at 443-44.
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STATE LAW AND THE DAMAGES REMEDY
UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT:
SOME PROBLEMS IN FEDERALISM
By JOSEPH A. PAGE*
The remedial reach of Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act has
been extended to tortious conduct violative of an individual's civil
rights, such conduct also being actionable under state law. Professor
Page examines this area of overlap of federal and state civil remedies
and the challenge to federalism thus presented. He points out the
problem of collateral estoppel which arises if separate suits are
brought respectively in state and federal courts. Joinder of both
claims in a single form, preferably federal, is thus desirable. Pro-
fessor Page analyzes the issues which a federal court must resolve
to award any monetary damages for the constitutional tort and the
common law tort. Should the court invoke a federal common law or
should it borrow state law? Should actions under section 1983 sur-
vive? Should there be wrongful death recoveries, and if so, any
limitations on recovery? Professor Page then points out the advan-
tages and disadvantages of a "selective use" of state law, i.e., federal
and state law is utilized but the court may substitute federal law for
state law when desirable. He concludes that a federal damages rem-
edy can give the injured party a better recovery and in so doing,
need not pose any imminent threat to federalism.
N Monroe v. Pape,' the United States Supreme Court expanded
the scope of the damages remedy created by Section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act Until Screws v. United States,' the act had gen-
erally been limited to abridgements of federally protected rights,
privileges and immunities by action of state officials pursuant to state
law.4 Screws held that conduct by state officials, even though in
*Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of Law. The Author wishes to thank
William J. Crowell, Jr., Associate Editor of the DENVER LAW JOURNAL, for his research
assistance.
1365 U.S. 167 '(1961).
2 REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
A subsequent section provides a damages remedy for conspiracy to interfere with civil
rights. REv. STAT. § 1980 (1875), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1958). The
federal district courts have original jurisdiction over damage suits brought under §§
1983, 1985(3). 68 Stat. 1241 (1954), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1958).
3 325 U.S. 91 '(1945).
4 See Alfange, Under Color of Law: Classic and Screws Revisited, 47 CORNPL L T.Q
395 (1962); Shapo, Constitutional Tort.: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond,
60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277, 282-87 (1965) ; Comment, The Civil Rights Act and Mr. lon-
roe, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 145, 163-66 (1961).
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violation of state law, might nevertheless qualify as action "under
color of" state law, and subject state officials to criminal prosecution
under the act. In Monroe, the Court applied the holding in Screws
to section 1893, and extended the remedial reach of the act to tortious
conduct violative of an individual's civil rights and actionable under
state law.
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, justified this du-
plication of remedies on the ground that "by reason of prejudice, pas-
sion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be en-
forced, and the immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
might be denied by the state agencies."5 In a lengthy and forceful
dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter argued that by not limiting the Civil
Rights Act to cases where redress in state courts had been barred by
state law or custom, the Court was upsetting the delicate balance vital
to a viable federal system.
Monroe has predictably' led to an increase in the number of civil
suits under the act.7 However, the reported decisions scarcely touch
upon the issue of the relationship between federal and state law in
the area where civil remedies overlap. This comment will refrain
from debate on the desirability of the overlap, and instead focus on
the challenge to federalism posed by its existence.
Damage suits under section 1983 have been based upon the com-
mission of such common law torts as assault and battery,' false arrest,'
false imprisonment," malicious prosecution," invasion of privacy, 2
and apparently, even negligence. 2 Since the constitutional tort and
the common law tort protect different interests even though they may
arise from the same occurrence, 4 plaintiff may maintain separate
suits in the state and federal court. Res judicata would seem clearly
inapplicable because of the distinct nature of the right which plaintiff
claims has been violated in each suit, but a specific finding of fact
5 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
61d. at 240:
One argument urged in Screws in favor of the result which that case reached
was the announced policy of self-restraint of the Department of Justice in
the prosecution of cases under 18 U.S.C. § 242. . . .Experience indicates that
private litigants cannot be expected to show the same consideration for the
autonomy of local administration which the Department purportedly shows.
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting.)
See also Hardwick v. Hurley, 289 F.2d 529, 530 (7th Cir. 1961).
7 See Shapo, supra note 4, at 325 n.249.
8 E.g., Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963).
9 E.g., Antelope v. George, 211 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Idaho 1962).
10 E.g., Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 975 (1963).
11 Ibid.
12 York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cr. 1963).
13 See Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957) (complaint which included
allegation of negligent or intentional failure to procure medical attention upheld).
14See Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962).
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(for example, defendant did not commit a battery upon plaintiff)
made in the first suit may be binding in the second suit under the
principle of collateral estoppel. 5 In what appears to be the only
opinion considering the point, the Third Circuit assumed, without
deciding, that collateral estoppel would be available as a defense in a
suit under section 1983, and held that since the transcript of the prior
state-court action (plaintiff's conviction of assault and battery upon
two of the defendants) had not been admitted into evidence in the
federal suit, defendants could not invoke collateral estoppel to bar
plaintiff's claim for damages under the Civil Rights Act."
The paucity of authority on this issue suggests a strategic reluc-
tance on the part of plaintiffs to bring separate suits in state and fed-
eral courts. In confining themselves to the federal forum, plaintiffs
are faced with the question of whether they may join counts alleging
common law torts with their claim for relief under section 1983. If
diversity of citizenship exists and the prayer for damages seeks the
jurisdictional amount, joinder is of course permissible. 7 In the ab-
sence of diversity jurisdiction, the federal court may adjudicate the
state claim only if the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is applicable."'
The leading case delineating the scope of pendent jurisdiction is
Hurn v. Oursler.9 There the Supreme Court held that "where two
distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged,
only one of which presents a federal question ... where the federal
question averred is not plainly wanting in substance, the federal court,
even though the federal ground be not established, may nevertheless
retain and dispose of the case on the nonfederal ground .... o A
distinction is drawn between situations involving a single cause of
action based on both federal and nonfederal grounds and those in-
volving more than one cause of action, some of which are federal and
others of which are nonfederal. The Court will apply the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction to the former,2' but not the latter. Thus, in
Hurn the Court states that "the rule does not go so far as to permit a
federal court to assume jurisdiction of a separate and distinct non-
15 See Note, Problems of Parallel State and Federal Remedies, 71 HARv. L. REV. 513,
523-25 (1958).
16 Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
17 See Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 975 (1963).
18 See generally Ferguson, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 11 VILL.
L. REV. 56 (1965) ; Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent T,,urs-
diction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1018 (1962).
19 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
20 Id. at 246.
21 See Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
VOL. 43
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
federal cause of action because it is joined in the same complaint with
a federal cause of action."'
A complaint which alleges a common law assault and a violation
of section 1983 states two causes of action and seeks money damages
for two wrongs. On the other hand, the claims arise out of the same
occurrence and the elements of the state cause of action are included
among the elements of the federal cause of action.3
Where the federal claim is "plainly wanting in substance," the
courts have not hesitated to dismiss any nonfederal claim joined with
it."4 A suggested rationale for this result is that "the dog would be
wagged by his tail if plenary trial of an ancillary claim was compelled
by a primary claim which could be disposed of on the pleadings."2
Application of this rule may be found in several cases under the Civil
Rights Act, where courts have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction com-
plaints alleging an insubstantial claim of violation of section 1983
and the commission of a common law tort. 6
Yet these decisions do not concern themselves with the question
of whether a claim based on the commission of a common law tort
may be joined with a valid claim for relief under section 1983.3 One
answer is that the elements of damage recoverable under section 1983
substantially encompass those recoverable at common law, 8 and
therefore the issue of jurisdiction need never be reached. Thus,
22 289 U.S. at 246.
23 The presence of the elements of the common law tort among the elements of the con-
stitutional tort (see also note 36 infra), and the virtual identity of damages recover-
able under each tort (see note 28 infra and accompanying text), support the view that
pendent jurisdiction is really a discretionary device to promote judicial economy. It
has been suggested that the ultimate inquiry to be answered by the federal courts is
"has there been a substantial commitment of federal judicial resources to the nonfederal
claim at the time the federal claim is decided so that remittance of the nonfederal
claim to a state court would occasion a senseless duplication of judicial and litigant
effort?" Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in
the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1044 (1962).
24 E.g., Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
25 HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 808 (1953).
26 E.g., Vechiola v. City of Chicago, 244 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ill. 1965) ; Rogers v. Provi-
dent Hosp., 241 F. Supp. 633 (N.D. Il1. 1965).
27 This issue seems to have been overlooked in at least one case involving a valid § 1983
claim and a tort claim based on state law. In Stringer v. Dilger, Civil No. 7073, D.
Colo., March 16, 1961, the common law claim made no allegation of jurisdiction. Id.,
Complaint, p. 4. The answer failed to raise lack of diversity of citizenship as a defense
(Id., Answer, pp. 2-3), although diversity was apparently lacking. In the pre-trial
order, jurisdiction was determined by the court and admitted by the parties. Record,
p. 8, Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
did not consider the jurisdiction issue. Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir.
1963).
28 Rue v. Snyder, 249 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Tenn. 1966). Here plaintiff attempted to uti-
lize the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to join a § 1983 claim with a claim alleging
the commission of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution at com-
mon law. The court found it unnecessary to rule on the common law claim because the




whether or not plaintiff adds a count alleging the commission of a
common law tort may make no practical difference in the outcome
of his case.
It is curious that the only case squarely raising the issue of
whether a tort claim under state law may be joined with a valid claim
of violation of the Civil Rights Act does not really involve the prob-
lem of overlapping damages because each count names a different
defendant. In Wojtas v. Niles, ' the Seventh Circuit affirmed a dis-
missal of common law claims against a municipal corporation on the
grounds that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, as enunciated in
Hurn, was inapplicable, and that there was no diversity of citizenship.
Defendants under the section 1983 claim were policemen employed
by the municipal corporation. The fact that the defendants were dif-
ferent under the federal and state claims would seem to be relevant
to a decision not to apply pendent jurisdiction, but the court makes
no mention of it. The opinion conveys the impression that common
law claims had not been brought against the policemen." If such
claims had been made, the issue would have been more clearly drawn,
and the language of the court suggests that they would have been
dismissed on the same grounds.
Though section 1983 says nothing about money damages, the
courts have interpreted it to provide a remedy enabling plaintiff to
obtain monetary relief.31 Punitive damages, intended to punish de-
fendant and deter him from subsequent misconduct,32 are clearly re-
coverable.3 Under the general rule that plaintiff may obtain dam-
ages proximately resulting from the commission of a tort,34 it would
seem that compensatory damages caused by injury stemming from a
violation of section 1983 should also be recoverable. In support of
this proposition is Mr. Justice Douglas' statement in his majority
opinion in Monroe that "Section [1983] should be read against the
background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the
natural consequences of his actions.'""
Common law tort damages may also be both compensatory and
punitive. The pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss which results from
the commission of the common law tort will also result from the
- 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1964).
30 A claim under § 1983 had not been brought against defendant-village because the
Civil Rights Act has been held not to create a damages remedy against a municipal
corporation. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
31 See generally Shapo, supra note 4; Note, Section 1983: A Civil Remedy for the Pro-
ec,ion of Federal Rights, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 839, 846-47 (1964).
32 
MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 77 (1935).
33 E.g., Antelope v. George, 211 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Idaho 1962).
34 MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 32, ch. 9.
35 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
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commission of the constitutional tort, so that the compensatory ele-
ment will exactly overlap with the compensatory damages recover-
able under section 1983.36 The punitive element seeks to punish de-
fendant, but only for the infringement of plaintiff's rights as pro-
tected by common law. However, since this infringement is in effect
a part of the violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights, it would
seem that a jury might take both wrongs into account in awarding
punitive damages under section 1983."7 The only elements of damage
recoverable under federal law but not under state law would be puni-
tive damages directed solely at punishing the commission of the con-
stitutional tort, and perhaps damages for mental suffering related to
the constitutional infringement only.
The substantial identity of the damages recoverable at common
law and under the Civil Rights Act creates further complications
when the question of choice of damage law is considered. Though
section 1983 is silent on this point, section 1988 provides that where
federal law is insufficient to furnish a proper remedy,
the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and
statutes of the State wherein the court ... is held, so far as the same
is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial
and disposition of the cause .... 18
The Third Circuit has broadly interpreted this provision in a
dictum in Basista v. Weir.9 The court stated that an award of puni-
tive damages in a civil-rights action brought in Pennsylvania would
be governed by federal common law, which allows recovery of puni-
tive damages in a civil rights action brought in Pennsylvania would
by Pennsylvania law, which requires proof of actual harm before
punitive damages may be awarded. The need for uniformity in the
application of a federal statute was postulated as the basis for this
position. To apply state law, the court declared, "would be to create
a legal hybrid of an incredible and unworkable kind.""
It is submitted that the court's language is too broad. A decision
to use the federal law of punitive damages in a particular case might
S But see The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HAtv. L. REv. 40, 215 (1961): "Since
1983 recovery is necessarily limited to conduct in violation of federal law, any torts
not so violative commited in the course of the misconduct giving rise to the federal right
cannot be compensated under section 1983 and are therefore separately actionable
under state law."
The difficulty with this statement is that it fails to differentiate between a tort and
the damages recovarebl as a result of it. And quaere whether the common law tort is
not in effect a "lesser included offense" within the reach of the constitutional tort.
37 Of course, if separate actions are brought in state and federal court, or if § 1983 and
common law claims are made in federal court, plaintiff will not be permitted to recover
double damages. See, e.g., Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963).
38 
REv. STAT. § 722 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1958).
39 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
40 Id. at 87.
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better be based upon the desirability of circumventing a restrictive
state rule which is inconsistent with the policy of section 1983, the
result being punishment of those who abridge constitutionally pro-
tected rights under color of state law. The punitive damages sought
in Basista were aimed at a violation of plaintiff's federally created
rights and could not be recovered under state law. Therefore, the
federal substantive law of damages was properly chosen, even though
the court's sole reliance on the need for uniformity is questionable.
The exclusive use of federal damage law under the Civil Rights Act
would lead to the disparity feared by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his
dissent in Monroe, where he asked: "Should an unlawful intrusion
by a policeman in Chicago entail different consequences than an un-
lawful intrusion by a hoodlum?"'"
It follows, then, that a federal court may apply state law in de-
termining questions of damage law which relate to damages also re-
coverable under state law. While section 1988 may be cited to justify
this "borrowing,"4 the overlap itself provides a more appropriate
basis for supporting the use of state law. If the same elements of
damage may be recovered under federal and state law, consistency in
principles of substantive damage law makes the existing duplication
of remedy somewhat less disruptive. If federal law is to be exclu-
sively applied, the purpose, as stated by the court in Basista, would
be to ensure uniformity in the application of a federal statute. A fed-
eral law of personal injury damages may be gleaned from decisions
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act " or the Jones Act.44 Yet
it is doubtful whether even among these decisions uniformity will al-
ways be found."
Another aspect of the choice-of-law problem arises upon the
death of a party to an action under section 1983. Two distinct issues
are involved: (1) should the action survive? (2) if so, what law
should be applied? Where the original defendant has died, federal
common law provides that penal actions are extinguished, but reme-
41 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 239 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
42 But see Note, Survival of Actions Brought under Federal Statutes, 63 COLUM. L. REv.
290, 294-97 (1963) (argument that § 1988 was intended to apply to forms of process
and remedy only).
43 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60'(1952) (remedy for railroad em-
ployees for injuries sustained because of negligence of employers). See also DeParcq
& Wright, Damages Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 17 OHIO ST. L.J.
430 (1956).
4441 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952) (remedy for seamen for injuries sus-
tained because of negligence of employers).
45 See, e.g., Dagnello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 289 F.2d 797, 802 (2d Cir. 1961) (split
among federal courts of appeal on question whether exercise of discretion by trial
judge in refusing to set aside verdict for excessiveness may be reviewed).
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dial suits survive. " Since an action under section 1983 seeking puni-
tive and compensatory damages is both penal and remedial, it is
plausible to conclude that at least that part of the claim seeking com-
pensatory damages will survive the death of the tortfeasor under
federal common law. Thus, the Eighth Circuit in Pritchard v. Smith"
unnecessarily looked to state law and used the Arkansas survival
statute to preserve plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages.
The aggrieved party may die, either as a result of the violation
of his civil rights or from independent causes. An example of the
latter is Nelson v. Knox,48 an action under the Civil Rights Act for
destruction of decedent's business. The court, drawing on the com-
mon law rule that tort actions based on interference with property
rights survive, allowed decedent's estate to bring the action. It has
already been pointed out that federal common law permits remedial
actions to survive.49 Therefore when decedent dies from causes un-
related to the deprivation of his civil rights, his estate should be able
to recover the compensatory damages which decedent could have ob-
tained had he lived.
Where death results from the constitutional tort, the anomaly of
relieving from liability the wrongdoer who brings about the ultimate
liquidation of his victim's civil rights is a strong policy argument for
the recognition of a death action under section 1983. While it may
be argued that a subsequent section of the act providing for the sur-
vival of actions based upon the intentional failure or refusal to pre-
vent a conspiracy to interfere with civil rights which results in death"0
indicates a Congressional intent not to permit death actions under
section 1983, this contention was rejected by the Fifth Circuit in
Brazier v. Cherry.5 The court stated that the details of the statute
would be construed according to the total, overriding purpose of the
act. The opinion in Brazier also points to section 1988 as authorizing
46 See Note, Survival of Actions Brought under Federal Statutes, 63 COLUM. L. REv.
290, 300-03 (1963) ; see also Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 223 F. Supp. 265
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), recognizing that an action under the federal securities act is both
penal and remedial, but characterizing it as remedial to allow the action to survive the
death of the tortfeasor and thus fulfil the policy of the act to recompense defrauded
purchasers.
47289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961); see Comment, 15 VAND. L. REv. 623 (1962).
48230 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1956); cf. Moss v. Jones, 288 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 868 (1961) (refusal to enjoin execution of prisoner, even though lat-
ter had initiated damage suit under § 1983 against penitentiary guards; court assumes
without deciding that action under Civil Rights Act would abate on prisoner's execu-
tion).
49 See Note, Survival of Actions Brought under Federal Statutes, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 290,
300-03 (1963).
50 REV. STAT. § 1981 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1958) (recovery limited to $5,000).
51293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961) ; Comment, 14 STAN. L.
REV. 386 (1962); Comment, 40 TExAs L. Rav. 1050 (1962); Comment, 47 VA. L.
REV. 1241 (1961); Comment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 623 (1962).
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resort to state law in order to create a remedy for death, although it
has been suggested that if Congress intended such a remedy to be
available, its existence should not depend on state law. 2
The difference between a survival statute and a wrongful death
statute is that the former permits recovery of damages sustained by
decedent until the time of his death, while the latter creates a remedy
for damages resulting from his death.' This distinction supports the
solution reached in Davis v. Johnson,"' which allowed a death action
to be brought under section 1983 by construing the words "party in-
jured" to include the administratrix of decedent's estate.
On balance, the conclusion that death actions may be brought
under section 1983 seems fully justifiable. The issue of choice of
law must next be faced. In Brazier, the Fifth Circuit used the Georgia
death statute. Resort to state law is supported by the analogy to ad-
miralty cases, where the federal courts have applied state death stat-
utes to furnish a remedy unavailable under admiralty law. Further-
more, it is well settled that state statutes of limitations are applicable
in damage suits under the Civil Rights Act.5 On the other hand,
whether punitive damages survive, where the death is from violation
of section 1983 or from independent causes, should be a matter of
federal law, since such damages specifically punish the constitutional
infringement.57
The suggestion that the federal courts may resort to state law in
assessing compensatory damages for injury or death resulting from a
violation of the Civil Rights Act leads to a further, more difficult
question: namely, must they do so where the state law imposes un-
desirable limitations? Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Monroe
poses the possibility of a state's passing legislation which eliminates
pain and suffering as elements of damage.58 A more realistic even-
tuality is the death of a man who would contribute to his survivors
much more than the maximum limit placed by state law upon wrong-
ful-death recoveries.5" In an action under section 1983, if a federal
52 See Note, Survival of Actions Brought under Federal Statutes, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
290, 297 (1963).
53 MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 32, § 93.
54 138 F. Supp. 572 '(N.D. Il. 1955).
55 See Comments, State Wrongful Death Acts and Maritime Torts, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 643
(1961) ; The Application of State Survival Statutes in Maritime Cases, 60 COLuM. L.
REV. 534 (1960).
5 6 See Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 1160 (1964).
57 See Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965). Under federal law, it appears that
punitive damages do not survive. See Note, Survival of Actions Brought under Federal
Statute, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 290, 300-03 (1963).
5 8 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 239 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
59 The use of the Civil Rights Act as a device to circumvent the $25,000 limitation on
the Colorado death statute is suggested in 13 Trial Talk, Colo. Trial Lawyers Ass'n,
No. 5, p. 2, Law Day 1966.
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court may use state law in these instances, what standards should be
used to determine when the court may not use state law, and resort
to principles such as federal common law is authorized?
In support of a selective use of state law is the view that a fed-
erally protected right should not be subjected to substantial under-
mining by state law. Thus, when use of state law would in effect
deprive plaintiff of a remedy under section 1983, the federal courts
should ignore state law." It is doubtful whether a maximum wrong-
ful-death dollar limit or the elimination of pain and suffering as ele-
ments of damage would substantially destroy the remedy provided
under section 1983. On the other hand, the use of the strict pecuniary
loss theory in a death case "1 involving an aged person whose demise
causes no monetary loss to his survivors might be considered as so
repugnant to the purpose of the federal statute that a departure from
state law would be justifiable. This approach bestows upon the fed-
eral courts a certain flexibility devoid of precision but better adapted
to the intent of the Civil Rights Act.
The argument against selective use is that it further complicates
the "legal hybrid" created by the application of federal and state law
to various elements of damage recoverable under the act. In other
words, both federal and state law are utilized, but for that portion of
the cause of action to which state law is ordinarily applicable, the
court may decide to substitute, in part, federal law.
By this time, it should be obvious that the disclaimer at the be-
ginning of this comment regarding discussion of the desirability of
the state-federal overlap has not been strictly followed. The entangle-
ments caused by the overlap indeed reflect in some way upon its de-
sirability. While predictions that the overlap will destroy the federal
system seem overdrawn, the conceptual difficulties inherent in its
existence should not be underestimated, even though they have up to
now been largely neglected by the courts.
Nonetheless, these complexities do not seem capable of counter-
balancing the need for a federal damages remedy under the Civil
Rights Act. The duplication of remedies has not yet destroyed the
delicate balance between state and federal government. After all,
federalism is not an abstract ideal to be revered for its logical purity,
but a relational structure designed to serve a nation's needs. As these
needs shift, creative adjustments in the system are unavoidable.
60 CI. Cinnamon v. Abner A. Wolf, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. Mich. 1963) (plaintiff
died during pendency of private antitrust suit under Clayton Act; defendant argued that
since federal act made no mention of survivability, the court should apply state law,
under which the action would abate; held, since state law might defeat the policy of the
federal act, federal decisional law, which allowed survival of the action, would govern).





By WILLIAM E. DOYLE*
judge Doyle discusses and analyzes the problems arising when
several persons' individual conduct, which is neither concerted nor
coincidental in time, causes indivisible harm to another. The courts'
refusal to hold the defendants jointly responsible is considered to be
unsatisfactory, and the American Law Institute's proposed solution
is considered in some detail. judge Doyle approvingly discusses the
ALI's apportionment of liability by shifting the burden of proof to
the defendant and concludes that "experience has shown that the
probabilities favor a just result where joint liability is imposed."
"Ignorance of history sometimes builds up a rule of thumb,
which when applied by mere logic, does cruel wrong."'
N THE above statement Professor Wigmore was referring to
that rule of law which held defendants liable jointly who acted
contemporaneously or in concert to produce an indivisible harm. He
went on to point out that in such circumstances the law wisely held
each of the wrongdoers liable for the entire harm inflicted. But as
"joint" is interpreted to mean concert of action, the case of the
indivisible harm resulting from conduct of several persons which
do not coincide time-wise or which is not concerted was, anomalously,
outside the rule. Wigmore insisted that the reason for joint liability
existed and had existed historically regardless of whether there was
true concert of action. His prime example of "cruel wrong" was
the case of Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co.,2 wherein six coal
mining companies ruined the plaintiff's farm by contributing to the
pollution of a stream which ran adjacent to the farm. The West
Virginia court refused to hold the defendants jointly responsible.
Both before and after the Wigmore note there has been wide-
spread concern about the seemingly simple but actually complex
problem of concurrent factual causes and joint liability, particularly
when it arose in the Farley type of pollution cases. Little has been
done to remedy the difficulty, however. The present discussion
considers the recent valiant effort by the American Law Institute to
prescribe a fair approach and solution to such non-concert of action
*U.S. Dist. Ct. Judge; member, American, Colorado and Denver Bar; L.L.B., George
Washington Univ., 1937; Justice, Colo. Sup. Ct., 1959-61; part-time instructor, Univ.
of Denver College of Law. The author wishes to thank Jeffrey L. Brown, a senior at
the University of Denver College of Law for his research assistance
1 Wigmore, Jointfeasors and Severance of Damages; Making the Innocent Party Suffer
Without Redress, 17 ILL. L. REv. 458 (1923).
2 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920).
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cases. Two companion sections' have been added in its new publi-
cation, The Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second. These sec-
tions are called to the attention of the bar primarily in respect to
the pollution problem because this is the extreme and exaggerated
application of the old rule. These sections also apply, however,
to every kind of case in which several persons contribute to an
injury. The guidelines there outlined are applicable regardless of
whether the causes are concurrent in time or whether there is concert
of action in the real sense.
The typical difficult case is that of the riparian farmer or
rancher whose land or cattle suffer injury from upstream pollution
resulting from independent acts on the part of several industries.
Must he pursue each of the alleged violators individually? If he has
suffered a single cumulative injury he faces difficult and sometimes
impossible problems of proof. Ordinarily the injury is, as a practical
matter, indivisible in that the contribution of any single one of the
miscreants can not readily be identified and isolated. The damage
problem is similarly complex. Indeed, it may result that no single
one of the offenders has been a substantial factor in the production
of the harm suffered. It is likely that the plaintiff will be unable
to generate proof, even in terms of rough percentages, of the extent
of each defendant's contribution. Thus, after expensive discovery
and litigation, the hapless farmer may well discover that he has no
cognizable claim. These complexities and difficulties have often
led lawyers and litigants to abandon the action at the outset. The
result is that the downstream owner is placed in the position of
bearing the cost of acts of pollution for which he is not in the least
responsible. The injustice of this result has been noted from time
tc time in the literature.'
This particular cause problem is described by Prosser5 as one
of apportionment of damages. The basic assumption is that the
defendant's conduct has been the cause of some damage suffered
by the plaintiff. Prosser further states that it is not primarily a
question of causation but rather one of the feasibility and con-
venience of splitting up the total harm into separate parts attribu-
table to two or more causes. The learned author concludes that
where there is some feasible basis for an apportionment it should
be made but if not, the practical course is to hold the defendant
liable for the entire loss.
To describe this problem as merely a question of apportion-
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS 433A-B '(1965).
4Jackson, joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEXAS L. REv. 399 (1939); Prosser,
joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413 (1937) ; Wigmore, supra
note 1.
5
PROSSER, TORTS 247 (3d ed. 1964).
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ment of damages seems at first to be oversimplification. Courts
typically consider it a problem of adequacy of evidence to prove
injury and to establish a factual link in the chain of causation, and
frequently tend to ask whether the causes are concurrent, concerted
or independent. Courts also on occasion stumble over a procedural
obstacle, that of misjoinder. The Restatement sections eliminate
most of these questions and follow the Prosser analysis.
Considering the complexity often involved, it is not surprising
that the trend of decisions has been to refuse to hold a defendant
liable on a joint basis where the plaintiff has been unable to show
the extent of the individual defendant's impact. Thus, where the
plaintiff has not been able to adduce proof of ,the amount of damages
attributable to each defendant he has lost his case.
I. RESTATEMENT VIEWPOINT
The injustice of this result led the American Law Institute to
adopt companion sections 433A and 433B.'
Section 433A concerns itself with the case in which the injuries
are distinct and the damages can be apportioned. It provides:
§433A. Apportionment of Harm to Causes
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or
more causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the con-
tribution of each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned
among two or more causes.7
Comment a to this section emphasizes that it applies whenever
two or more causes have combined to bring about harm to the plain-
tiff and each has been a substantial factor in producing the harm.
Undoubtedly, the section contemplates that the conduct of each
participant has an independent origin, for it notes that it is im-
material whether or not all of the participants are joined. The
section has in mind successive injuries, distinct harms, divisible
harm, and innocent causes associated with tortious ones.
The comment on subsection (2) calls attention to the fact that
certain harms are by their nature incapable of any logical, reasonable,
or practical division. "Death is that kind of harm, since it is im-
possible, except upon a purely arbitrary basis for the purpose of
accomplishing the result, to say that one man has caused half of
it and another the rest."' This comment continues:
Where two or more causes combine to produce such a single result,
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS (1965).
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 433A (1965).
8 Id. § 433A, comment i at 439.
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incapable of division on any logical or reasonable basis, and each is
a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, the courts have re-
fused to make an arbitrary apportionment for its own sake, and each
of the causes is charged with responsibility for the entire harm. The
typical case is that of two negligently driven vehicles which collide
and kill a bystander. The two drivers have not acted in concert, and
the duties which they owe are separate and distinct, and may not be
identical in character or scope; but the entire liability of each rests
upon the obvious fact that each has caused the single result, and
that no rational basis for division can be found.9
Thus there is a recognition of the view accepted by the cases where
a combination of causes produces harm. The comment points out
that the section is not limited to simultaneous causes - that it also
applies where one defendant has produced a condition and a subse-
quent defendant acts later to cause the harm.
The device which has been adopted to solve the problem under
consideration, that is, apportionment of cause and damage in the
multiple cause case, is ingenious. It uses a method which has become
increasingly popular- the shifting of the burden of proof. Section
433B, here the center of interest, recognizes that in the ordinary
case "the burden of proof that the tortious conduct of the defendant
has caused the harm to the plaintiff is upon the plaintiff."'" It goes
on to point out the exceptional cases in subsections (2) and (3).
Subsection (2) provides:
(2) Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has com-
bined to bring about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the
actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the harm is cap-
able of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to the
apportionment is upon each such actor.'
A similar technique is prescribed in subsection (3) for solving
the case of two or more persons who acted and the conduct of only
one has caused the harm to the plaintiff but it is not possible to
ascertain with certainty which one is responsible. Like subsection (2)
it declares that "the burden is upon each such actor to prove that
he has not caused the harm."' 2 The familiar example of this is the
case in which two hunters shoot at the same time in the direction
of the plaintiff who is struck by a single shot which could have
come from either gun. The shooters can be sued jointly and in the
action each has the burden of proving that the shot did not come
from his gun. If he fails to do so he is subject to liability. Conceiv-
ably, both defendants could fail to bring forward necessary proof;
this would render both of them liable. 3
9 Id. at 440.
'ld. § 433B(1), at 441.
11 Ibid.
12 Id. at 442.
13 Reyher v. Mayne, 90 Colo. 586, 10 P.2d 1109 (1932).
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It is subsection (2) which introduces the new and revolutionary
approach which is most interesting. According to the comment it
applies where there are distinct independent harms capable of ap-
portionment. It contemplates, however, the ultimate presentation of
evidence -to establish the extent of the contribution of each. In such
a case the obscurity must be cleared away by the defendant, the party
who is in the best position to know the extent of his impact. The
rationale of the subsection is succinctly set forth in -the comment:
d. The reason for the exceptional rule placing the burden of
proof as to apportionment upon the defendant or defendants is the
injustice of allowing a proved wrongdoer who has in fact caused
harm to the plaintiff to escape liability merely because the harm
which he has inflicted has combined with similar harm inflicted by
other wrongdoers, and the nature of the harm itself has made it nec-
essary that evidence be produced before it can be apportioned. In
such a case the defendant may justly be required to assume the bur-
den of producing that evidence, or if he is not able to do so, of
bearing the full responsibility. As between the proved tort feasor
who has clearly caused some harm, and the entirely innocent plain-
tiff, any hardship due to lack of evidence as to the extent of the
harm caused should fall upon the former.
14
II. PRIOR CASE HISTORY
The somewhat drastic nature of the proposed change is ap-
parent from a study of some of the early cases which expound the
rule of nonliability. A good example of this orthodox majority rule
is Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co."5 Farley overruled an earlier de-
cision of the West Virginia court, that of Day v. Louisville Coal &
Coke Co. 6 Day had held several stream polluters jointly and sever-
ally liable on the simple basis that there was direct causation. In
Farley the action was against six coal mining corporations located
along tributaries of the Bluestone River. Plaintiff complained that
the several companies had caused damage to his farm. Although he
recovered in the trial court, this judgment was reversed on appeal,
the court saying: "There is no allegation that the defendants acted
in concert, collusion, or in pursuit of a common design in the per-
formance of the acts which are alleged to have injured and defiled
the stream and damaged plaintiff's land."" The court further held
that the principle of concurrent causation could not be applied in
pollution cases because of the consequential nature of the injury
and, therefore, the remoteness of the result. It said: "The injury
to the plaintiff is consequential only, or remotely resulting, as con-
1
4 
RFs ATMNT (SECON ) ,TORTS at §4,B at 444 (1965).
15 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920).
1660 W. Va. 27, 53 S.E. 776 (1906).
17 Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595, 597, 102 S.E. 265, 266 (1920).
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tradistinguished from direct and immediate."' 8 The court did not
fail to recognize the obvious fact that "viewed from a merely prac-
tical standpoint, this distinction may not be important;"' 9 that the
injury is equally serious regardless of whether the impact is direct
or consequential or results from joint, coincident, or contemporan-
eous action of the wrongdoers. Apparently, however, the court felt
it was helpless to grant relief. The underlying basis for the court's
decision is found in the policy statement which declares:
In this state the development of natural resources and location
of mills and factories along its numerous streams has only fairly
commenced; wherefore it is highly important that the rights of ripar-
ian owners and persons conducting diverse kinds of business along
the water courses and their remedies for wrongful acts respecting
them and the adjacent lands be correctly defined.
20
The opinion notes that the overwhelming weight of authorities
stands against the court's former opinion in Day, holding, as it
does, that several defendants may be joined in one action under
circumstances such as those presented in the case and that liability
may be imposed upon one of several individuals for the entire
damage.
Thus, the West Virginia court was concerned with a number
of problems, including the propriety of joinder, concurrent action,
and joint liability in a case in which each of the defendants had
acted independently. The court was also apprehensive about whether
each of the defendants had inflicted a substantial injury on plaintiff
whereby there was a cognizable harm inflicted. Thus Farley is a
classic example of the orthodox viewpoint. Although it unques-
tionably had and continues to have the support of the vast maiority
of decided cases,"' the injustice of the result was recognized even at
the time. 2
Since 1920 a few states have refused to follow the majority
rule and have reached the contrary result by simply concluding
that there was concurrent causation.2 However, one decision stands
out as a fully reasoned opinion and a leading case for the minority
view. It is the decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in Landers v.
East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co. 4 Two separate companies per-
18 Id. at 598, 102 S.E. at 267.
19 Id. at 600, 102 S.E. at 267.
20Id. at 602, 102 S.E. at 268.
2
1 Annot., 91 A.L.R. 759 (1934); Annot., 35 A.L.R. 409 (1925); Annot., 9 A.L.R. 939
(1920).
2 18 MICH. L. REv. 708 (1920) ; 29 YALE L.J. 935 (1920).
2 See McDaniel v. City of Cherryvale, 91 Kan. 40, 136 Pac. 899 (1913) ; Prairie Oil &
Gas Co. v. Laskey, 173 Okla. 48, 46 P.2d 484 (1935) ; Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 153
Okla. 137, 5 P.2d 389 (1931).
24 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952).
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mitted their pipelines to break at about the same time, resulting in
the escape of salt water and oil into the plaintiff's lake which killed
his fish and polluted the water. The court held the defendants
liable on a joint and several basis, adopting the rule that
"Where the tortious acts of two or more wrongdoers join to produce
an indivisible injury, that is, an injury which from its nature can-
not be apportioned with reasonable certainty to the individual wrong-
doers, all of the wrongdoers will be held jointly and severally liable
for the entire damages * * * -25
The court explained the reason for the holding as being the impos-
sibility of plaintiff's satisfying the burden of proving the portion of
injury attributable to each defendant. Several earlier Texas decisions
are cited to illustrate the difficulties which the plaintiff faces in prov-
ing liability. These, of course, were overruled by Landers.
In this 1952 decision, the opinion of the Texas court, by Mr.
Justice Calvert, noted the existence of criticism of the rule refusing
to recognize joint liability where the torts have had independent
origin but have produced a single injury to the land of another:
Much has been written on the need for re-examination of the
rule approved in the Robicheaux case. See Wigmore in 17 Illinois
Law Review 458; 27 Columbia Law Review 754; Gendel in 19 Cali-
fornia Law Review 630; Prosser in 25 California Law Review 413;
Jackson in 17 Texas Law Review 399; Robinson in 27 Texas Law
Review 732. Thus far, however, but little has been achieved toward
inducing the courts to re-examine the rule. Wigmore has suggested
that the rule of joint and several liability in the field of torts had
its inception in the need of the law, bent on justice, to relieve a
plaintiff of the intolerable burden of proving what share each of
two or more wrongdoers contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, and
that the burden is just as intolerable and the need for relief there-
from is just as great when the independent tortious acts of multiple
defendants contribute to a plaintiff's indivisible injuries as when the
acts are done in concert and of common design. Jackson in 17 Illi-
nois Law Review 459.26
The most significant comments leading to the adoption of
the Restatement sections are those of Wigmore which have been
referred to above and which influenced the decision of the Texas
court. In commenting on Farley and other similar cases, Wigmore
said:
Such results are simply the law's callous dullness to innocent
sufferers. One would think that the obvious meanness of letting
wrongdoers go scot free in such cases would cause the courts to think
twice and to suspect some fallacy in their rule of law. It does not
take much reflection to see the reason of the original rule, i.e., mak-
ing each joint tortfeasor liable for the whole of the harm done, and
to perceive that the reason of that rule carries beyond the narrow
limits of its orthodox application. The rule should be: Wherever
25Id. at 256, 248 S.W.2d at 734.
26 Id. at 255, 248 S.W.2d at 733.
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two or more persons by culpable acts, whether concerted or not,
cause a single general harm, not obviously assignable in parts to the
respective wrongdoers, the injured party may recover from each for
the whole. In short, wherever there is any doubt at all as to how
much each caused, take the burden of proof off the innocent suf-
ferer; make any one of them pay him for the whole, and then let
them do their own figuring among themselves as to what is the
share of blame for each.2
Wigmore made this final observation: 'This all goes to show
that a rule of law applied without regard to its reason may become
a rule of injustice.'"'2
In view of Wigmore's recommendation that in cases of doubt
as to how much injury each defendant caused, the emphasis should
be in the area of burden of proof - that the burden should be taken
off of the innocent sufferer - it would appear that Wigmore's argu-
ments were at long last vindicated by the adoption of section 433B
(2), the burden of proof approach.
One other case, illustrative of the minority or joint liability doc-
trine, is Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hardee."9 This was an action
brought by certain farmers against four oil companies for damages
sustained from pollution. At the trial the defendants obtained a
verdict based on their theory that they could be held liable only if
the evidence established that a particular defendant had independent-
ly produced the plaintiffs' injuries. Plaintiffs had asked the trial
judge to instruct the jury to render a verdict in their favor if it ap-
peared that the defendants had jointly produced the injuries com-
plained of. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, applying
the law of Louisiana, concluded that there was joint liability. It
remanded the case stating:
If, therefore, on a new trail, plaintiffs can adduce evidence suf-
ficient to show that the defendants, or any of them, were negil-
gent and, though acting separately, their negligence combined to
produce the pollution damage, plaintiffs may recover for the whole
damage against one or all of those contributing. The judgment is re-
versed and the cause is remanded for further and not inconsistent
proceedings.30
In the course of the opinion the court of appeals mentioned
the requirement that the conduct of each wrongdoer must appear
to have been a substantial factor in producing the harm to the plain-
tiff.
III. THE LAw IN COLORADO
Although the law in Colorado in pollution cases is somewhat
obscure, there has been a tendency at least toward the rule of joint
2 Wigmore, supra note 1, at 459.
2
8Id. at 460.
2189 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1951).
3 0 Id. at 212.
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liability. In Larimer & Weld Irr. Co. v. Walker,3 a flooding case,
joint liability was recognized. Two water companies, each with
knowledge of the other's act, conveyed water down a natural stream
(dry creek) on the same day. The volume was such that it raised
the stream of the channel above its capacity, resulting in an overflow
which damaged plaintiff's property. The court noted that the testi-
mony established that the defendant companies were operating to-
gether, and thus the acts of the one were in effect the acts of the
other. On the matter of joint liability it was said:
A further contention is that the evidence fails to establish a
joint tort. In order to render parties jointly liable for tort it must
clearly appear that the wrong complained of flowed from their joint
action or non-action. Mead v. Zang Brewing Co., 43 Colo. 1, 95
Pac. 284. To make them jointly liable the injury must be the result
of concerted action. Stratton's Independence v. Sterrett, 51 Colo.
26, 117 Pac. 351. In 36 Cyc. 483, the principle is thus stated:
'Where different persons owe the same duty and their acts naturally
tend to the same breach of their duty, the wrong may be regarded
as joint and both may be held liable.'
In this case the injury complained of was plainly the result of
the joint acts of the defendants in attempting to convey an exces-
sive amount of water through Dry Creek. The commingling of their
respective allowances of water in the stream produced the injury,
and under the rule announced they are each liable for the damage
done, and are therefore jointly liable. The case was tried upon a
correct theory and the instructions given properly stated the law
governing the issues involved.32
The emphasis is on actual concert of action as between these
defendants. Hence Colorado cannot be classified as a joint liability
jurisdiction.
Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, Inc. " is a pollution case which de-
clares that defendants operating independently, each contributing to
the pollution of the stream, are responsible individually for the en-
tire damage. The court said that one introducing extraneous matter
into a stream is under a duty to prevent damage as the result thereof
either from his act alone or his act in conjunction with acts of others.
This, however, was an injunction suit; the courts in this type of case
have been less restrictive about the cause factor.
One other interesting Colorado case is that of Reyher v. Mayne.34
Here two defendants were engaged in hunting. One of them shot
the plaintiff. The trial court entered judgment against both the
shooter and his companion. The Colorado Supreme Court held that
this judgment was not in error, in that the defendants were acting in
31 65 Colo. 320, 176 Pac. 282 (1918).
32 Id. at 323, 176 Pac. at 283-84.
3396 Colo. 319, 44 P.2d 1024 (1934).
3490 Colo. 586, 10 P.2d 1109 (1932).
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concert. Both were violating the law in that they were trespassers.
The court described the action of the two defendants as "a thing in-
tegral and indivisible. Each defendant here is properly answerable
for the sum or aggregate of the damage inflicted 'by both wrong-
doers." "5
The decision in Ryan Gulch Reservoir Co. v. Swartz,36 contains
some consolation as well as some argument material for those advo-
cating the individual liability principle. In that case the Colorado
Supreme Court held -that there was an improper joinder of parties
inasmuch as the several sources of the flooding were independent.
It made the following comments:
The difficulty that the plaintiff must necessarily encounter, if
he brings a separate action against either defendant, in showing
what its contribution was to the single injury, is no reason why this
court in a joint action against them, where the evidence does not
show a joint liability, should hold either defendant liable for the
entire injury to which he is only one separate contributor, nor is it
any reason why we should permit a joint action to be maintained
against both when there was no concurrence, either in time or
place, of their distinct and separate acts." 7
Joinder is, of course, no longer a problem but the substantive
questions remain. Perhaps the question is now an open one in
Colorado.
The reader might conclude from what has been said that sec-
tions 433A and B are plaintiff principles. It is suggested that they
strike a middle ground between the old rule of individual non-liabil-
ity and that of strict joint liability exemplified by Landers and Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. For example, it is open under the Restatement
view to the defendant to whom the burden of proof has shifted to
show nonliability by establishing that his part in the injury or dam-
age to the plaintiff was legally insubstantial or insignificant. It
should be borne in mind that this section does not, directly at least,
seek to change the substantive law; it is limited to a shifting of the
burden of proof and thus requires the defendants to prove their in-
nocence or to establish the extent of their respective contributions to
the indivisible result. This may prove in practice to be a difficult
burden. Again, however, it must be emphasized that in general these
are cases in which the defendants have acted independently and in
which the impact brought about by each defendant is presumably
susceptible to apportionment. The philosophy of section 433B(2) is
that there is a probability of fault inferable from the happening
similar to that in res ipsa loquitur cases. The several defendants are
35Id. at 590, 10 P.2d at 1110.
3677 Colo. 60, 234 Pac. 1059 (1925).
37 Id. at 69, 234 Pac. 1062.
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deemed to be in a superior position to produce evidence as to actual
contribution or participation.
One possible result of this rule is that in practice it could, with
the modern attitude toward expert witnesses, transform a wide variety
of cases which are now regarded as joint tortfeasor in character into
individual liability cases. Defendants could conceivably put this pro-
cedure to work for them.
One final observation: It should be kept in mind that the en-
tire concept of joint liability is and has been a fiction which has come
to us under the guise of concert of action. It was derived from in-
tentional tort cases. Obviously there is no true concert of action in a
case in which two automobiles coming from different directions neg-
ligently collide with the car of the plaintiffs. The culprits are held
jointly liable notwithstanding that they were not in a conspiracy. The
result is an expedient one; the plaintiff cannot prove the contribution
of each defendant and is relieved from the burden in the interests of
achieving a just result. We take this type of case for granted.
Sections 433A and B would open the door to a holding of joint
or several liability in the other multiple 'cause-indivisible injury cases,
thus extending what might be called a fiction on a consistent basis.
It eliminates the old, meaningless catch phrases such as concurrent
causes and recognizes that joint liability in all of the non-intentional
tort cases is not a matter of concert of action or joint enterprise but
is a question of whether damages can be feasibly and conveniently
apportioned. Experience has shown that the probabilities favor a
just result where joint liability is imposed. It thus appears hypocritical
to draw the line in the hard case and to rationalize the unjust result
by these catch phrase tests. Professor Wigmore must have had this in
mind when he said that "ignorance of history * * * does cruel wrong."
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NOTES
SELF- INCRIMINATION: TESTIMONIAL VS.
NON-TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
One may note with alarm or satisfaction that recent judicial de-
cisions have displayed increasing concern for the protection of the
constitutional rights of suspected criminals. This concern spreads
across the full range of the criminal process, from arrest and interro-
gation to eventual trial and possible conviction. The problem posed
by this Note focuses upon the protections afforded a defendant from
involuntary self-incrimination. The scope of this problem necessarily
encompasses a citizen's treatment from the moment he enters the
police station until his trial is completed.
To place the problem area in perspective, consider the circum-
stance of a drunken driving suspect who is being detained at the
police station for questioning and an examination of his intoxicated
condition. This man, hereafter referred to as the defendant, is placed
in a small room with police officers and miscellaneous testing equip-
ment designed to determine the alcohol content of his blood. The
defendant is generally uncooperative and vocally refuses to submit to
coordination tests. Without the defendant's consent, and perhaps
even without his knowledge, the entire scene is preserved by sound
motion pictures. At a subsequent trial, the sound motion picture is
introduced into evidence to show the defendant's demeanor and ap-
pearance. In order to show the slurred speech of the defendant, a
portion of the sound track is played for the jury; by coincidence or
intention, that portion contains the defendant's verbal refusal to
submit to the sobriety and coordination tests. In this situation, the
defendant's reasonable contention could be that such "evidence" vio-
lated his right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination. It is
submitted that the validity of such a contention is primarily dependent
upon whether the sound track of the motion picture is testimonial or
non-testimonial in character. The distinctions between testimonial
and non-testimonial evidence, and which type of evidence is provided
with protection from compulsory self-incrimination, is the thrust of
this Note.
It should be noted that the above "hypothetical" situation is, in
fact, based upon a recent Colorado decision.'
1 Lanford v. People, 409 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1966).
501
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF PHOTOGRAPHS AND MOTION PICTURES
A brief reference to these types of evidence will clarify later dis-
cussion. The admissibility of a motion picture is based on the theory
of the admissibility of still photographs, thereby making discussion
of still photographs relevant.
The rule admitting still photographs into evidence is well estab-
lished. It is generally held that photographs of persons, places and
things, when authenticated by a showing that the scene depicted is an
accurate reproduction, are admissible.2 The admission of such a
photograph is discretionary with the trial judge It would seem that
such evidence is admissible whenever it can relevantly supplement
the testimonial descriptions of a witness.4
Photographs commonly depict a scene, object, or person as it or
he was at the time an offense or act occurred. Such evidence assumes
importance when physical appearances have significantly changed and
an essential aspect of the issues presented is appearances as they were
at the time of the commission of the offense5 or happening of the act.
Based on the theory that motion pictures are nothing more than
a series of single or still pictures,6 the rules governing the admissibility
of still photographs are equally applicable to the admissibility of
motion pictures. Motion pictures have been found particularly useful
for the documentation of confessions' and the recordation of interro-
gation and statement signing scenes.'
The use of a motion picture to document a confession would
seem incomplete unless a sound track were included. A California
decision has taken this position by stating that, -[A]s a method of
presenting confessions, sound motion pictures appear to have a
unique advantage in that, while presenting the admission of guilt,
they simultaneously testify to facts relevant to the issue of volition."9
When a prosecutor employs motion pictures and their sound
tracks in his effort to secure a conviction, the question of self-incrimi-
nation may be raised. Clearly, if the movie and sound track pertain
to a voluntary confession, the defendant has manifested his consent
2 Potts v. People, 114 Colo. 253, 158 P.2d 739 (1945).
3 Ibid.
4 See Martinez v. People, 124 Colo. 170, 235 P.2d 810 (1951).
5 State v. Sanders, 358 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. 1962) ; accord, Vigil v. People, 134 Colo. 126,
300 P.2d 545 (1956) ; State v. Hughes, 244 La. 774, 154 So. 2d 395 (1963).
6Heiman v. Market St. Ry. Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 311, 69 P.2d 178 (1937) ; House-
wright v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 101, 225 S.W.2d 417 (1949).
7 Grant v. State, 171 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1965).
8 Hammil v. People, 145 Colo. 577, 361 P.2d 117, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 903 (1961);
Martinez v. People, 124 Colo. 170, 235 P.2d 810 (1951).
9 People v. Dabb, 32 Cal. App. 2d 491, 495, 197 P.2d 1, 5 (1948) (voluntary re-enact-
ment of robbery and murder by accused).
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to self-incrimination. But not infrequently, the motion picture is
taken without the defendant's consent or even his knowledge, raising
the defense of compulsory self-incrimination in contravention of the
privilege contained in the United States Constitution" and many state
constitutions."
II. TESTIMONIAL OR NON-TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
A. Types of Evidence
There appears to be a confusion of meaning between "evidence"
and "testimony." An apparent minority of courts have held either
that testimony means all evidence or that testimony is synonymous
with the term evidence. 2 However, the better reasoned decisions hold
that "evidence" is inclusive of "testimony," and thus that testimony
is merely a particular kind of evidence. 3 A case illustrative of this
concept stated,
Is there not a difference between giving evidence and being a witness
(which implies testimonial evidence only) ? The word evidence is a
broad embracing term, including all classes of proof, testimonial or
otherwise ....
'Evidence' is the broader term and includes all testimony, but 'testi-
mony' is accurately used to designate only a particular kind or spe-
cies of evidence .... 14
Having noted that "evidence" and "testimony" are not synony-
mous, the phrase "testimonial evidence" requires further definition.
Testimonial evidence is that evidence which is the result of a witness
having made a statement or given non-physical evidence under oath."
It would seem, therefore, that the elements of testimonial evidence
are three: (1) a witness; (2) an oath; and (3) communication of
evidence, written or oral, by the witness, to the tribunal.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person .. shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself .... ).
11 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 18 ("No person shall be compelled to testify against
himself in a criminal case ....").
12 See Aldrich v. State, 220 Ga. 132, 137 S.E.2d 463 (1964) ; Roberts v. Carlson, 142
Neb. 857, 8 N.W.2d 175 (1943) ; United States v. Clark, 5 Utah 226, 14 Pac. 288
(1887).
13 Stern v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 2d 9, 177 P.2d 308 (1947) (testimony limited
to evidence given by witnesses under oath or affirmation) ; Columbia Nat'l Bank v.
German Nat'l Bank, 56 Neb. 803, 77 N.W. 346 (1898) (testimony is a species of
evidence given orally by witnesses); Worland v. McGill, 26 Ohio App. 442, 160
N.E. 478 (1927) (evidence includes exhibits; testimony does not); Hendrickson v.
Myers, 393 Pa. 224, 144 A.2d 367 (1958) (evidence including everything submitted
to the jury) ; Crooks v. Harmon, 29 Utah 304, 81 Pac. 95 (1905) (testimony is evi-
dence but evidence may or may not be testimony).
14 Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 643, 16 A.2d 80, 89 (1940).
"5E.g., People v. Krotz, 341 I11. 214, 172 N.E. 135 (1930) ; Flick v. Gately, 328 I11.
App. 81, 65 N.E.2d 137 (1946); Meyers v. State, 112 Neb. 149, 198 N.W. 871
(1924); People v. Chu, 193 Misc. 1043, 85 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1949); Baker v. Wood-




At the point of oral communication with the tribunal, a witness
may assert the privilege against self-incrimination only in the context
of "testimonial compulsion."1  This compulsion can be best under-
stood by reference to the aforementioned elements of testimonial evi-
dence. The first two elements and an order of the court compelling
a witness to communicate with the tribunal results in testimonial
compulsion. Thus, it shall be found that the testimonial or non-
testimonial nature of the "evidence" determines the validity of in-
voking the privilege against self-incrimination.
During an investigation of this privilege, Wigmore concluded
that "the history of the privilege ... suggests that the privilege is
limited to testimonial disclosures. It was directed at the employment
of legal process to extract from the person's own lips an admission
of guilt, which would thus take the place of other evidence."' 7 Recog-
nizing the importance of the distinctions between testimonial and
non-testimonial evidence, Wigmore, in a later section of his book,
stated that,
From the general principle (§ 2263 supra) it results that an
inspection of the bodily features by the tribunal or by witnesses
does not violate the privilege because it does not call upon the ac-
cused as a witness-i.e., upon his testimonial responsibility. That
he may in such cases be required sometimes to exercise muscular
action - as when he is required to take off his shoes or roll up his
sleeves - is immaterial, unless all bodily action were synonymous
with testimonial utterance; for ...not compulsion alone is the
component idea of the privilege, but testimonial compulsion. 18
Confining the operation of the privilege solely to testimonial com-
pulsion seems to be the general thrust of case law. " If, in fact, the
privilege is so confined, real or physical evidence (non-testimonial)
which has no element of verbal communication will not be excluded
on the ground of involuntary self-incrimination. This is true even
though the source of the evidence involves fingerprinting," photo-
16 People v. Sykes, 47 Cal. Rptr. 596, 599 (1965 ).
17 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2263, at 378 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
18Id. § 2265, at 386.
29 See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 163 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1947); People v. Sykes,
47 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1965); Vigil v. People, 134 Colo. 126, 300 P.2d 545 (1956);
Berney v. Volk, 341 Mich. 647. 67 N.W.2d 801 (1955).
20 Schmerber v. California, 86 Sup. Ct. 1826, 1832 (1966) ; Smith v. United States, 324
F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1963); United States v. Krapf,




graphing,21 or an examination of the body of the defendant in search
of identifying characteristics."2
The leading United States Supreme Court opinion of Holt v.
United States23 supports this analysis. In this case, a witness other
than the defendant was allowed to testify that the accused had put on
a blouse and that the blouse had fit him. The defendant, stating that
this had been done under duress, contended that he had been involun-
tarily compelled to incriminate himself. The Court disagreed and
held that
the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral com-
pulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his
body as evidence when it may be material .... For when he is ex-
hibited, whether voluntarily or by order, and even if the order goes
too far, the evidence, if material, is competent.2 4
The Holt rule, having withstood the test of time, has been cited
with approval as recently as 1966.5 The blood within an individual
has also been treated as merely the "body" of said individual and
therefore outside of the protection afforded by the privilege.26 One
jurisdiction that has clearly limited the protection afforded by the
privilege, stated that "the [constitutionalI provision against self-
incrimination is limited to protection against testimonial compulsion,
and does not extend to the exclusion of the body as evidence when
such evidence may be relevant and material.""
The formulation of law requires the drawing of lines. Dis-
tinguishing between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence is no
exception to this general rule. When lines between legal and illegal
conduct are sought to be drawn, or decisions made regarding the
question of whether given evidence is testimonial or non-testimonial,
gray, borderline areas necessarily develop. 8 A correctly drawn line
21 Schmerber v. California, supra note 20; Smith v. United States, supra note 20; United
States v. Amorosa, 167 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1948) ; State v. Linebarger, 71 Idaho 255,
232 P.2d 669 (1951).
2 Schmerber v. California, supra note 20; McFarland v. United States, 150 F.2d 593
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 788 (1945).
23 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
24 Id. at 252. (Emphasis added.) Accord, Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1957) ; People v. Tomaszek, 54 Il. App. 2d 254,
204 N.E.2d 30 (1964).
2 Schmerber v. California, 86 Sup. Ct. 1826 '(1966).
26 See, e.g., Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36, 240 P.2d 512, cert. denied, 343 U.S. 978
(1952) (results of a sample of a defendant's blood, taken while defendant was un-
conscious, admitted into evidence) ; accord, Mestichelli v. Mestichelli, 44 Misc. 2d
707, 255 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1964) (civil action).
2 Vigil v. People, 134 Colo. 126, 129, 300 P.2d 545, 547 (1956). See also note 19 supra
and accompanying text. Contra, Cox v. State, 395 P.2d 954 (Okla. 1964).
2
8 Allen v. State, 183 Md. 603, 39 A.2d 820 (1944).
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will separate physical evidence from testimonial evidence, and by so
separating, will indicate which evidence is a proper subject for appli-
cation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
C. Results of Tests Indicating Physical Facts
It is common practice to use the results of a blood test to prove
non-paternity." Such evidence is usually considered to be real or
physical, or, using other terminology, non-testimonial rather than
testimonial. As such, the evidence is outside the protection of the
privilege.
The blood test is also used to indicate the extent of intoxication,
if any. When used for this purpose, the evidence resulting from
analysis of the blood is clearly considered to be non-testimonial, even
though taken without the consent of the supposed offender and at
the express direction of a police officer." In reaching this conclusion,
the United States Supreme Court stated,
We hold that the privilege protects an accused only from being
compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State
with evidence of a testimonal or communicative nature... and that
the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in question in this
case did not involve compulsion to these ends. 31
In attempting to define what is meant by the phrase "testimonial or
communicative nature," the Court offered the following explanation
in footnote five to the decision.
But the Fifth Amendment relates only to acts on the part of
the person to whom the privilege applies, and we use these words
subject to the same limitations. A nod or head-shake is as much a
'testimonial' or 'communicative' act in this sense as are spoken words.
But the terms as we use them do not apply to evidence of acts non-
communicative in nature as to the person asserting the privilege,
even though, as here, such acts are compelled to obtain the testimony
of others.32
The Court is clearly declaring this class of "blood test" evidence non-
testimonial. This should come as no surprise because such evidence
can be placed before a tribunal without utilizing the testimonial re-
sponsibility of an accused person. To forcefully remove a sample of
blood from a suspect's body is analogous to requiring fingerprinting
or examination of a defendant's body. In each case, the suspect or
defendant is required to submit to governmental authority and the
practical result of this submission is the procurement of evidence.
2Mestichelli v. Mestichelli, 44 Misc. 2d 707, 255 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1964) (civil action).
See also note 26 .upra and accompanying text.
30 Schmerber v. California, 86 Sup. Ct. 1826 (1966).
3
1 Id. at 1830-31.
32 Id. at 1830-31 n.5.
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But, such evidence is physical in nature and does not involve the tes-
timonial capacity of the defendant.
For any evidence, whether verbal or physical, to be valuable, it
must have some element of communication. One can thus conclude
that it is not what is communicated that is important, but rather the
mode of communication, since only if the mode of communication
involves testimonial responsibility can the privilege be successfully
invoked. Therefore, while all evidence communicates by conveying
useful information to the tribunal for its consideration while arriving
at a decision, such communication, even when compelled, violates no
privilege provided that the information pertains to real or physical
evidence rather than testimonial evidence.
The United States Supreme Court has recently discussed the
scope of the fifth amendment privilege in the context of testimonial
and non-testimonial compulsion.
It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an ac-
cused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the
compulsion of responses which are also communications .... On
the other hand, both federal and state courts have usually held that
it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to finger-
printing, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for
identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to
walk or to make a particular gesture. The distinction which has
emerged . . . is that the privilege is a bar against compelling 'com-
munications' or 'testimony,' but that compulsion which makes a sus-
pect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does not
violate it.1
3
The Court appears to equate "communications" with "testimony,"
but it does so in a very narrow context. Testimonial communication
is within the privilege, but to be technically correct, the general term
''communication," must be equated to the general term "evidence,"
and the narrow term "testimonial communication," must be taken to
be a special kind of communication.
D. Conclusion
1. Motion Picture without a Sound Track
It will be useful to place the conclusion in the context of the
previously related hypothetical. 4 To draw the line in this borderline
situation, the question requiring an answer is whether or not the
motion picture alone was testimonial or non-testimonial.
It cannot be doubted that the conduct of the defendant at the
time of the filming of the motion picture was an essential aspect of
the issue of intoxication, subject to change by the passage of time. 5
33
1d. at 1832.
34 See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
35 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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Nor can it be doubted that the motion picture was intended to prove
the truth of the prosecution's allegations, i.e., for the motion picture
to have been admissible, it must have been shown that it was an accu-
rate reproduction of the scene as it actually was at the time of the
filming. 6 In effect the film is a type of witness which has been sworn
to tell or show the whole truth and nothing but the truth. The foun-
dation of authenticity which is required before the film becomes com-
petent evidence is analogous to the oath.
Consider, briefly, the pictorial nature of this cellulose "witness."
It must be noted that officers present in the interrogation room could
have testified to the demeanor, attitude and general condition of the
defendant as they had observed him. Because such testimony would
have been proper, it seems clear that the same information could have
been photographed and conveyed by means of a motion picture cam-
era. It therefore appears reasonable to conclude that the movie, when
offered to show the demeanor of the defendant, is non-testimonial
in nature and outside the protection afforded by the privilege. This is
in accord with two Texas decisions 7 wherein the Texas judiciary al-
lowed as evidence, motion pictures purporting to show the demeanor
and'bodily condition of the defendants in both cases.
2. Motion Picture with a Sound Track
The essence of the privilege against self-incrimination is the de-
fendant's right not to incriminate himself by compelled testimonial
communication. 8 In this context, it is clear that the results of some
physical tests, particularly blood tests, are non-testimonial and there-
fore outside the privilege."' However, when a defendant is asked to
submit to a blood test and refuses to do so, what begins as an attempt
to secure purely physical evidence, may result in testimonial evidence
if evidence of the defendant's refusal to cooperate is presented to the
tribunal. Evidence of such a refusal may appear in the form of a
prosecutor's comment or might be contained in the sound track of a
motion picture made at the time the defendant was being interrogated.
The issue to be resolved, therefore, is whether a vocal refusal to sub-
mit to a physical test is testimonial or non-testimonial, and if testi-
monial, whether the refusal is incriminating.
The United States Supreme Court has considered the question of
refusal to testify on several occasions, the first being Wilson v. United
States where the Court said,
36 Sec note 2 supra and accompanying text.
37 Carpenter v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 383, 333 S.W.2d 391 (1960); Housewright v.
State, 154 Tex. Crim. 101, 225 S.W.2d 417 '(1949).
38 See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
39 See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
VOL. 43
SELF-INCRIMINATION
The act of Congress permitting the defendant in a criminal
action to appear as a witness in his own behalf upon his request de-
clares ... that his failure to request to be a witness in the case shall
not create any presumption against him.
To prevent such presumption being created, comment, especial-
ly hostile comment, upon such failure must necessarily be excluded
from the jury. The minds of the jurors can only remain unaffected
from this circumstance by excluding all reference to it.
4
0
Wilson established only a federal rule regarding prosecution
comments on a defendant's refusal to testify. A suggested rationale
for this federal rule is that a defendant, by electing not to testify, is
exercising his privilege against self-incrimination. If this election is
subsequently commented upon, the protection offered by the privilege
will likely be destroyed by the creation of an inference of the defend-
ant's guilt in the mind of the jury. This may, in effect, result in in-
voluntary self-incrimination.
In 1963, in Malloy v. Hogan,41 the Court extended the self-in-
crimination clause of the fifth amendment to the states via the four-
teenth amendment. Two years later, in Griffin v. California,42 the
Court stated that the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amend-
ment contained the same prohibitions as the statute construed in Wil-
son, and that because of Malloy, "the Fifth Amendment, in its direct
application to the Federal Government, and in its bearing on the
States ... forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's
silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of
guilt."
43
Aside from the previously mentioned adverse inference, if the
evidence of a refusal is conveyed by the sound track of a motion pic-
ture, there is again created the issue of involuntary self-incrimination.
This is due to the compelled testimonial nature of the sound track,
which is an authenticated reproduction of the defendant's own voice
emanating from his own lips," and recorded either without the de-
fendant's knowledge or consent, or both. The elements of testimonial
40Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 65 (1893). The act referred to in text is set
out fully below:
That in the trial of all indictments, informations, complaints, and other
proceedings against persons charged with the commission of crimes, offenses,
and misdemeanors, in the United States courts, Territorial courts, and courts-
martial, and courts of inquiry, in any State or Territory, including the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the person so charged shall, at his own request but not
otherwise, be a competent witness. And his failure to make such request
shall not create any presumption against him.
Act of March 16, 1878, 20 Stat. 30, ch. 37.
41378 U.S. 1 (1963).
4380 U.S. 609 (1965).
43 Id. at 615. See also Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (Griffin
not to be applied retroactively).
44 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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compulsion are all present: (1) the defendant's personal appearance
in the motion picture; (2) the proven accuracy of the film substitut-
ing for the oath; and (3) an involuntary, oral communication to the
tribunal.
Little more need be said. Let it suffice to say that a sound track
should be generally inadmissible in a criminal prosecution, except
when part of a voluntary confession, because of its unmistakable com-
pelled testimonial characteristics, and it should be specifically inad-
missible when it communicates evidence of a defendant's refusal to
take physical tests and the source of the refusal is the defendant's own
voice. It is submitted that a decision contrary to these principles is
contrary to the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution.
Jerry E. McAdow
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN CIVIL CASES
T HERE undoubtedly remain many perplexing problems concern-
ing the meaning and application of the exclusionary rule1 in
criminal trials,' but the most unsettled question relates to its applica-
tion to civil trials. Does an individual have a right to have evidence
excluded on the grounds that it was seized in violation of the fourth
amendment when he is subject, not to a criminal prosecution, but
rather to a civil suit instituted either by the government or by a pri-
vate citizen? There are statements by the United States Supreme
Court which are cited for the proposition that the fourth amendment
and the exclusionary rule apply to all cases,3 and others which are
cited for the proposition that their application is limited solely to
criminal prosecutions.' The difficulty involved in evaluating such
authority is that in none of these cases was the Court specifically ad-
dressing itself to the problem of the application of the fourth amend-
ment and the exclusionary rule to civil cases.' In only one case, One
1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,' has the Supreme Court so ad-
dressed itself. In that case the Court held that evidence seized illegal-
ly by state agents could not be introduced into evidence in forfeiture
proceedings. The first problem discussed in this Note deals with the
1 The rule set forth in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and made appli-
cable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), excludes all evidence in crim-
inal trials obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.
2 See generally Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L. J.
319.
3 In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914) the Court said:
The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States
and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limita-
tions and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever
secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against all unreason-
able searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all
alike, whether accused of crime or not .... (Emphasis added.)
Similarly in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920),
the Court said: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in
a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court
but that it shall not he used at all." (Emphasis added.)
4 In Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) the Court said:
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures,
and as shown in the previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action.
Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the
activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon
other than governmental agencies .... (Emphasis added.)
5 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) was a criminal trial involving illegal
seizure of documents. The statement in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920) was made in reference to a subpoena for documents that had
been illegally seized and returned. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) was
a criminal trial in which evidence illegally seized by private individuals was turned over
to the government.
6 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
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applicability of this holding to other civil suits in which the govern-
ment is a party, and the second involves the application of the exclu-
sionary rule in private actions where the government is not a party.
I. CIVIL SUITS IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT Is A PARTY
A. Forfeiture Proceedings
This area is the more settled of the two, particularly since the
decisive opinion in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan.7 Until this decision
the circuit courts were split on the question of whether illegally seized
evidence could be offered into evidence in forfeiture proceedings In
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan two Pennsylvania officers stationed at the
New Jersey border noticed a car entering Pennsylvania which ap-
peared to be low in the rear. On stopping the car, they found thirty-
one cases of liquor not bearing Pennsylvania tax seals, and imme-
diately seized both the car and the liquor. In accordance with a Penn-
sylvania statute, which declared that no property right existed in any
automobile used to transport illegal liquor and that such an auto was
subject to forfeiture,9 the government instituted an action for for-
feiture of the car. The trial court sustained the defendant's conten-
tion that the testimony of the officers concerning the contents of the
car should be excluded because the officers acted without probable
cause, and dismissed the action."0 The superior court reversed and
ordered the automobile forfeited." This order was affirmed by the
state supreme court. 2 The United States Supreme Court reversed and
7 Ibid.
8 The confusion resulted in a large part from the failure of the circuit courts to distin-
guish between the illegality of the search and seizure as affecting the jurisdiction of
the court to entertain the forfeiture proceeding and as affecting the admissibility of
evidence so obtained. It was held in Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530 (1926) that
the jurisdiction of the court in a forfeiture proceeding depended solely upon whether
the government had possession of the res at the time of the trial, and the man-
ner in which it obtained possession was irrelevant. This rule is followed in all juris-
dictions. E.g., United States v. 1058 in United States Currency, 323 F.2d 211 (3d Cir.
1963) ; United States v. One 1956 Ford Tudor Sedan, 253 F.2d 725 (4th Cir. 1958) ;
Sanders v. United States, 201 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Harman v. United States, 199
F.2d 34 (4th Cir. 1952). The problem arose when the courts attempted to construe the
language of the Dodge case for the proposition that the exclusionary rule does not
apply in forfeiture proceedings. See United States v. One 1956 Ford Tudor Sedan, 185
F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Ky. 1960). The Second, Seventh and Tenth Circuit Courts relied on
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) and held that evidence illegally obtained
should be excluded in forfeiture cases. E.g., United States v. Five Thousand Six Hun-
dred and Eight Dollars and Thirty Cents in United States Coin and Currency, 326 F.2d
359 (7th Cir. 1964) ; United States v. Physic, 175 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1949) ; United
States v. Butler, 156 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1946). For further discussion of the con-
fusion see 69 DICK. L. REV. 284 (1965).
9 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 6-601 (1952).
10 Pennsylvania v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, Misc. Liquor Condemnation Docket No. 4,
Quarter Sessions Court of Philadelphia County, Pa., Feb. Term, 1961.
11 Pennsylvania v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 199 Pa. Super. 428, 186 A.2d 52 (1962).
12 Pennsylvania v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 414 Pa. 540, 201 A.2d 427 (1964).
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remanded for a rehearing on the issue of probable cause. 3 In holding
that the exclusionary rule applied to forfeiture cases, the Court relied
heavily on Boyd v. United States," stating that "although there is this
factual difference between Boyd and the case at bar, nevertheless the
basis of the Boyd holding applies with equal, if not greater, force to
the case before us."", The reasoning of the Court was that although
a forfeiture proceeding is technically civil, it is criminal in substance
because it requires proof of a crime, and because the effect of the
proceeding, loss of the automobile, was punitive rather than com-
pensatory.
Finally .. . a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character.
Its object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commis-
sion of an offense against the law. ... It would be anomalous in-
deed, under these circumstances, to hold that in the criminal pro-
ceeding the illegally seized evidence is excludable, while in the for-
feiture proceeding, requiring the determination that the criminal
law has been violated, the same evidence would be admissible. That
the forfeiture is dearly a penalty for the criminal offense and can
result in even greater punishment than the criminal prosecution has
in fact been recognized by the Pennsylvania courts. 6
The Court also settled once and for all the distinction between
contraband per se and derivative contraband. The general theory
behind the distinction is that there exists a certain class of articles
which, for the protection of the public, should never be allowed in
the hands of private individuals. The most effective method to insure
that such articles do not find their way back to their original possessor
is to refuse to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence in forfeiture
cases relating to the seizure of the articles. By thus making irrelevant
the legality of the search, the state has only to prove that the indi-
vidual had possession or used the goods in violation of state law.
The courts, however, were not agreed as to the class of goods to which
this reasoning should be applied. Some courts applied it to goods
which, although not intrinsically illegal, were used for illegal pur-
poses. 7 Others applied it only to goods the mere possession of which
was illegal. 8 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the former
application in holding that since the statute declares that no property
right exists in any automobile used for the transportation of illegal
13 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702-03 (1965).
14 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In an action by the government to forfeit thirty-five cases of
plate glass imported without payment of custom duties, the Court held that an order for
production of papers and records was in violation of the fourth amendment.
15 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 698 (1965).
16 Id. at 700.
17 United States v. 1058 in United States Currency, 323 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1963) (evi-
dence relating to the illegal seizure of money in a gambling raid deemed admissible
because the money was used for illegal purposes).
18 United States v. Burns, 4 F.2d 131 (S.D. Fla. 1925) (illegally seized liquor not admis-
sible in evidence since mere possession was not unlawful per se).
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liquor, the possession of the auto was illegal and evidence relating to
its search and seizure would not be excluded. *" In other words, in de-
termining if the exclusionary rule should be applied, the court did
not rely on the intrinsic nature of a car, which is certainly not such as
to make its possession illegal, but rather on the use to which the car
was put, which did make its possession illegal. The Supreme Court
rejected this application when it stated:
It is apparent that the nature of the property here, though termed
contraband by Pennsylvania, is quite different. There is nothing even
remotely criminal in possessing an automobile. It is only the alleged
use to which this particular automobile was put that subjects Mr.
McGonigle to its possible loss . . . . We, therefore, do not have a
case before us in any way analagous to the contraband involved in
Jeffers and Trupiano and these cases can in no way be deemed to
impair the continued validity of Boyd which, like this case, involved
property not intrinsically illegal in character.20 (Emphasis added).
It can thus be concluded that in a forfeiture case involving an illegal
search or seizure, the exclusionary rule will be applied to all evidence
resulting from the search or seizure except when the goods are "prop-
erty intrinsically illegal in character."'
B. Tax Proceedings
Although the One 1958 Plymouth Sedan case does leave un-
answered a few questions relating to forfeiture proceedings,22 the
most stimulating question deals with its possible application to other
types of civil suits by the government. One area involves tax collec-
tion suits by the government in which the assessment of properties
is based on evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and
seizure. The protection of the fourth amendment is usually used as
the basis for an action to restrain collection of the tax,2" or as a de-
fense to a suit in assumpsit by the government.2' Although the pro-
tection has usually been afforded, it has been restricted to cases where
the plaintiff could show that the government acted solely on the
knowledge illegally obtained." One court utilized the fruits doctrine
19 Pennsylvania v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 414 Pa. 540, 201 A.2d 427 (1964).
20 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1965).
21 Id. at 700.
22 An interesting question not yet settled is the effect of an acquittal of the criminal charge
on the forfeiture proceedings. Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886) held that
an acquittal on the criminal charge barred the forfeiture proceeding. However, the case
has either been circumscribed or rejected in two later Supreme Court cases: Helvering
v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) ; Various Items of Personal Property v. United States,
282 U.S. 577 (1931). The Court has based its decisions primarily on the ground that
the issues and burden of proof are different in the two proceedings. Problems relating
to the effect of a conviction on the criminal charge, or no verdict at all, are discussed
in Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1137 (1953).
23 Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 230 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. Ohio 1963); Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F.
Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1962) ; Tovar v. Jarecki, 83 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
24 Rogers v. United States, 97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938).
2
5Tovar v. Jarecki, 83 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
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of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States 3' in granting an order
barring the government from using "in any proceeding of any kind" '
the evidence illegally obtained and from "reacquiring it by any
means." I However, it was held in Lord v. Kelley"' that although
the government would be required to return the records illegally
seized, a motion to suppress their use in subsequent criminal or civil
proceedings would not be granted if the government had prior knowl-
edge of the existence of the records.3" It has also been held that il-
legally seized evidence in a tax assessment case may be used to im-
peach the petitioner.1 Such would seem to be in accord with the rule
that illegally seized evidence may be used for impeachment purposes
in criminal cases.3
The One 1958 Plymouth Sedan case should have somewhat of a
solidifying effect on these cases, since the basic reasons behind the
holding in that case seem applicable. First, it appears that many of
the cases involving tax assessment are brought in lieu of a criminal
proceeding because of the realization by the government that a crim-
inal proceeding would fail as a result of the exclusion of the illegally
seized evidence. The terse analysis of such practices in forfeiture
proceedings by Mr. Justice Bradley in Boyd v. United States,33 cited
in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan,"' would seem applicable:
If the government prosecutor elects to waive an indictment, and to
file a civil information against the claimants . . . can he by this de-
vice take from the proceeding its criminal aspect and deprive the
claimants of their immunities as citizens, and extort from them a
production of their private papers, or, as an alternative, a confession
of guilt? This cannot be.35
Secondly, although proof of a crime is not required in these cases,
and the result - the tax - is not criminal in effect, it is clear that
the individual can be subject to penalties as severe as those imposed
in many criminal cases.3 The end result - penalties criminal in na-
ture based on illegally seized evidence - is present.
In the use of the investigative powers of the Internal Revenue
26 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
27 Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 230 F. Supp. 91, 97 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
28 Ibid.
29 223 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1963).
3 0 Ibid. In this case the petitioner was required to keep the records by law.
31 Compton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1964).
32 Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
3 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886).
34 380 U.S. at 697.
35 116 U.S. at 634.
30 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7203, among other things, makes it a misdemeanor, punish-
able by a fine of not more than $10,000, or imprisonment for not more than a year, or
both, for failure to keep records or supply information as required by law or regulation.
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Service there is little doubt that where the evidence is obtained by
"stealth or trickery" it will be excluded. 7 The unsettled area seems
to concern the use by the Internal Revenue Service of its power to
subpoena taxpayers' records.38 The most frequent grounds for exclu-
sion are that the subpoena constitutes an unreasonable search and
seizure because it lacks specificity,39 or because it imposes an oppres-
sive burden on the taxpayer." Since for failing to comply with a sub-
poena a taxpayer can be found in contempt of court,"' as well as fined
as much as 1,000 dollars, imprisoned for a year, or both,' it seems
that the reasoning used in the case of tax assessments would be ap-
plicable and require that all evidence obtained as a result of a sub-
poena issued without probable cause be excluded.
C. Condemnation Proceedings
The holding in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan should have a de-
termined effect on the body of case law holding that the protections
of the fourth amendment do not apply in condemnation proceedings
under the Federal Food and Drug Act.' It has been held: in a pro-
ceeding for condemnation of tuna fish, the order of attachment does
not require a finding of probable cause;" misrepresentation of pur-
pose by an inspector will not exclude evidence thereby obtained;4
there need be no verification of probable cause in the affidavit sup-
porting the condemnation proceeding." One of the reasons given for
the holdings in such cases is that since a condemnation proceeding is a
proceeding in rem, as opposed to a proceeding in personam, the owner
of the goods is not entitled to raise the protections of the fourth
amendment. 7 This distinction, relied on by the Pennsylvania Supreme
3 See generally De Reuil, Applicability of the Fourth Amendment in Civil Cases, 1963
DUKE L.J. 472; Gordon, When Can Records Be Withheld During Tax Investigations?,
17 J. TAXATION 174 (1962) ; Note, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Tax Investiga-
tions, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 676 (1957).
38 See articles cited note 37 supra.
39 See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) (not too indefinite) ; Wil-
son v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) (suitably specific) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1906) (too sweeping to be reasonable).
40 First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947) (subpoena requiring
bank to produce six million records for inspection unreasonable). But see, United
States v. First Nat'l Bank, 295 Fed. 142 (S.D. Ala. 1924).
41 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7604.
42 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7203, 7210.
43 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1964).
44 United States v. Eighteen Cases of Tuna Fish, 5 F.2d 979 (W.D. Va. 1925).
45 United States v. Seventy-Five Cases, 146 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1944).
48 United States v. 935 Cases, 136 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1943) ; United States v. Two Bar-
re!- of Desiccated Eggs, 185 Fed. 302 (D. Minn. 1911) ; United States v. 62 Packages,
48 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Wis. 1943).
47 In United States v. Seventy-Five Cases, 146 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1944), the court held that
the goods were "outlaws of interstate commerce" and that since the action was not
against the owner he could not raise the protections of the fourth amendment.
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Court in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan,8 and by various other courts in
forfeiture cases,"9 was definitely rejected as immaterial by the United
States Supreme Court in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan. The Court said:
This Court in Boyd v. United States... rejected any argument that
the technical character of a forfeiture as an in rem proceeding
against the goods had any effect on the right of the owner of the
goods to assert as a defense violations of his constitutional rights.
50
The distinction and its effects would seem to be equally irrele-
vant in condemnation proceedings.
Also, one ground upon which the decision in One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan was based - that proof of a crime was necessary - would
seem to have a bearing on these cases. Violation of the provisions in
the Federal Food and Drug Act concerning misbranded and adulter-
ated51 goods not only subjects the goods to condemnation but also
could subject the owner to criminal penalties.2 The most effective
argument for not extending the One 1958 Plymouth Sedan holding
to condemnation proceedings is that misbranded or adulterated goods
represent a threat to the public health, safety, and welfare. It will be
recalled that in forfeiture proceedings it was concluded that the ex-
clusionary rule will not apply to illegally seized property that is in-
trinsincally illegal in character, since to exclude the evidence would
be in effect to allow the return of the goods.5 It is submitted that the
same policy consideration would govern in condemnation proceedings,
at least in respect to those instances in which the deficiency could not
readily be corrected or eliminated by the owner.
D. Conclusion
The principal result of the One 1958 Plymouth Sedan case is to
illustrate that the fourth amendment will be applied to civil actions
initiated by the government if the reasons are sufficient. It will be
recalled that the Court approved the application of the fourth amend-
ment and the exclusionary rule because: (1) The proceeding required
proof of a crime; (2) The effect of the proceeding was criminal; and
(3) It appeared that the government frequently brought the civil
action in lieu of a criminal action. Whether its application to other
areas will require all three of these factors, or a combination of any
two, or just one, remains to be seen. True, there was no sweeping
language to the effect that it would be applied in all such cases, but
48 414 Pa. 540, 201 A.2d 427 (1964).
49 United States v. One 1941 Chrysler Brougham Sedan, 74 F. Supp. 970 (E.D. Mich.
1947) ; United States v. One 1940 Packard Coupe, 36 F. Supp. 788 (D. Mass. 1941).
50380 U.S. at 701 n.ll.
5152 Stat. 1042 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1964).
52 52 Stat. 1043 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1964).
53 See notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text.
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neither was there language restricting it to forfeiture cases. In other
areas the lower courts have interpreted the fourth amendment as ap-
plying to civil actions brought by the government when abuses seemed
apparent; 4 when the issue is presented in the future, it should be
considered in light of the statement by Mr. Justice Clark in Gouled
v. United States that the fourth amendment should "receive a liberal
construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual
depreciation' of the rights secured by [it,] by [the] imperceptible




If it can be said that the present portends the increasing appli-
cation of the fourth amendment and exclusionary rule to civil actions
by the government, it can also be said that the future holds no such
promise for civil actions by private citizens. In the first place, the
case law indicates no such trend." A sampling of the cases shows
little consistency in approach or result. In Lebel v. Swincicki" a suit
for damages resulting from injuries sustained in a car accident, the
plaintiff attempted to prove the intoxicated condition of the defend-
ant by introducing into evidence blood taken from the defendant
while he was unconscious. The court held that "the taking of blood
for purpose of analysis from the person of one who is unconscious
at the time constitutes a violation of his rights and that testimony...
should not be admitted in evidence."58 This result has been criticized
on the ground that the plaintiff was innocent of any wrongdoing be-
cause it was the hospital that took the blood." In Walker v. Penner,"0
the court allowed into evidence a bottle of whiskey illegally seized
from defendant's car by the plaintiff's husband, stating that the ex-
clusionary rule was limited to cases involving the government. In
cases concerning alienation of affections, one court held that love
letters from the defendant to the plaintiff's husband were admissible
54 In deportation proceedings it has been held reversible error to admit illegally seized
evidence: Ex parte Jackson, 263 Fed. 110 (D. Mont. 1920) ; United States v. Wong
Quong Wong, 94 Fed. 832 (D. Vt. 1899); Schenck v. Ward, 24 F. Supp. 766 (D.
Mass. 1938). Cf., Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 Fed. 129 (lst Cir. 1922).
In Strawn v. Western Union Telegraph, Sup. Ct. D.C., March 11, 1936, commented
upon in N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 1936, p. 1 '(not officially reported), the court granted
an order enjoining the telegraph company from complying with a blanket subpoena
issued by the Senate Lobby Investigating Committee on the grounds that it amounted
to an unreasonable search and seizure. See 84 U. PA. L. REv. 904 (1936).
55 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
r See cases collected in Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 670 (1966).
57 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958).
58d., 93 N.W.2d at 287. However, the court did not hold such error to be grounds for
reversal because of the adequacy of other evidence.
917 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 155 (1960).
60 190 Ore. 542, 227 P.2d 316 (1951).
VOL. 43
EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN CIVIL CASES
even though the plaintiff had violated the United States' postal laws
in obtaining them," but another court held that a plaintiff's fourth
amendment rights were violated when his estranged wife took letters
from his suitcase, and that the letters should have been excluded.'
However, these and other state court cases are weak authority either
for or against the proposition, since in most of them the court either
handled the issue perfunctorily or relied on the pre-Mapp rules in
criminal cases."3
In the most recent case, Sackler v. Sackler," the issue ran the
gamut of the court system of New York. In a suit for divorce by the
husband, he attempted to prove his wife's adulterous conduct by of-
fering evidence obtained when he and a force of private detectives
illegally entered her apartment. At the trial level, the wife's motion
to suppress this evidence was granted." The appellate division re-
versed three to two,66 and was affirmed by the court of appeals five
to two.
6 7
The Sackler decision resulted in a rash of comments, 8 most of
which did little to clarify the issue. By careful analysis it can be seen
that the question resolves itself into two distinct issues: (1) Does the
fourth amendment protect individuals from illegal searches and seiz-
ures by other individuals? (2) If so, is the exclusionary rule to be
applied to such evidence? Thus, the writers who begin by asking
whether the exclusionary rule, as enunciated in Mapp v. Ohio,6" should
be applied in civil cases, fail to recognize the distinction between the
two issues and thus omit half of the problem. A discussion of the
second issue is valueless unless it is preceded by a determination that
the fourth amendment does apply to the actions of private individuals.
A. Applicability of the Fourth Amendment to Actions of Individuals
In considering this first question, one argument against the
proposition that the fourth amendment applies in civil cases can be
quickly dismissed. It has frequently been stated that the historical
purpose of the fourth amendment was to protect the citizens against
61 Mercer v. Parsons, 95 N.J.L. 224, 112 Atl. 254 (1920).
62 Kohn v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 2d 459, 55 P.2d 1186 (1936).
63 See Munson v. Munson, 27 Cal. 2d 659, 166 P.2d 268 (1946).
64 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 '(1964).
65 33 Misc. 2d 600, 224 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1962).
6 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1962).
67 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964).
68 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 407 (1965); 63 COLUM. L. REV. 168 (1963); Note, 48 COR-
NELL L.Q. 345 (1963); Note, 31 FORDIIAM L. REV. 390 (1962) ; 25 MD. L. REV. 186
(1965) ; 46 MINN. L. REV. 1119 (1962) ; 43 N.C.L. REV. 608 (1965) ; 41 N.D.L. REV.
559 (1965); Note, 11 N.Y.L.F. 141 (1965); Note, 14 S.C.L.Q. 433 (1962); 16
SYRACUSE L. REV. 884 (1965); Comment, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1043 (1962) ; Note,
YALE L.J. 1062 (1963).
6367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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unfettered governmental action and that this purpose in itself pre-
cludes its application to private action. The majority opinion in
Sackler " cited Boyd v. United States" in support of this proposition.
That the original purpose of the fourth amendment was to protect
against the odious writs of assistance and general warrants is not
questioned." However, the assumption that the historical purposes
should serve to limit all later constructions of the amendment is
questionable, and in light of the recent opinion by the United States
Supreme Court in Frank v. Maryland 3 it seems unlikely that this
limitation will be the case. In Frank the Court said:
While these concerns for individual rights were the historic im-
pulses behind the Fourth Amendment and its analogues in state con-
stitutions, the application of the Fourth Amendment and the extent
to which the essential right of privacy is protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are of course not restricted
within these historic bounds.
74
It has also been argued that the Supreme Court has already held
that the fourth amendment does not apply to civil cases by virtue of
its holding in Burdeau v. McDowelPs which stated that evidence un-
lawfully obtained by a private person would not be excluded in a
criminal prosecution since the Constitution does not apply to indi-
viduals." The dissent in Sackler77 argued that Burdeau was implicitly
overruled by the holding in Elkins v. United States7 that evidence
seized by state officers in violation of the fourth amendment was in-
admissible in federal courts. Indeed, Elkins was so construed in dic-
tum in Williams v. United States.7' These cases would seem to be
poor authority since both involve criminal prosecutions. However,
since Burdeau was also a criminal case, it is submitted that it should
not be allowed to preclude a fresh examination of the issues.8"
What then, are the possible constitutional grounds for applying
the fourth amendment to private searches? The first possibility in-
volves the right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination arising
70 15 N.Y.2d 40, 42, 203 N.E.2d 481, 483, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85 (1964).
71 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
7 2 
See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS at 427 (7th ed. 1903).
73359 U.S. 360 (1959).
74 Id. at 365-66.
78 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
7
6 Id. at 475. This case was relied on by the majority in the court of appeals decision in
Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 42, 203 N.E.2d 481, 483, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85
(1964).
77 15 N.Y.2d at 43, 203 N.E.2d at 484, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
7
8364U.S. 206 (1960).
79282 F.2d 940, 941 (6th Cir. 1960).
80 In 72 YALE L.J. 1062, 1064 (1963) it is stated that "Sackler may be distinguished
from Burdeau on the ground that the public's interest in criminal prosecutions was the
gravamen in the latter case."
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out of the "intimate relationship" between the fourth and fifth
amendments. " In Boyd, Mr. Justice Bradley said:
[T]he two amendments ... throw great light on each other. For the'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the Fourth
Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling
a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is
condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man 'in a
criminal case to be a witness against himself,' which is condemned
in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is
an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.82
Originally the application of the fifth amendment was limited to
criminal proceedings,83 but it has since been held applicable in civil
proceedings, the only requirement being that it must appear that the
incriminating evidence, if not excluded, could reasonably be said to
lead to a criminal prosecution.84 Analyzed in this light, the evidence
should have been excluded in Sackler since the evidence obtained
could well lead to a criminal prosecution for adultry. Just how heavi-
ly the Court has relied on this formula in criminal cases is not clear.
It was not mentioned in the majority opinion in Weeks v. United
States' or in Elkins v. United States.88 However, in Mapp the Court
indicated that this might have been partly responsible for their hold-
ing when they quoted the language in Boyd which states that the two
amendments run "almost into each other,'87 and indeed, Mr. Justice
Black stated in his concurring opinions in Mapp88 and One 1958
Plymouth Sedan89 that it was this reasoning that persuaded him to
abandon the position he took in Wolf v. Colorado" - that the con-
stitutional provision against illegal searches and seizures did not re-
quire the exclusion of the evidence in state courts.
However, this argument contains the fatal flaw mentioned
earlier in this section. The reasoning used in Boyd, mentioned in
Mapp, and relied on by Mr. Justice Black in One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan, was that the fifth amendment was the basis for excluding
evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment. The fifth
amendment applies to the exclusion of the evidence, not to the seizure
81 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
82Ibid.
83 See Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause (pts.
1-2), 29 MIcH L. REv. 1, 13-14, 191, 195-96 (1930).
84 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
85232 U.S. 383 (1914).
8 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
87 367 U.S. at 646.
8
8Id. at 661-66.
8 380 U.S. at 703-05.
90 338 U.S. 25'(1949).
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of it. There must be independent grounds for holding that it was
originally seized in violation of the fourth amendment.
Perhaps the most plausible method for accomplishing this is
found in the argument for extending the "state action" concept as
applied in Shelly v. Kraemer.91 This case held that a state court's in-
junction enforcing a private covenant designed to discriminate against
Negroes in the sale of property was state action denying equal pro-
tection. However, neither post-Shelly decisions 2 nor commentators 3
have construed this holding to apply to all judicial conduct which
tends to encourage private behavior in which a state could not con-
stitutionally engage. The present interpretation of Shelly seems to
be that it is limited to instances in which the court is asked to compel
a private citizen to do an act which would be unconstitutional for the
state to perform as opposed to acquiescing in the admission of evi-
dence offered by an individual, which if offered by the government,
would be excluded. 4 Even though the Supreme Court has not shown
any inclination to extend the application of this principle beyond
cases involving racial discrimination," neither has it definitely de-
clined to do so, since the problem of "state action" as it relates to
the fourth amendment in private actions has never directly confronted
the Court. A warrant for its extension to private actions involving
reception of evidence can be found in the realization that if one of
the purposes of the concept is to discourage "private misconduct," it
should make little difference whether the court is asked to enforce
it or merely acquiesce in the reception of its results into evidence.
From this analysis it is evident that the first step in the applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule to private actions presents serious ob-
stacles. There seems to be no readily apparent basis for holding that
the fourth amendment in any of its judicial interpretations applies to
private actions, and without this there is little practical reason for
considering the second step. One might also avoid a discussion of
this second issue by determining that if the fourth amendment does
apply, the exclusionary rule automatically applies. Indeed, it could
91334 U.S. 1, 15 (1948).
92 In Black v. Cutter Labs, 351 U.S. 292 (1956) the Court refused to apply the Shelly
reasoning when, in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement, the employee
was discharged for membership in the Communist Party. In denying the employee en-
forcement of an arbitration award of reinstatement the Court held that the contract was
of a local nature and did not raise a federal question.
93 See Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1108-20 (1960);
Pollack, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler,
108 U. PA. _. REV. 1, 14 (1959).
94 See 46 MINN. L. REV. 119, 1126 (1962) ; 72 YALE L.J. 1062, 1064 n.17 (1963).
95 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961 )the Court ap-
plied the state action concept to a Negro who was refused service in a restaurant on prop-
erty leased by the state, but expressly limited its holding to the precise facts of the case.
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be argued that as a result of Mapp, the exclusionary rule is now an
inherent part of the fourth amendment right, and that anytime the
latter is applied the former is also. If reflection on the criminal cases
is of any help, it will be recalled that although the Supreme Court
had been condemning unconstitutional searches and seizures for many
years, it was not until 1914, in Weeks v. United States "' that the
Court decided to enforce it in the federal courts by means of the ex-
clusionary rule. And although in 1949 the Court recognized that the
fourth amendment applied to the states through the due process
clause, 7 it was not until twelve years later in Mapp that they applied
the exclusionary rule to state courts. Thus, even if one concludes
that the remedy is now a part of the right, it is obvious that this is
not so simply because of the inherent nature of the right. In reply
to this it could be argued that we should learn from past mistakes
and short-cut this torturous process by declaring ab initio that the
remedy is inherent in the right. This would indeed foreclose discus-
sion but for the fact that the policy reasons behind the application
of the exclusionary rule in criminal cases are not applicable to civil
cases. 8 Thus, after finding the fourth amendment applicable to civil
cases, the Court may very well be faced with a similar arduous task
of determining which remedy is most appropriate to give protection
to the right.9
B. Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule
Assuming then that one of the grounds discussed above is found
sufficient for applying the fourth amendment to private actions, and
also that the exclusionary rule is not to be automatically applied, the
discussion turns to the second issue - Should evidence seized uncon-
stitutionally be excluded in private actions? Many of the arguments
made both for and against the proposition that the rule should apply
miss the point, for they fail to keep in mind the primary purpose of
the exclusionary rule. It has been said that the purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule is twofold: (1) To police the law enforcement
agencies; and (2) To protect the civil rights of citizens by deterring
future illegal searches and seizures by the police. 00 This analysis is
misleading, since the purpose of the rule is not to punish the police,
but to enforce the rights of citizens by deterring future illegal searches
and seizures by the police. It was based on the proposition that the
9 232 U.S. 383'(1914).
7 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
98 See generally discussion notes 100-105 infra.
99 Another difficult problem, not considered in this Note, is what standards would be used
to determine if one individual had violated another's fourth amendment rights.
100 17 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 155, 159'(1960).
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exclusionary rule would have a prospective effect on police be-
havior.'' Thus, it is ineffectual to argue that since civil remedies
are available against the violator there is no need for the exclusionary
rule." An action in trespass may punish the individual, but it is
doubtful that it will have any deterrent effect."3 Even assuming that
a trespasser would consider the possible civil remedies available
against him, he may proceed nevertheless, in the expectation that the
damages he hopes to collect in his civil action will exceed the amount
he may be required to pay in a trespass suit, since such damages are
usually insignificant."°
The reasons for the application of the exclusionary rule in crim-
inal cases are irrelevant when offered to support the proposi-
tion that the rule should apply in civil actions. The statement that it
is logically inconsistent to make the application of the rule depend on
the nature of the trespasser," while reasonable at first glance, is fal-
lacious when examined closely. It is this very difference between the
government and an individual which supplies the rationale for the
exclusionary rule in criminal cases. The police department is in the
business of detecting crime, and supposedly, the exclusion of illegal
evidence in one case will affect its behavior in the future. The only
possible application of such reasoning in private actions would be in
the case of a detective agency, in which case it could be argued that
the exclusion of the evidence would modify their behavior in the
future. In the case of a private citizen, however, his trespass is
usually a singular affair, and thus in the average case the effect of
the rule would be to punish rather than -to deter. The argument that
the trespasser will not win his case if the evidence is excluded' is
not persuasive, since the purpose of the rule is not to prevent the win-
ning of lawsuits, but to deter future illegal searches and seizures.
Thus, the reasons for the exclusionary rule as applied in criminal
101 That this was the main reason for the holding in Mapp can be shown from the Court's
recognition of the failure of other means to deter the police.
In connection with this California case, we note that the second basis elaborated
in Woil in support of its failure to enforce the exclusionary doctrine against the
States was that 'other means of protection' have been afforded 'the right to pri-
vacy.' 338 U.S., at 30. The experience of California that such other remedies have
been worthless and futile is buttressed by the experience of other States. The
obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the protection of other
remedies has, moreover, been recognized by this Court ....
367 U.S. at 651-53. See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
102 See 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 554 (1965).
103 Suppose for example that A sees his wife enter a motel room with B. Is it reasonable
to assume that he will refrain from entering the room for fear of a civil action in
trespass or invasion of privacy?
104 See Note, 72 YALE L.J. 1062, 1071 n.59-60 (1963).
105Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 44, 203 N.E.2d 481, 484, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 86
(1964) (dissenting opinion).
106 See article cited note 100 supra.
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cases are inapplicable in private actions, and the only remaining basis
for its application would be the "intimate relationship" between the
fourth and fifth amendments discussed earlier."° If the searches and
seizures are found to be unconstitutional, the most reasonable grounds
for excluding the evidence will be found in the protection of the fifth
amendment.
C. Equitable Considerations
If reliance upon the Constitution as a means of excluding evi-
dence -in private actions appears too hazardous, there are two other
possibilities. The first is based on the theory that the integrity of the
judicial process requires the exclusion of tainted evidence. It has
been relied on at least incidentally in several cases. In Elkins v.
United States"' the Court, in rejecting the "silver platter" doctrine
said, "But there is another consideration - the imperative of judicial
integrity."'" In Sorrells v. United States,11 Mr. Justice Roberts, in a
concurring opinion, stated:
Always the courts refuse their aid in civil cases to the perpetration
and consummation of an illegal scheme. Invariably they hold a civil
action must be abated if its basis is violation of the decencies of life,
disregard of the rules, statutory or common law, which formulate
the ethics of men's relations to each other. Neither courts of equity
nor those administering legal remedies tolerate the use of their
process to consummate a wrong .... The doctrine rests, rather, on
a fundamental rule of public policy. The protection of its own func-
tions and the preservation of the purity of its own temple belongs
only to the court."'
The principle was stated succinctly in People v. Cahn:112 "Out of re-
gard for its own dignity as an agency of justice and custodian of lib-
erty the court should not have a hand in such 'dirty business.' ""'
However, the above cases were all criminal prosecutions, and the
principle was invoked incidentally. However salutory its purposes, it
would seem a difficult task to convince a court to exclude vital evi-
dence in a civil case solely on this ground.
The second possibility involves the "clean hands" doctrine which
deprives the plaintiff of his cause of action if he has obtained the
right by inequitable means." 4 The most common application of the
doctrine has been to refuse judicial enforcement of illegal schemes,'
10 See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
10 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
109 Id. at 222.
110287 U.S. 435 (1932).
111 d. at 455-57.
11244 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
113 Id., 282 P.2d at 912.
114 See McCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 26 (2d ed. 1948) ; 2 POMEROY, EQuITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 397 (5th ed. 1941).
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or of contracts deemed to be against public policy. " The reasoning
that no one should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong..
appears applicable to a fact situation such as that present in Sackler,
where the wrong was a deliberate planned trespass committed for the
sole purpose of using the results as evidence.'
The real question is whether the policy considerations involved
in the above theories are sufficient to overcome the common law doc-
trine that the manner of obtaining evidence is not cause for its sup-
pression in a civil or criminal proceeding."' The purpose of the ju-
dicial inquiry is the ascertainment of the truth, and all relevant and
reliable evidence should be admitted unless the exclusion of the evi-
dence "has a public good transcending the normally predominant
principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." 2'
Public policy has been deemed sufficiently overriding in the instances
of evidence obtained in the course of a husband and wife relation-
ship, 2' or an attorney and client relationship,'22 but the reasoning
here is founded upon the belief that exclusion of the evidence will
tend to preserve and further such relationships in the future,2 and
such a concept of continuity is lacking in illegal searches by private
persons. The most persuasive principles of public policy would seem
to lie in a synthesis of the values espoused in the "contamination"
and "clean hands" doctrines.
D. Conclusion
In summary, it is evident that the question of the application of
the exclusionary rule to civil cases involves a maze of both legal and
policy questions. If the Constitution is relied upon to exclude the
illegally seized evidence, it must be first determined that private ac-
tion falls within the scope of the fourth amendment. The only pres-
ently apparent ground for doing this is to decide that it would be
"state action" for a court to admit evidence which if seized by the
government would have been illegal. If by the use of this concept,
115 The courts often dismiss actions in which the plaintiff has fraudulently lured the de-
fendant into the jurisdiction in which to obtain service. Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d
313 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Dunlop & Co. v. Cody, 31 Iowa 260 (1871) ; Abercrombie v.
Abercrombie, 64 Kan. 29, 67 Pac. 539 (1902).
116 Crocker v. United States, 240 U.S. 74 (1916); Hazleton v. Sheckels, 202 U.S. 71
(1906).
117 See BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at 952 (Gavit. ed. 1941).
118 33 Misc. 2d 600, 605, 224 N.Y.S.2d 790, 795 (1962).
119 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
1 20EIkins v, United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (dissent by Mr. justice Frank-
furter).
121 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 82 (1954).
1
22 Id. § 91.
123 Id. § 72.
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the first obstacle is thus overcome, there must be adequate policy rea-
sons for excluding the illegally seized evidence. Since the reasons for
exclusion in criminal cases are irrelevant in civil cases, the most logi-
cal ground for exclusion would be the fifth amendment - that by
admitting over objection evidence seized in violation of the fourth
amendment, the witness is being forced to testify against himself. In
order to do this, Mr. Justice Black would have to convince a majority
of the Court that this was why they excluded illegally seized evidence
in criminal and quasi-criminal cases.' Aside from these constitu-
tional grounds, the only other apparent reason for excluding the evi-
dence would be based purely on public policy - the integrity of the
judicial process and the feeling that no one should profit from his
own wrong demand that the tainted evidence be excluded.
In the final analysis it appears that the application of the ex-
clusionary rule in private actions is unlikely. Until more persuasive
constitutional grounds are proposed, there appears to be no basis for
the application of the fourth amendment, and until a better enuncia-
tion of the public policy reasons involved is given, it is submitted
that the courts will not so hinder the judicial process in its ascertain-
ment of the truth.
Harry N. MacLean
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